

JOURNAL *of* CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOLUME XIV

JANUARY, 1955

NUMBER FOUR

GERMAN EASTWARD EXPANSION, FACT AND FICTION:

A Study in German-Ottoman Trade Relations

1890-1914

by M. L. Flaningam

THE DEUTSCHE Bank, under the direction of Georg von Siemens, symbolized the aggressive spirit of German economic expansion overseas at the turn of the twentieth century. One of the primary objectives of the Deutsche Bank was to facilitate the commercial relations between Germany and overseas markets. Siemens sought to achieve independence and supremacy in the field of foreign trade from England. His views were crystallized and expressed in a definitive manner by Dr. Karl Helfferich.¹

What Siemens and Helfferich pronounced in the economic field Marschall von Bieberstein and the Kaiser affirmed in the political realm. The former wrote to Chancellor von Hohenlohe in March, 1898, in regard to German opportunities in the Ottoman Empire that there was ". . . plenty of scope for useful future expansion, for solid enterprises, employing German capital and German industry. There are, quite apart from special services for the army, railways, ports, and bridges to build, electrical works to erect for lighting, tramways, etc. and the really wretched conditions of most of the steamers that ply regularly here offer good chances for German competition. We shall naturally not be left alone to do all this, and certain concessions will be granted to others. But one thing we must claim for ourselves and that is the connecting up of the present sphere of interests of the Anatolian Railways with the river districts of the Tigris and Euphrates, and so on to the Persian Gulf."² On the margin of the latter statement the Kaiser wrote: "Without a doubt."

The expansion of foreign trade was pursued as a means of increasing the power of the state by Bismarck's successors. This was especially notable under Chancellors Caprivi and von Bülow. Anxiety relative to German

¹Helfferich, Karl, *Georg von Siemens: Ein Lebensbild aus Deutschlands grosser Zeit*, Berlin, 1923.

²Marschall to Hohenlohe, March 5, 1898. *German Diplomatic Documents, 1871 to 1914*, II, 467-68, E. T. S. Dugdale, London, 1929. Marschall was German Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire at this time.

trade competition was revealed in the British press, in the annual consular reports, and in Parliament after 1890. A climax was reached in the Bagdad railway controversy after 1900.

Historians and economists have established the concept of pre-war German conquest of the foreign trade of the world.³ That German political leaders sought to accomplish such an objective can be readily substantiated even without the flamboyant and irresponsible statements of the Kaiser. There are, however, distinctions to be made between ambitious policies to be achieved and the realities of the moment. There are also distinctions to be drawn between political considerations and the economic facts essential to those considerations. What the German leaders willed, what their competitors abroad feared and finally came to believe, was one thing and what the Germans actually achieved in the field of foreign trade expansion was quite another matter. This is especially notable when examined on an area-time pattern. A case in point is the record of German-Ottoman relations after 1890.

It must be stressed initially that the foreign trade of the Ottoman Empire was increasing generally, in these years, with all countries. The position of the German trade came to be outstanding by reason of the open and concentrated effort which the Germans made to expand their Ottoman trade whereas their competitors did not. Secondly, the German trade record is remarkable more for the rapid rate of its increase, between 1890 and 1914, rather than for the actual volume or value of the trade. Finally, the subject of trade relations became absorbed in the political developments of the period. The result, all too frequently, was a gross distortion between economic realities and political motives whether viewed from the position of Germany, the Ottoman Empire, or from that of a third state.

The assumption is frequently made that economic expansion by one state in the domain of another leads to political influence and, perhaps, control.⁴ German economic expansion in the Ottoman Empire after 1890 would automatically lead to German political control. This view was widely held among Germany's competitors at the time. Such a concept is not necessarily true in every instance and proved to be unfounded in the particular instance under study. Extenuating and conditioning factors and many variables, both political and economic, must be taken into consideration in each case. Commerce may serve as a measure in the case of German-Ottoman relations.

³For example, Earle, E. M., *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railroad*, (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1923), Hoffman, R. J. S., *Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914*, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938) and Feis, Herbert, *Europe, the World's Banker*, (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1930).

⁴Hirschman, Albert O., *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade*, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1945). I have adhered to Hirschman's theories on foreign trade in evaluating the data in this topic.

Political Factors

Great caution should be used in citing German trade advances in the Ottoman Empire as evidence of political influence and control. This is particularly true if it is designed to show a corresponding decline of British and French interests in this area as a result of German efforts. The fact that the Ottoman Empire entered the European War in 1914 on the side of the Central Powers is also misleading. This event cannot be assumed to be a logical consequence of prior economic developments. It is not to be implied, however, from the record of trade relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire that German political penetration did not take place or that it was of minor importance. On the contrary, German trade relations were not commensurate with German political ambitions in the Ottoman Empire.

In order to make it clear that the Ottoman Empire was in the economic as well as the political orbit of Germany by 1914, trade statistics and their analysis frequently incorporate Austria-Hungary and Italy, i.e., the orbit of the Triple Alliance.⁵ This is essentially unsound both upon a political and an economic basis. By combining the trade statistics of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy with the Ottoman Empire and comparing the total with that of Great Britain or France the mathematical result will give the desired political conclusion, i.e., the Triple Alliance had captured the commerce of the Ottoman Empire by 1914. In describing and defining a German economic expansion in the Ottoman Empire, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and the Triple Alliance may not be used. These are, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, separate political concepts.

As early as 1900 a Franco-Italian rapprochement was in the making and by the time of the Algeiras Conference, 1906, it was clear to all concerned that Italy was at the "diplomatic bargaining counter." Italy had a foot in both political camps. It was partly for this reason that Germany did not entertain any illusions as to the value of Italy as an ally. From 1900 onward the Italian position was increasingly independent of Germany and the Germans had no regard for Italian interests. Italy was largely of a nuisance value to Germany vis-à-vis France in the German scheme of things. For these reasons, the trade statistics of Italy, as a member of the Triple Alliance, with the Ottoman Empire may not be calculated as evidence that the latter was within the economic orbit of Germany and the Central Powers.

Meanwhile, Austria-Hungary was actually competing with the German trade interests in the Ottoman Empire. Politically, Austria-Hungary, as an ally of Germany, became increasingly more concerned with Balkan affairs than with the Ottoman Empire. The exact reverse was true in the case of Germany. German interests in the Balkans were largely as an ally of Austria-Hungary but in the Ottoman Empire the German political interests were immediate and direct.

⁵Earle, E. M., *Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railroad*, p. 107.

Trade Data

The first two tables below will indicate both the general increase in the value of the foreign trade of the Ottoman Empire and the relative importance of the six major powers in the Empire's trade. The degree and rate of change may also be derived therefrom.

These and subsequent tables may also be used to indicate the degree to which Germany reduced its dependence upon the Ottoman Empire while at the same time increasing the dependence of the Ottoman Empire upon Germany. In this manner Germany could increase its power position in the Ottoman Empire.

TABLE I⁶

IMPORTS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM THE SIX
LEADING GREAT POWERS (in millions of dollars)

Year	Germany	Austria- Hungary	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Russia
1890	8.5					
1891	9.2					
1892	9.92					
1893	10.2					
1894	8.6					
1895	9.5	17.5*	26.5	9.5*	2.6*	6.4*
1896	7.0	16.8*	25.0	8.4*	2.8*	7.0*
1897	7.7		32.5			
1898	9.2	20.8	31.0	9.9*	5.5*	7.0*
1899	8.1	18.4	26.5	11.8*	5.3*	8.0*
1900	8.5	13.3	26.5	7.4	7.4	8.3*
1901	9.3	14.2	34.0	9.5	10.9	
1902	10.8	15.3	30.2	9.3	10.1	
1903	12.5	16.2	27.6	9.1	11.3	
1904	18.75	19.4	32.0	10.2	13.3	
1905	17.7	19.1	34.8	10.6	14.3	7.2*
1906	17.0	23.1	42.7	12.0	17.5	
1907	20.3	22.5	36.8	11.6	15.7	
1908	16.0	17.3	36.3	12.9	14.6	9.9*
1909	19.5	19.2	39.0	13.6	16.6	
1910	26.2	26.8	44.2	14.6	23.7	12.3*
1911	28.2	30.0*	43.7*	17.3*	10.8*	13.7*
1912	28.2					
1913	24.6	26.3	34.8	15.4	11.5	15.0

* Indicates the period March 13 to March 12 rather than the calendar year.

⁶This Table and Table II are based upon an adaptation from the following sources for each of the years indicated: *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Reich, Deutsches Handels-*

TABLE II

EXPORTS OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE TO THE SIX
LEADING GREAT POWERS (in millions of dollars)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Germany</i>	<i>Austria- Hungary</i>	<i>United Kingdom</i>	<i>France</i>	<i>Italy</i>	<i>Russia</i>
1890	2.4					
1891	3.5					
1892	7.2					
1893	4.1					
1894	4.7					
1895	5.5	7.6*	28.75	11.8*	2.2*	1.6*
1896	6.5	5.9*	25.85	18.4*	1.187*	1.62*
1897	7.6	4.9*	31.0	17.1*		
1898	7.3		25.0		2.1*	1.87*
1899	7.2	5.9*	25.0	19.0*	2.8*	2.18*
1900	7.6	8.8	28.0	21.5	5.6	
1901	7.5	7.9	28.7	20.0	6.5	1.86*
1902	9.1	8.8	30.5	20.7	7.2	
1903	9.4	10.0	28.0	20.3	9.5	
1904	10.8	9.7	30.6	18.2	7.8	
1905	12.9	9.8	29.7	20.2	10.5	2.33*
1906	13.7	9.8	32.3	22.6	11.2	
1907	13.7	8.6	34.1	23.8	12.6	
1908	11.9	9.0	27.3	17.6	11.1	2.2*
1909	14.3	9.1	27.3	19.7	14.7	
1910	16.8	10.8	25.1	19.2	12.0	
1911	17.5					
1912	19.4					
1913	18.5	9.5	20.0	18.4	3.9	3.5*

* Indicates the period March 13 to March 12 rather than the calendar year.

There are a number of significant observations to be made relative to the foreign trade of the Ottoman Empire. Germany's position rose the most rapidly of all and the increases took place primarily in the ten years, 1903 to 1913. Prior to this the growth of German trade was comparatively steady. It was not until after 1902 that Germany's position in the Ottoman trade approached that of Austria-Hungary.

The British trade remained remarkably steady throughout the entire period. It declined sharply only in 1899 and 1900 due largely to the Boer War and the Boxer Rebellion and again in 1908 when nearly all Ottoman trade declined because of the Young Turk revolt.

archiv, the *Statesman's Yearbook*, *United States Consular Reports*. In these tables the German mark is based at 25 cents, the British pound at \$5.00, the French franc at 20 cents and the Turkish piastre at 4 cents. Also see Earle, op. cit., pp. 104-105 for a comparison.

Of the six powers only France imported more than it exported to the Ottoman Empire throughout the period. Furthermore, French imports from the Ottoman Empire exceeded those of both Germany and Austria-Hungary. In some years, notably from 1896 to 1903, French imports exceeded the combined imports of Germany and Austria-Hungary from the Ottoman Empire.

The Italian position was equal to that of Germany in showing the greatest degree of upward change in the value of trade with the Ottoman Empire. In view of the contrast in the domestic economies of Italy and Germany at this time the Italian position was pivotal in a political sense depending upon whether it remained a valid member of the Triple Alliance, oriented with France, or remained an independent force.

In spite of the traditional enmity between Turkey and Russia and the latter's relentless stand against any changes which might enhance the power and wealth of the Sultan's domain, the trade between them was significant and indicated some increase in value over the years.

What factors delimited the position of the German trade with the Ottoman Empire? Some of these factors are overlooked in the diplomatic studies. Germany's trade expansion after 1890 was based, in part, upon a vigorous effort to arrive at favorable tariff and commercial treaties with other states. The Caprivi treaties of the 1890's and those concluded by von Bülow, 1904 to 1906, had as their express purpose the fostering of the German export trade.⁷ In the case of the Ottoman Empire, the possibility of Germany gaining an economic advantage through the conclusion of desirable tariff and commercial treaties was at an absolute minimum. The Sultan's government was not a free agent in determining its own position in this regard. Any real change in Turkey's tariff and commercial policies had to meet the approval of all the creditor powers. The Germans learned this in their financing of the Anatolian and Bagdad Railroads.⁸ Prior to 1908 the Ottoman Empire maintained an eight per cent *ad valorem* import tariff and a one per cent export tariff except on cereals. The Germans did not and could not reduce this by commercial negotiations. Quite the contrary for, in 1907, the creditor powers permitted a three per cent increase in the Ottoman tariff for seven years.⁹ Every attempt which Germany made to negotiate a commercial treaty with the Sublime Porte or to assert the right of the latter to regulate its own commerce proved futile. The most-favored-nation principle continued to govern German-Ottoman trade relations. This principle was scarcely the basis upon which the Germans might launch an aggressive program of trade expansion, yet they succeeded in doing so. Thus, it may be concluded, German trade expansion with the Ottoman Empire took place without the special benefits and privileges that

⁷Reichsamt des Innern, *Reichsgesetzblatt*, (Berlin, 1892 to 1894 and 1905 and 1906). The texts of the commercial treaties concluded by Caprivi and von Bülow with the countries of central and southeastern Europe portray their policies.

⁸Wolf, John B., *The Diplomatic History of the Bagdad Railroad*, (University of Missouri Studies, 1933), pp. 12-18. See also, Feis, XIV, XV.

⁹*Statesman's Yearbook*, 1907, 1536; 1908, 1573.

might be derived from a comprehensive commercial and tariff agreement program. This fact is in contrast to German trade relations with the Balkan states where such treaties did exist.

German Methods

The character of foreign trade is often more significant than the value of it in determining the extent of the economic influence asserted and of the political implications, if any, that may be observed. What was unique in the German trade with the Ottoman Empire from which one might conclude an evidence of German economic control? With the exception of a marked increase in rails and other essentials to railroad construction, German exports to the Ottoman Empire were all in the same categories as those of other countries trading with the Empire. Even in the case of rails and railroad equipment the Germans had no monopoly. For example, one United States firm alone, in 1906-07, shipped 20,000 tons of rails to the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰

It was the methods used and the competition of the German rather than the volume, character, or value of their trade increase that attracted the contemporary attention and criticism of other powers. Whenever an item was sold by a foreign firm the Germans entered the market and sold it on better terms. Lower prices and easier credit terms offered by the Germans than their competitors were either willing or able to do facilitated the expansion of German trade in the Ottoman Empire. The fact that the British, Americans, and other western powers made no real effort to expand their own trade or to compete with the Germans on the same basis also made the German trade expansion appear more remarkable than it actually was. The only field where other foreign powers attempted to challenge the Germans was in the battle for economic concessions from the Sultan and in the international political arena.

"The English have large commercial interests which have been established for a century or more. They are very conservative and have not expanded as might have been expected . . . The French have heavy investments in the railways and harbors works, but their import trade is larger than their export commerce with Turkey. The Austrians have certain lines of business to which they confine themselves. The Italians are very prominent and have the largest colonies, . . . The Greeks . . . are the most numerous nationality."¹¹

But the Germans got much of the new business and undercut the old, the author might have added.

But there were further limitations to the apparent German conquest of the Ottoman trade. With the exception of railroad and harbor improvements, the German exports to the Ottoman Empire were not generally of such a character as to enhance the economic development of this area of the world. In the long run economic view, a real German conquest of the

¹⁰Department of Commerce and Labor: "Report on Trade Conditions in Asiatic Turkey," C. M. Pepper, (Washington, D. C., 1907) p. 14.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 32.

Ottoman Empire's economy needed to harness German technology and Turkish resources. The needs of the Ottoman Empire were great and so were the capacities of the Germans to fill them, particularly in the technological field. The actual commerce between the two empires does not, however, reveal that the Germans met the needs and opportunities which the Ottoman Empire offered. Local industrialization under German direction and initial leadership was essential if the Germans sought to harness the Ottoman Empire to the economy of the Reich. True, the Germans had blueprints for irrigation projects and they made initial efforts in the field of petroleum and other mining projects but these had to await the outcome of the Bagdad Railroad project.¹² Moreover, the German efforts to develop the native resources came late in the period. German-Ottoman trade relations do not justify the concept that the position of the other powers in the Ottoman Empire was seriously jeopardized at any time, though some, particularly the British, liked to think so at the time.¹³

Major changes in the general economic life of the Ottoman Empire were necessary before the importation of large scale industrial goods was possible. Two obstacles in the way of such changes were the Sultan and his government and the inadequacies of internal transportation. The Sultan was generally opposed to western innovations unless he was convinced they would facilitate his control over the Ottoman Empire. Changes in internal transportation meant railroads and this subject was hopelessly lost in international power politics. Consequently, a serious limitation on the importation not only of agricultural implements but of mining, electrical, and heavy industrial equipment existed prior to 1914. It was not until after 1906 that a future in the electrical industry could be contemplated and this possibility was limited to the Mediterranean littoral.¹⁴

Since the Ottoman Empire was largely agrarian in economy the import of agricultural equipment and supplies other than implements would seem to be a major factor in trade relations. But it remained largely potential. Germany did not participate in the limited trade in agricultural equipment to any appreciable extent. Little modern equipment or methods were used in the Ottoman Empire. The illiteracy of the agrarian population, their poverty, and the type of farming methods used reduced the possibility of expanding the import of agricultural supplies. The economy and education of the agrarian population had to be substantially raised before anyone could hope to export much in the line of agricultural supplies to Asiatic Turkey.

On the other hand the Ottoman Empire was a fast expanding field for the import of consumer items. Contrary to the general concept in the western world, the Moslem East was fast changing and was becoming westernized after 1890. It was here that the Germans made their greatest

¹²Henderson, W. O., *German Economic Penetration in the Middle East, 1870-1914*, (*The Economic History Review*, London, 1948), XVIII, 54.

¹³Hoffman, R. J. S., *Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914*, (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1938), pp. 139-167.

¹⁴"Trade Conditions in Asiatic Turkey", 15 ff.

gains. Although they had to compete with the older and more firmly established businesses of the other Great Powers, the Germans were willing to take calculated risks in dealing with the local importers and the local market.

At least four factors facilitated the German trade advance in the field of consumer items. Easy credit terms, cheaper goods, cheaper transportation costs and the use of commercial travelers were the principal assets to German trade expansion.

The Germans were willing to deal directly through local importers and to extend long term credit to their customers. Such practices must have been effective or the Germans would not have continued their policy. The British and American and other foreign firms frequently regarded local importers and business firms as unreliable in business methods and unsound financial risks.

The Germans exported everything from pocket-knives to bicycles and bathtubs to the Middle East in these years. All one had to do was to demonstrate the article before the prospective Moslem customer in the market-place in order to establish an outlet for one's goods.¹⁵ German goods were frequently cheaper item for item than those of other countries because they were willing to sell at an initial loss in order to get a foothold in the market. This together with long term, easy credit and lower costs made it possible for the Germans to market items at a lower price than their competitors.

The Germans early established direct shipping contacts with the Middle East. This explains, in part, their interest in harbor improvements in the Ottoman Empire. There were three main German shipping lines: the German *Levant Line*, established in 1889, the *North German Lloyd*, in 1905, and the *Hamburg-American Line*, in 1906. All three maintained direct contacts between German ports and those of Asiatic Turkey for purposes of freight transportation. The latter line created the most political furor because it alone maintained service between Basra, the Persian Gulf port, and Germany. This was a gross effrontery to the British monopoly of the Persian Gulf of a century's duration. The date it was established, 1906, undoubtedly added to the anti-German sentiment in the British press at the time, in view of the Bagdad Railroad issue.

In addition to the methods which the Germans used as suggested above, they also had the advantage of the system of through rates both by rail and sea. This procedure meant lower freight costs, lower prices to the consumer and faster transit. The advantage the Germans enjoyed thereby was further increased by the failure of the British and other foreign competitors to adopt the same procedure. Here again Germany's competitors complained and protested against German expansion but they apparently could never bring themselves to adopt German methods or to devise new and original techniques of their own by which they could offset the German gains.

¹⁵"Report on the Trade Conditions in Asiatic Turkey," p. 30.

But for all this German effort most of the trade with the Ottoman Empire had to go by the sea routes which remained under the domination of the British navy. By 1914 the German trade with the Ottoman Empire was still second to that of Great Britain and their rate of increase paralleled that of Italy. Finally, the total trade of Germany with the Ottoman Empire was never more than a small fraction of the total foreign trade of Germany.¹⁶ For example, in 1910, the total imports of Germany from the entire Ottoman Empire including European Turkey amounted to only 0.7 per cent of Germany's total imports. Of Germany's total foreign exports that which went to the Ottoman Empire, in 1910, constituted only 1.4 per cent.¹⁷

There yet remained one additional feature of the German methods for trade expansion. The comprehensive program of commercial travelers came to be symbolic of the German foreign economic policy. Although most nations used to some degree a system of commercial agents abroad, the Germans developed this method to a remarkable degree. In the case of the Ottoman Empire the Germans were not alone in this respect nor was their system peculiar to the area under view. Commercial representatives of nearly every western power were to be found throughout the Middle East by 1914. This fact attests further that the Germans had not conquered the Ottoman market. Wherein, then, did the German agents have an advantage over their competitors? As in the case of the Balkans, when the German agent went out to his assigned area he was familiar with the language, habits, wants, needs, and business methods of his prospective customer. He supplied commercial literature printed in the language of the market and in the system of weights, measures, and monetary terms of the area. The German commercial traveler was willing to deal directly with the consumer market and the local merchant-importer. The British and Americans dealt largely through their consular agents and in the English language, system of weights and measures, and they were far more reluctant than the Germans to establish contractual relations with local merchants and customers.¹⁸ If only for this reason, it is not too surprising that the Germans made gains in the retail market.

Character of the Trade

One of the principal categories of foreign import into the Ottoman Empire was textiles, both retail goods and cloth. Within this category the German trade was chiefly in woolen goods. Nearly all of the cotton goods imported into the Ottoman Empire came from other countries, principally Great Britain. Even within the woolen trade the German articles were of a coarser and more common grade. Woolen shawls from Germany and the

¹⁶Sombart, Werner von, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im neunzehnten Jahrhundert und im Anfang des zwanzigsten Jahrhundert*. (Berlin, Dunker und Humblot, 1923). pp. 526-527.

¹⁷*Ibid.* Also see, *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Reich* for these years.

¹⁸*Parliamentary Papers: House Sessional Papers; Accounts and Papers*, "Commercial Reports" (Annual Series), (London, H. M. Stationery Office, 1888-1914). The consular reports of Great Britain throughout the Near East uniformly and almost annually complained and protested to the home office in this matter.

fez or tarbouche from Austria were the most steady imports of the Ottoman Empire from those countries.

The rise of the German dye industry tended to help German yarns somewhat because of the fact that the German colors were more lasting. Throughout the period, however, German textiles had little hope of equaling their competition from Great Britain, France, and Italy. The British had both volume and value in all classifications while the French and Italian textiles excelled in quality. The principal textile centers in Asiatic Turkey were Smyrna, Beirut, and Damascus but the data on the trade, its origins, and title are unreliable because of the questionable, if not outright illegal, practices of both foreign importers and local merchants. The export statistics of each of the powers must be used in each case. This much is clear, however. The bulk of the textile imports of the Ottoman Empire were cottons in which the British, not the Germans, maintained a clear and consistent supremacy.

The detailed character of such bulk trade between Germany and the Ottoman Empire may be better observed from the following table.¹⁹

TABLE III

GERMANY'S EXPORTS TO THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1910-1911
(in metric tons)

	1910	1911
1. Cotton cloth**:	1,908 (29,124) *	1,890 (29,972)
2. Wool fabric for clothes:	2,889 (25,071)	2,074 (24,240)
3. Ready made clothes**:	122 (8,655)	108 (8,614)
4. Leather for shoes, boots, etc.:	60 (8,301)	85 (8,937)
5. Hose, stockings of all kinds:	523 (8,585)	454 (8,044)
6. Analin, coal tar dyes and by-products:	268 (52,480)	293 (49,997)
7. Malleable bar iron:	5,573 (668,400)	9,154 (780,827)
8. Railroad ties, spikes, etc.:	17,812 (162,990)	19,448 (123,931)
9. Railroad rails:	15,749 (515,722)	26,840 (520,120)
10. Bridge iron, forged steel scaffolding, etc.**:	2,793 (25,269)	6,753 (30,023)

* Figures in parentheses represent total German export of the item.

** To European Turkey only.

¹⁹*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Reich*, (Berlin, 1912-1913), v. 33, 188-243.

11. Miscellaneous forged ironwares:	1,146 (47,003)	1,729 (59,840)
12. Vessels, freight cars. etc., without motors***:	2,365 (43,737)	1,580 (34,840)
13. Copper products***:	566 (5,937)	579 (6,697)
14. Locomotives (steam) without tenders:	1,304 (31,400)	1,280 (48,184)
15. Cases of loaded ammunition:	4,204 (6,875)	1,866 (4,232)
16. Ships, ocean going, power driver:	5	2
(Number of; not metric tons)		

*** To Asiatic Turkey only.

The small number of major categories and the contrast between the volume export to the Ottoman Empire and total foreign export of Germany in each case serves to illustrate further the relatively minor position of the Ottoman Empire in Germany's export trade. If the British and other foreign powers were alarmed by the expansion of the German export trade in the Ottoman Empire, their alarm was misplaced except in an anticipatory sense. Germany exported more goods to Great Britain itself and to other overseas markets than it did to the Middle East. In the matter of wool fabric in 1910 and 1911 Germany exported to Great Britain 3399 and 3368 metric tons respectively.²⁰ It is also interesting to note that Germany's trade with various South American countries usually exceeded that with the Ottoman Empire before 1914. Germany's trade with Argentina increased from 593 million marks in 1908, to 625 million marks, in 1911, with German exports showing the greatest gain. With Brazil the German trade increased from 283 million marks, in 1908, to 472 million marks in 1911 with German exports increasing almost 100 per cent. In each case there was a greater variety and volume of goods than in the German-Ottoman trade.²¹

Germany's imports from the Ottoman Empire were even more limited and significant for the absence of industrial raw materials in any appreciable degree. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that geography was basically against any real German eastward expansion in an economic sense, though not necessarily in a political sense. Industrial raw materials and industrial goods in German foreign trade depended on the sea lanes. The Danube river flowed in the wrong direction and the Bagdad Railroad, even if it achieved maximum extent and efficiency, could not be expected to supplant the sea routes as the principal avenue of commerce. Air transportation and oil pipe-lines were in the unknown future.

²⁰*Ibid.*

²¹*Ibid.*, pp. 256-278.

TABLE IV²²

GERMANY'S IMPORTS FROM THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1910-1911

(in metric tons)

	1910	1911
1. Raw Cotton:	800	467
	(402,428)	(444,017) *
2. Eggs**:	1,096	1,058
	(157,871)	(157,214)
3. Hides, skins for the manufacture of leather goods**:	34	24
	(3,651)	(3,058)
4. Hazelnuts and other nutmeats***:	3,493	3,472
	(9,593)	(10,889)
5. Raw silk***:	52	43
	(3,800)	(3,574)
6. Raisins***:	13,368	13,577
	(16,140)	(19,577)
7. Tobacco (leaf):	6,376	6,599
	(65,269)	(72,101)
8. Carpeting, floor covering made of other than coarse animal hair:	783	774
	(910)	(1,019)

* Figures in parentheses represent the total German importation of the category.

** From European Turkey only.

*** From Asiatic Turkey only.

In the case of raw cotton above, Germany imported most of it in these years from Egypt. In fact, in analysing Germany's foreign trade in the prewar years one observes that Egypt frequently loomed larger than the Middle East in diversity of goods exchanged and in the volume and value of the commerce. In the case of raisins and carpeting the difference between the importation from the Ottoman Empire and the total is to be assigned to Persia. Although Turkish tobacco was but a small percentage of the total German importation it obtained a higher price than that from other sources.

A close analysis of German imports from the Ottoman Empire over the entire period reveals that there was no substantial increase in the diversity of the goods involved. The total volume of the trade, both imports and exports, remained quite small in relationship to the total foreign trade of both empires. More important than these two considerations is the fact that the position of the other powers, engaged in trade with the Ottoman Empire, was not seriously jeopardized by the apparent rapidity in the rise

²²*Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Reich*, (Berlin, 1912-1913), pp. 183-243.

of the German export trade. Indeed, all countries with any record between 1890 and 1914 in the Ottoman Empire experienced an increase in the volume and value of their trade. Even France, which always imported more than it exported to the Ottoman Empire, experienced a substantial increase in its exports between 1890 and 1914.²³

A geographical approach may also be used in an analysis of German trade with the Ottoman Empire. Whereas the other powers, Great Britain in particular, traded with the Ottoman Empire as a unit, the German trade may be divided into clearly defined zones. These zones were European Turkey, Asia Minor and Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and the Mediterranean littoral. In the first two zones Germany had an initial advantage after the Anatolian Railroad was built and it was here that the Germans made their greatest gains. In the remaining zones, particularly Mesopotamia, the Germans encountered the stiffest competition to their trade expansion by the other powers. By 1914 these latter zones remained in non-German control and were primarily British in their trade relations. But the Germans remained persistent in their advance. In fact, the penetration of German trade, as well as the Bagdad Railroad issue, probably facilitated the Anglo-Russian rapprochement after 1907 relative to Persia. The division of Persia into three zones consisting of the Russian sphere in the north and the British in the south with a zone between them was designed, in part, to thwart further German expansion in that direction. The Germans were undaunted and pursued their interests relentlessly. But in a strictly economic sense and in a final analysis the German position, by 1914, must be regarded as anticipatory. What concerned the British and Russians more, relative to the Germans in Mesopotamia and Persia, were the German intentions and the potential capacity of the Germans to fulfill those intentions. The Germans, for their part, were alarmed lest an Anglo-Russian combination would seal German interests out of the area entirely. The Germans clamored for an "open door" and regarded both Mesopotamia and the "neutral" zone of Persia as open to them. The Germans made no attempt to disguise their intents and interests for they presented their plans directly to the other powers on the spot. The establishment of a strong consular office at Basra, the Hamburg-American line in the Persian Gulf, and an able minister at Teheran, an extension of the Bagdad Railroad via Khanikin to the Persian frontier, a branch of the *Deutsche Orientbank* at Teheran, and a German College at Teheran, and all accomplished between 1905 and 1910, left little doubt of German intentions for the future.²⁴

Conclusions

In retrospect, Germany's trade with the Ottoman Empire was a contributory factor to rather than a source of the political tensions among the European powers in the Middle East. The fact that the Ottoman trade

²³See Tables I and II above.

²⁴Herr Stemrich was appointed German Minister to Teheran in 1906. He had been the German Consul-General at Constantinople.

was only a small fraction of the total German foreign trade should not be interpreted to minimize German political ambitions and influence. But the alarm expressed by Germany's competitors in the economic field was based upon the political implications to be derived from the rapid expansion of German trade and economic interests in the Ottoman Empire after 1890. It was the rapidity and the vigor with which German trade developed that alarmed the British and other foreign interests. A combination of German aggressiveness in trade expansion, the hostility of the British press, and the pressure of certain vested interests on 10 Downing Street was probably responsible for the reversal of the Lansdowne policy from one of sympathetic interest to one of open hostility to the German position relative to the Bagdad Railroad.

It may now be observed that by 1914 competitive German trade expansion had neither dislodged nor seriously jeopardized that of other nations with the Ottoman Empire. This is in contrast to the prevailing view in most quarters at that time. German overseas economic interests were so diversified and widespread that in any one area at any precise moment they were liable to be distinctly limited. Moreover, German capital for overseas expansion was always less than that of her principal competitors, Great Britain and the United States. To paraphrase Professor Feis, German capital went about as far as it could.²⁵ And this was not far enough to do really permanent damage to the British and other foreign interests in the Ottoman Empire.

Only in an anticipatory sense was German trade and general economic expansion in the Ottoman Empire a source of genuine anxiety in foreign circles. It was that which the Germans were potentially capable of achieving in the future, more than their actual accomplishments in these years, which reasonably formed the basis of a fear of German eastward expansion. But such a future was predicated upon peace indefinitely, whereas war, not peace, confronted the Powers in 1914.

PURDUE UNIVERSITY

²⁵Feis, p. 353.

A PROPOSED COMPROMISE OVER DANZIG IN 1939?

by Gerhard L. Weinberg

ALTHOUGH the general outlines of German-Polish relations in the last year before the outbreak of World War II have been known for some time, a number of important details are only now coming to light. As additional documents are published and some of the archives opened, it will become possible to trace the development of German-Polish relations with increasing precision. One of the problems which needs investigation as new material becomes available is the question of whether and under what conditions either country was willing to compromise on any of the issues which arose. The positions actually assumed by the two countries and the outcome of the negotiations will be understandable only when the various possibilities considered during the period from October, 1938—August, 1939, have been clarified.

The problems raised in the negotiations ranged from the intended issuance of certain Polish stamps considered offensive by the Germans to the German demand that Poland adhere to the Anticomintern Pact. The question raised first and the one most in the public eye was the issue of Danzig. This city, together with its environs, had been made a Free City under the protection of the League of Nations by the Treaty of Versailles.¹ By the end of 1938, its status as a territory separate from Germany was still intact. Shortly after Hitler's statement that the Sudetenland was Germany's last territorial demand, the Germans on October 24, 1938, asked Poland to agree to the incorporation of Danzig into Germany.² Jozef Lipski, the Polish Ambassador, immediately warned German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop that Poland could not be expected to agree to this but acceded to Ribbentrop's request that he go to Warsaw to discuss the matter with Polish Foreign Minister Jozef Beck.³

The instructions which Lipski obtained from Beck for his reply to the German foreign minister contained a lengthy exposition of the Polish attitude toward some of the demands made by Ribbentrop. The instructions included proposals for changing the status of Danzig but also contained the

¹For the relevant provisions of the treaty, together with a summary of developments between 1920 and 1939, see U.S., Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1919, The Paris Peace Conference*, Vol. XIII (Washington, 1947), pp. 241-62.

²Lipski to Beck, 25 Oct. 1938, *The Polish White Book* (New York, 1940), No. 44, p. 47; Memorandum of Hewel, *Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 1918-1945*, Series D, Vol. V, *Polen, Südosteuropa, Lateinamerika, Klein- und Mittelstaaten, Juni 1937-März 1939* (Baden-Baden, 1953) (hereafter cited as *German Documents, Germ. ed.*), No. 81, p. 88. *U. S. ed.* A cut and revised version of Hewel's memorandum was published by the German government as No. 197 in *Zweites Weissbuch der deutschen Regierung* (Basel, 1940) (hereafter cited as *German White Book*).

³Lipski appears to have thought at first that Ribbentrop was acting to some extent on his own initiative and without specific instructions from Hitler (Jean Szeimbek, *Journal 1933-1939* [Paris, 1952], 29 Oct. 1938, p. 366, 22 Nov. 1938, p. 379). This is now definitely proved wrong by a document which shows that at that time Hitler discussed the demands being made on Poland with at least one of his ministers (Tödt to Ribbentrop, 27 Oct. 1938, *German Documents, Germ. ed.*, No. 86, p. 95).

statement that the "Polish Government must state that . . . any attempt to incorporate the Free City into the Reich, must inevitably lead to a conflict."⁴ The term "conflict" in the context of the document did not necessarily mean war, but the implication was still there. Accordingly, when Lipski saw Ribbentrop again on November 19, he warned the German foreign minister of the danger of an annexation of Danzig for good German-Polish relations.⁵ In the subsequent discussions, the Germans nevertheless continued to insist that the Free City must be incorporated into Germany, while the Poles continued to object to this as inadmissible.⁶ Was any effort made to find a middle way?

From the material available now, there is no evidence to indicate that any thought was given by the German government to plans for a possible compromise of the Danzig question. When Ribbentrop was in Warsaw at the end of January, 1939, an agreement was reached to the effect that Germany and Poland would consult with each other in case the League of Nations withdrew from Danzig, and would respect the *status quo* until a new arrangement had been agreed upon.⁷ This agreement was not considered a compromise solution by the Germans who continued to demand Polish agreement to the annexation of Danzig.

In recently published material there are signs that within the Polish government some thought was given to a possible compromise. Although the proposals considered were never formally presented to the German government, a brief examination of them may help illuminate Polish policy in the last months before the war and indicate some avenues for exploring whatever additional evidence on this period may yet be made available.

In the period immediately after the Ribbentrop-Lipski conversation of November 19, some consideration was given to the possibility of a compromise on the question of a road across the Corridor which had also been raised by the Germans.⁸ It was arranged that Beck should meet Hitler and Ribbentrop at the beginning of January, 1939, while Ribbentrop was to visit Warsaw later in the same month.⁹ Beck appears to have thought that there was some chance of a settlement as a result of these conferences,¹⁰ but

⁴Beck to Lipski, 31 Oct. 1938, *Polish White Book*, No. 45, p. 50.

⁵Lipski to Beck, 19 Nov. 1938, *Polish White Book*, No. 46, p. 50; Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 19 Nov. 1938, *German Documents, Germ. ed.*, No. 101, p. 107. Because German propaganda wanted to associate the Polish attitude on Danzig with the guarantee given Poland by Great Britain more than four months later, the passage containing Lipski's warning and Ribbentrop's answer to it were cut out of Ribbentrop's memorandum as published in the *German White Book*, (No. 198).

⁶*Polish White Book*, Nos. 47-49, 52, 61-64; Szembek, pp. 385, 404-06, 411, 414-17; *German Documents, Germ. ed.*, Nos. 112, 119-20, 126; *German White Book*, Nos. 203, 208, 211.

⁷*Polish White Book*, Nos. 52-53; Memorandum of Ribbentrop, 1 Feb. 1939, *German Documents, Germ. ed.*, No. 126, p. 140. See also, Szembek, pp. 411-15; Paul Otto Schmidt *Statistik auf diplomatischer Bühne* (Bonn, 1949), pp. 425-27; Bruno Peter Kleist, *Zwischen Hitler und Stalin* (Bonn, 1950), pp. 17-23.

⁸Szembek, 22 Nov. 1938, p. 380, 6 Dec. 1938, p. 383, 7 Dec. 1938, p. 385; Memorandum of Hewel, 15 Dec. 1938, *German Documents, Germ. ed.*, No. 112, pp. 119-20.

⁹See especially the newly published letter sent by Moltke to Ribbentrop on December 20, 1938, in *German Documents, Germ. ed.*, No. 115, p. 122.

¹⁰See Beck's statement to the Under-secretary of State in the Polish Foreign Ministry

he was thoroughly disillusioned by his meetings with Hitler and Ribbentrop on January 5 and 6, 1939, when the demand for Danzig (and the "Corridor across the Corridor") was made again in imperious tones.¹¹ After this, Beck did not believe that any basic agreement could be reached when Ribbentrop came to Warsaw later that month, but for the first time he seems to have seriously considered the possibility of a compromise solution of the Danzig question.¹² Sometime in the period between Beck's return from the conversations in Germany and the German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939, a plan for such a compromise was apparently worked out in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The proposal which was prepared provided that the territory of the Free City would be partitioned between Germany and Poland. According to a report from Sir Howard Kennard, the British Ambassador to Poland, the plan specified that "the Poles would have the railway and the western part of the Free City Territory, running up between Oliva and Zoppot with some loop system in Danzig itself and a new canal connection with the Vistula."¹³ The existence of such a plan, which had, however, not been officially communicated to the Germans, was confirmed to Kennard by Miroslaw Arcisewski, General Secretary of the Polish Foreign Ministry.¹⁴

Although the quoted report is not entirely clear, its general meaning can be derived from a study of the territory involved and the later plan which is referred to below.¹⁵ The railway mentioned must be the Tczew (Dirschau)—Danzig—Zoppot line which runs through the territory of the Free City from south to north, parallel to and slightly west of the Mottlau river. The rest of the sentence is clearly garbled in some manner because the railway passes through both Oliva and Zoppot, two towns northwest of Danzig. Apparently what is meant is that the western part of the Free City area, including the railway, Oliva, and Zoppot, would go to Poland; while the eastern part, including the city of Danzig itself and about two-thirds of the total area of the Free City, would go to Germany. The "loop system in Danzig itself and a new canal connection with the Vistula" might refer to Polish retention of the Westerplatte, a Polish-controlled area at the mouth of the Dead Vistula, or some way of building a branch of the

on December 21 that he had worked out a plan for future conversations with the Germans and had discussed it with Marshal Smigly-Rydz, the Inspector General of the Polish Army (Szembek, p. 396), and his statement to the British Ambassador on December 20 that he expected a settlement of the Danzig question by late January 1939 (Kennard to Halifax, 20 Dec. 1938, *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939*, Third Series [London, 1949-1953] [hereafter cited as *British Documents*], Vol. III, No. 437, p. 439). It should be noted that Beck avoided informing the British about the details of the German-Polish negotiations; the British government did not learn the exact German demands until February 24, 1939, and then from the German Ambassador to Poland (Kennard to Halifax, 24 Feb. 1939, *British Documents*, Vol. IV, No. 144, p. 147).

¹¹Szembek, 8 Jan. 1939, pp. 405, 407, 10 Jan. 1939, pp. 407-08.

¹²Sec Under-secretary of State Szembek's account of his conversation with Beck on January 10, 1939, in Szembek, pp. 407-08.

¹³Kennard to Sargent, 28 June 1939, *British Documents*, Vol. VI, No. 164, p. 186.

¹⁴*Ibid.*

¹⁵For the geography of the Free City of Danzig, see Nikolaus Creutzberg, *Atlas der Freien Stadt Danzig* (Danzig, 1936).

Tczew—Danzig—Zoppot railway line to by-pass Danzig. In any case, partition along the general lines indicated would have returned to Germany the major part of both the area and the population of the Free City of Danzig.

The German occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia on March 15, 1939—after that country had yielded its German-speaking areas to Germany in October, 1938, and had given the Germans permission for the construction of an extra-territorial road across its territory in November, 1938—no doubt deterred the Poles from advancing the compromise plan after Ribbentrop again raised the German demands in his conversation with Lipski on March 21, 1939.¹⁶ The Poles offered to make concessions on the question of transit across the corridor but insisted that Danzig must remain independent.¹⁷ Hitler thereupon decided to attack Poland.¹⁸

From the recently published documents of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs it appears that the idea of partitioning Danzig was again raised in August, 1939, in the last weeks before the outbreak of war. On August 7, Pietro Arone, Italian Ambassador to Poland, reported to Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Galeazzo Ciano about a partition plan. The outline of the plan as included in the report is almost identical with the one discussed above. The territory of the Free City would be divided along the Mottlau river; Danzig itself and the territory between the Mottlau and East Prussia would go to Germany, Poland would acquire the area west of the Mottlau (which would include the railway, Zoppot, and Oliva). Poland would also retain the Westerplatte. According to Arone, the author of the project had contacts with the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and though there were conflicting reports about the attitude of the Ministry toward him, Arone thought that the plan could be considered a discreet sounding. Arone therefore asked Ciano for permission to continue to investigate this possible compromise.¹⁹ Ciano telegraphed authorization.²⁰

In subsequent reports Arone identified the author of the project as Władysław Studnicki and summarized an interview he had given the latter.²¹ Studnicki was an old follower of Pilsudski who had repeatedly been in trouble because of his pro-German attitude. He was strongly anti-Russian, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-Semitic. He favored a policy of collaboration with Germany and repeatedly urged such a policy on the Polish government in 1939, even recommending that Poland agree to the German annexation of Danzig.²²

¹⁶Polish White Book, No. 61, pp. 61-64; German White Book, No. 203, pp. 229-32.

¹⁷Polish White Book, No. 62.

¹⁸See Hitler's order cited by the Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces in a note of April 3, 1939, in Nuremberg Document No. C-120, *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg, 1946-1948), XXXIV, 381.

¹⁹Arone to Ciano, 7 Aug. 1939, *I documenti diplomatici italiani*, Eighth Series (Rome, 1952-1953) (hereafter cited as *Italian Documents*), Vol. XII, No. 794, pp. 592-93. For a detailed discussion of the Italian document publication, see Ferdinand Siebert's review in *Historische Zeitschrift*, CLXXVI (1953), 376-90.

²⁰Ciano to Arone, 9 Aug. 1939, *Italian Documents*, Vol. XIII, No. 816, p. 609.

²¹Arone to Ciano, 10 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*, No. 822, pp. 613-14; Arone to Ciano, 18 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 97, p. 65.

²²Some of Studnicki's suggestions were published by the Germans from captured

Arone, who was not aware of the fact that a partition plan had once been considered in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, tried to sound out the attitude of the Polish government to such a proposal at that time.²³ At his request, Monsignor Cortesi, the Papal Nuncio in Warsaw, hinted at the existence of a compromise proposal to both Beck and Arciszewski. The Nuncio's impression was that both were maintaining a reserved attitude without excluding the possibility of negotiating a peaceful solution. He thought that before a compromise of the Danzig question could be effected, it would be necessary to establish whether this would in fact be the last German demand or merely an opening for new ones.²⁴

What was the attitude of Germany toward such a proposal in August, 1939? According to Arone, the German Ambassador to Poland had heard about the plan and could be expected to discuss it with his superiors during his stay in Berlin in the second week of August.²⁵ No further direct evidence on this aspect of the question has yet become available. On the other hand, there is some interesting indirect evidence on the German position. Studnicki had given Arone a detailed memorandum on the partition proposal; and the latter had sent it to Ciano by special courier to Salzburg, where Ciano was conferring with Hitler and Ribbentrop from August 11 to 13.²⁶ There is nothing in the records of the Salzburg conversations to indicate that Ciano passed on any information about the compromise plan, presumably because the trend of the conversation convinced him that the Germans had already decided on war and that nothing would deter them.²⁷ He commented in his diary:

The decision to fight is implacable. He [Ribbentrop] rejects any solution which might give satisfaction to Germany and avert the struggle. I am certain that even if the Germans were given more than they ask for they would attack just the same, because they are possessed by the demon of destruction.²⁸

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Polish archives in Werner Frauendienst, "Ein ungehörter Warner," *Monatshefte für Auswärtige Politik*, VII (1940), 5-14. For the general views of Studnicki, see his *Polen im politischen System Europas*, German ed. by Johannes Maass (Berlin, 1936) and *Das östliche Polen*, trans. by W. von Harpe (Kitzingen-Main, 1953).

²³Arone to Ciano, 10 Aug. 1939, *Italian Documents*, Vol. XII, No. 822, p. 614.

²⁴Arone to Ciano, 18 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 97, pp. 65-66. Arone commented that Szebek had recently told him the same thing.

²⁵Arone to Ciano, 10 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*, Vol. XII, No. 823, p. 614.

²⁶Arone to Ciano, 10 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*, Vol. XII, No. 822, p. 613; Arone to Ciano, 18 Aug. 1939, *ibid.*, Vol. XIII, No. 97, p. 65 and n. 2. The memorandum of Studnicki has not been found.

²⁷The Italian records of the conversations are in *ibid.*, Vol. XIII, Nos. 1, 4, 21; for the German records, see Nuremberg documents PS-1871 and TC-77.

²⁸Galeazzo Ciano, *The Ciano Diaries, 1939-1943*, ed. by Hugh Gibson (Garden City, New York, 1946), 11 Aug. 1939, p. 119. For Ciano's statement that Ribbentrop told him outright that Germany wanted war, see *ibid.*, p. 582, and Ernst von Weizsäcker, *Erinnerungen* (Munich, 1950), p. 246.

THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF MARE CLAUSUM AND POLICIES IN BLACK AND BALTIC SEAS

by *Kazimierz Grzybowski*

I

IN THE course of June 1953 the Soviet Government officially assured Turkey that it abandoned its claims to some of the Turkish provinces bordering on the Soviet Union and to the military bases in the Straits. It pressed, however, for a revision of the Montreux Convention of 1936, and repeated its demands for a joint conference with Turkey and other Black Sea powers to establish a new regime in the Straits.¹

The principle that the Montreux Convention needed revision had already been agreed to during World War II. The Yalta Conference produced a formula which spoke of Soviet proposals to be deliberated upon by the foreign secretaries of the Three Major Allied Powers. On March 19, 1945, the Soviet Government denounced its earlier treaties of friendship with Turkey, and on June 7, 1945, it offered to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation, similar to those with its satellites in Eastern Europe, provided that a new regime of the Straits was established, and Turkey ceded the Kars Ardahan area. The Potsdam Conference produced an agreement that the three governments would separately approach the Turks with the same object in view. It is also quite probable that at that time the Soviets had already presented their demands for military control of the Straits, though it is doubtful whether any of the other partners had agreed to it.² When the Soviet Government made public its demands for military control of the Straits it gave as its reason for the revision numerous violations of the Montreux Convention during the War. Some of the Soviet charges were based on events which took place in 1941, prior to the Soviet-British assurances of August 10, 1941, that both powers would remain bound by the Montreux Convention, and would respect the territorial integrity of Turkey. The Soviet view was not shared by the other Western Allies. At least the power most concerned, Great Britain, made clear its point of view in this respect, and the British Foreign secretary declared in the House of Commons that although there was some disagreement between the Turks and the British regarding the interpretation of certain clauses of the Convention, on the whole the Turks had lived up to their obligations.³

This fundamental difference in the reasons for reviewing the Montreux Convention was reflected in the scope of the revisions desired by each of the three governments concerned. The Soviet Government felt that the very

¹*The New York Times*, June 11-14, 1953.

²*The Department of State Bulletin* (1946) No. 374, p. 420; see: *ibid.* (1945) No. 333, p. 766. Cf. Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War, Triumph and Tragedy* (1953), p. 669.

³Mr. Bevin's statement in the House of Commons, October 22, 1946, *Hansard*, Vol. 427, p. 1500.

principle of the security of its territory was involved, and that the new regime ought to establish safeguards to that effect. Soviet demands as finally made public in its note of August 7, 1946, consisted of the following five points:

- 1) Straits should be free to merchant shipping of all nations;
- 2) Straits should be open at all times to warships of Black Sea powers;
- 3) Straits should be closed to warships of non-Black Sea powers except in cases especially agreed upon;
- 4) The regime of the Straits, which are a waterway to and from the Black Sea, are of concern exclusively to the Black Sea Powers, and as such ought to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers;
- 5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, being the states most vitally interested and able to safeguard the freedom of navigation and security in the Straits, shall jointly organize the defense of the Straits in order to prevent their use for hostile purposes against the Black Sea powers.⁴

The United States and British Governments, however, failed to share the Soviet point of view in its entirety. Soviet legitimate interests could be met, in the opinion of the United States Government, by the following changes in the Montreux regime:

- 1) Straits to be open to merchant shipping of all nations, at all times;
- 2) Straits to be open to the transit of warships of the Black Sea powers at all times;
- 3) Passage through the Straits to be denied to warships of non-Black Sea powers at all times, except when acting under the authority of the United Nations.⁵

The second American note of August 19, 1946, to the Soviet Government in connection with the Soviet note to Turkey emphasized two basic points of difference between the Soviet and American points of view. First, the U. S. Government saw no reason to depend on Soviet military bases in the straits for the maintenance of peace and security in that part of the world. Turkey should be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits:

"Should the Straits become the object of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations."

Secondly, the chief point in revising the Convention would be to bring the regime of the Straits into appropriate relationship with the U. N.

⁴*Izvestia*, August 13, 1946; see *Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskogo Soiuz* (1946). pp. 167-170.

⁵*The Department of State Bulletin* (1945) No. 333, p. 766. The American Note was dated November 2, 1945. The British Government sent its note pursuant to its agreement in the Potsdam Conference on November 21, 1945. See also Howard, H. N., *The Problem of the Turkish Straits*, (1947) p. 37. *The Department of State Bulletin* (1946) No. 380, p. 655.

so that it should function in a manner and in accordance with the aims of that organization.⁶

Still more outspoken in their rejection of the Soviet proposals were the British. The British Foreign Secretary in the pronouncement in the House of Commons already referred to declared that:

"At the various international conferences during the last three or four years, and their latest correspondence with the Turkish Government the Soviet Government have made it clear that they are anxious to obtain a base in the Straits, which would ensure, in effect, that the control of this waterway would rest in the hands of the Soviet Union and not in the hands of the territorial power most clearly concerned. His Majesty's government have made it clear that in their view, if this were adopted it would involve unwarrantable interference with the sovereignty of Turkey . . . and would also represent an improper interference with the rights of other powers concerned . . . His Majesty's government are very anxious to keep the international aspect of this waterway always in view . . . it had for a long time been internationally recognized that the regime of the Straits was the concern of other powers beside the Black Sea powers, and that they would not, therefore, accept the Soviet view."⁷

To complete the account of international events set by the publication of the Soviet note of August 7, 1946, the Turkish government accepted in principle the first three points of the Soviet note as the basis for negotiations, reserving to itself the right to raise certain points when it came to the actual settlement of practical issues. However, it rejected points 4 and 5 as contrary to the rights of other nations and to Turkish sovereignty, and as an invasion of Turkish security and independence.

In its note of September 24, 1946, the Soviet government refused to accept the Turkish point of view. It advanced the argument that the Black Sea is a closed sea. It reminded that in its early treaties with revolutionary Russia, Turkey had accepted the principle of the exclusive jurisdiction of the littoral powers over the Black Sea and the regime of the Straits, and finally, that the principle of joint defense is in accordance with the provisions of the U. N. Charter, because it is intended to promote conditions of security in the Black Sea area, and contribute to the maintenance of peace in general.⁸ At the same time the Soviet press drew attention to the fact that Soviet demands represented only the return to the old principles of the Russo-Turkish military cooperation expressed in the three defensive alliances of 1798, 1805, and 1833.

The question of the Straits was once again raised by the Soviet delegation during the Paris Peace Conference in 1946. But obviously that was not the place to achieve a solution of this problem.

In the final analysis, therefore, the difference between the Western

⁶*Ibid.* (1946) No. 374, p. 420.

⁷*Hansard*, Vol. 427, p. 1500.

⁸Soviet Turkish Agreements of March 16, and October 13, 1921, and Turkish-Ukrainian Agreement of January 21, 1922. *Izvestia*, September 28, 1946; see also: *Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskogo Soiuz*a (1946), pp. 193-202.

governments and the Soviet government can be reduced to the difference of opinion as to the meaning of the new world order which emerged after World War II, and how it should operate. In Soviet opinion, the Soviet government had the right to exclusive decision in matters affecting Soviet interests and within a certain sphere of influence without referring matters to the United Nations Organizations. This specifically applied to the Turkish Straits. In its view, contemporary international relations are still based on a system of spheres of influence of the great powers in spite of the creation of the UN.⁹ The Soviet note which announced that the Soviet Union had renounced its claims to territorial concessions and to military bases in the Straits still adhered to this fundamental principle that the Straits are within the Soviet sphere of influence in relation to UN or other great powers. At the same time, the United States, the British and also the Turkish government desired to retain those features of the Montreux Convention which would make it a part of the collective security system within the framework of the UN.

II

The events just related represent only a most recent phase in the development of a considerable past. Control of the Straits was and remained a vital issue of the policies of Russia, whether imperial or Soviet. It provided a platform on which Russian interests clashed with those of Turkey and of other major powers of the world. But it also provided a platform on which a modicum of agreement was almost invariably reached, which is evidenced by the fact that Turkey was able to survive as an independent state and still retain control of the Straits. However, the Soviet phase deserves a separate treatment, if only because of the repeatedly advanced claim that after the Revolution (1917) Russian policies basically changed, and aggressive designs in this direction were totally abandoned.

The question of Straits, both Danish in the Baltic Sea, and those in the Black Sea, came to the fore on the morrow of the October Revolution. During World War I, the Baltic and Black Sea Straits were closed to all shipping, since minefields, the German fleet, and Turkish artillery denied passage to and from the two seas. The Allied victory opened the Straits and created additional hazards to the Bolshevik Revolution and communist struggle for power. Allied ships in the Dardanelles and the Baltic ended isolation of Russia and restricted to some extent the freedom of action of the Soviet government. In spite of the almost complete isolation of Poland during the Bolshevik offensive through the strikes of German, Czech and Austrian trade unions, and the consequent halting of military supplies, it was still possible to supply essential munitions by French ships to assist Polish armies. It is difficult to overestimate the extent to which the presence of Allied ships had restrained Bolshevik ambitions of expansion and secured the independence of nations in Eastern Europe.

⁹Cf. Generalissimo Stalin's speech to the Moscow Voters on February 9, 1946, *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SRRR*, February 12, 1946.

In the ensuing period Bolshevik diplomacy spared no effort to secure the Black Sea and Baltic flanks from the military and political influence of the West. Article V in the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship signed in Moscow (March 16, 1921) contained the following clause:

"In order to assure the opening of the Straits to the commerce of all nations, the Contracting Parties agree to entrust the final elaboration of an international agreement concerning the Black Sea to a conference composed of delegates of the littoral states, on condition that the decisions of the above-mentioned conference shall not be of such nature as to diminish the full sovereignty of Turkey or the security of Constantinople, her capital."¹⁰

A year later, on the eve of the Conference of Lausanne, which was to consider the Near Eastern Question, Lenin formulated the objective of the Russian participation in the Conference, to achieve the "closing of the Straits to all warships, equally during the time of peace or war."¹¹

During the Conference, the Russian point of view contradicted in every respect the Allied proposals. The Allied powers pressed for the demilitarization and placing of the Straits under international control. The Russian plan was summarized by Lord Curzon presiding over the Conference as follows:

"But there are more specific criticisms which might be made upon M. Chicherin's formula. In the first place, apart from the fact that it ignores the principle of international law that the passage between the two seas should be regarded as an international highway, it would, if adopted by this conference, give to Russia a position of exceptional and indefensible advantage within the Black Sea. . . . In the second place, he contended that the opening of the Straits to warships would be to the advantage of the strongest sea power. But he omitted to mention that the closing of the Black Sea would place other littoral countries at the mercy of the littoral power possessing the strongest land forces, in other words Russia herself. . . . In fact, the more closely we examine the Russian programme the more clearly does it emerge that it has only one object in view viz. to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake with Turkey as the faithful guardian at the gates."¹²

Other Black Sea powers were either strongly opposed, or indifferent to Russian plans, the representative of Romania being the most outspoken of all. In his opinion "the Straits must be . . . free for the passage of ships of war and commerce without restriction . . ." He warned the Turkish delegation that even their country "might one day come to regard the system advocated by him as more complete guarantee of her sovereignty,"

¹⁰Shapiro, *Soviet Treaty Series*, the Georgetown University Press. See also B. A. Dranov, *Chernomorskie Prolivy (Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Rezhim)*, Moscow, 1948, p. 177.

¹¹Lenin, *Sochinenia*, Vol. XXVII, p. 313 f.

¹²Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs (1922-1923), *Record of Proceedings*, HMSO, Cmd 1814, p. 140.

obviously hinting at the revival of Russian ambition to the exclusive control of the Straits. The striking feature of the Russian position was that Chicherin's defense of Turkish interests went further than that of the Turkish delegation itself. As Lord Curzon had sarcastically remarked:

"It seemed remarkable that this programme, which provided chiefly for the defense of Turkish interests, should be put forward by Russia. While listening to this proposal, he had thought Mr. Chicherin had mistaken his role and assumed the kalpak of Ismet Pasha. Mr. Chicherin had said that his views were those of both Russia and Turkey; then why did not Turkey say so?"¹³

Turkish attitude must have been a source of serious embarrassment for the Russian delegate, and thirty years later a Soviet author recounting these events noted with bitterness Turkish unwillingness to go along with the Bolshevik line.¹⁴

During the Lausanne conference the Russians for the first time used the argument that the Black Sea is a closed sea. In reply to Lord Curzon's argument that under international law all Straits between the seas are open to all nations, and all ships whether men of war or merchant vessels, the Russian delegation countered by stating that:

"Again the parallel drawn by Lord Curzon between the Bosphorus and Dardanelles regime and that of other Straits is not justified since the former are not, properly speaking, a passage between two open seas, but the entry and outlet of a sea which many authors . . . regard as *mare clausum*."¹⁵

The demand to seal off the Black Sea Straits was extended to cover also the Baltic Sea Straits, at the Rome Conference on Naval Disarmament, which met on February 14, 1924, and broke up February 25 after having achieved nothing. It included all nations with capital ships and during this conference the Russian representative, Admiral Behrens, demanded as preliminary to all discussion of naval disarmament by Russia that the Black and Baltic Seas should be made inaccessible to the warships of all powers except those of the littoral states. Specifically, Russia demanded that the Lausanne Convention on the Black Sea Straits be revised and that the Straits be closed to foreign warships except those belonging to Black Sea Powers.¹⁶

¹³*Ibid.*, pp. 131-132.

¹⁴Dranov, *loc. cit.*, pp. 188-189.

¹⁵Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs (1922-1923), *Record of Proceedings*, p. 160.

Article 21 of the Russian Draft of the Straits Convention provided that:

"The Contracting Powers are agreed to elaborate and sign within three months from the adoption of the present regulation an international Act recognizing the Black Sea as *mare clausum* of the littoral powers even in the event of changes being made in the regime of the Straits which modify the above stipulation." (*Ibid.*, p. 253)

¹⁶*Sous-commission navale de la commission permanente consultative. Rapport au Conseil sur les travaux de la deuxième session, tenue au Palais de la Prefecture à Rome du 14 février au 25 février, 1924. Procès verbaux des séances.* League of Nations (Ser. C.P.C/S des N. 31. 1924). *Vneshniaia Politika Sovetskogo Soiuza* (1935-1941) pp. 128 ff, 138 ff. Cf. *Pravda*, June 24, 1936, *Izvestia* April 14 and 18, 1936.

III

The failure of collective security in the late 1930's forced the interested powers to have recourse to more orthodox methods of maintaining peace in the Straits. Russians cooperated in the working out of the new regime which gave control of the Straits to Turkey and ended the demilitarization. During the Conference assembled in Montreux (June 22–July 21, 1936) the Soviet delegation pressed for closing the Straits to men of war of non-Black Sea powers. In particular the Soviet amendment to the Turkish Draft proposed to deny access to all Black Sea powers, unless Turkey was involved in war.

The diplomatic season of 1939 witnessed the renewal of Soviet endeavors to seal off the Straits. In the diplomatic game which evidently was directed against the British and French influence in Turkey the Soviet Union was supported by Germany. Initially, this was unconditional support. When the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact was signed, Germany was willing to concede all Soviet demands as far as Constantinople and the Straits.¹⁷ However, the Soviet Government did not include the Straits in its share of the division of the spoils. But even before the Pact the identity of Russo-German interests was obvious to German leaders. The German ambassador to Moscow reported with satisfaction (June 5, 1939) on Potemkin's (Soviet vice-commissar for foreign affairs) visit to Turkey with the purpose of dislodging the British. A later report (September 2, 1939) on Soviet efforts to secure a treaty of neutrality with Turkey was accepted by German leaders with calm. The Germans were encouraging the Soviet government to get Turkey to close the Straits altogether.¹⁸

However, shortly after the first delights of the Soviet-German honeymoon wore off, signs of friction in relations between the partners, in particular with regard to Soviet juggling for an independent position in the Straits, began to appear. When according to German intelligence it appeared that in the beginning of October, 1939, protracted negotiations might finally result in a Russo-Turkish mutual assistance pact, Ribbentrop's reaction was quite strong. The German ambassador in Moscow was instructed to inform the Soviet leaders that:

" . . . in the event that the Soviet Government itself cannot avoid concluding a mutual assistance Pact with Turkey we would regard it as a foregone conclusion that she would make a reservation in the pact, whereby the pact would not obligate the Soviet government to any kind of assistance aimed directly or indirectly against Germany. . . . "

¹⁷*Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*. Documents from the German Foreign Office, Department of State, 1948, p. 157.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, pp. 20-26.

On September 17, 1939, Stalin informed Schulenburg (German Ambassador in Moscow) that Turkey was ready to agree to an assistance pact, provided that she should not be obligated to come to Soviet assistance against France or England. Germany favored the idea, provided that the pact would not obligate the Soviet Union to support Turkey against Germany, Italy, or Bulgaria (*Ibid.*, p. 97). In October 1936, Ribbentrop

Ribbentrop furthermore indicated that he would not be satisfied with a secret protocol to the pact either. A stipulation of that nature should be stated formally so that "the public will notice it".¹⁹

Shortly afterwards a mutual assistance pact was concluded between France, Great Britain and Turkey. Only indirectly was the Soviet Union able to achieve its desires, as the protocol appended to the pact stated that in no case would Turkey be obliged to participate in an action which would result in a war against the Soviet Union. Consequently, the Soviet Union was guaranteed freedom from interference of Western powers with its plan in the Balkans. *Izvestia*, the mouthpiece of the Soviet government, presented the failure to conclude a Soviet-Turkish pact simultaneously with the Turkish pact with Britain and France as evidence of the independence of Soviet diplomacy and a successful evasion of becoming involved in an anti-German entanglement.²⁰ There is little doubt, however, in view of Ribbentrop's instruction to the German ambassador in Moscow, that the real reason for not signing up with Turkey was German opposition to Russia's gaining an independent position in the Straits. It was realized in Moscow that nothing could be achieved without obtaining a *placet* from Berlin, and from that time all Soviet efforts were concentrated in that direction. For a time Soviet leaders found themselves stalemated.²¹

The supreme effort to gain an independent position in the Straits was made during Molotov's visit to Berlin in November 1940, when he submitted to Hitler's consideration proposals for the solution of the question of the Turkish Straits. Molotov's plan was directly connected with Soviet ambitions in Bulgaria. The Soviet Union was, according to his suggestions, to provide for territorial guarantees similar to those given by the Axis powers to Romania, assuming at the same time the obligation not to interfere in the internal order of the country. Guarantees would be combined with creating an outlet to the Aegean for Bulgaria, which probably meant creating Soviet bases directly on the Mediterranean. As to the Straits, Molotov never went beyond a statement of the principle. He insisted, however, that guarantees in Turkey and Bulgaria should not be "paper" guarantees, but must be "real." It seems certain that "real guarantees" meant

prompted the Soviet government to act quickly to forestall a Turkish tie-up with Western powers: "... no doubt, the best solution at the moment would be the return of Turkey to a policy of absolute neutrality, while confirming Russian-Turkish agreements." (*Ibid.*, pp. 110, 113)

¹⁹*Ibid.*, pp. 117-118.

²⁰*Izvestia*, October 24, 1939.

²¹On two occasions the Soviet government served notice of its claims in the Straits. In June 1940 in conversation with the Italian ambassador Rosso, Molotov expressed anxiety that Turkey is scheming to retain exclusive control of the Straits. He forecast that the Soviet government will be forced to take measures to eliminate dangers from that quarter (*Nazi-Sov. Rel.*, pp. 160-161). On some other occasion Molotov, recounting Stalin's conversation with the British ambassador, told Schulenburg that the British recognized Soviet leadership in the Balkans, and backed Soviet claims in the Straits. In Molotov's version of the Cripps-Stalin conversation, Stalin's reply was that the Soviet Union claimed no leadership in the Balkans, but that it opposed Turkey's exclusive jurisdiction over the Straits, and Turkish dictation of conditions in the Black Sea, and the Turks were aware of this (*Ibid.*, pp. 167-168).

military bases in Bulgaria and Turkey.²² However, Hitler refused to commit himself, beyond vague promises of a new regime satisfactory to the Russians, in exchange for Soviet participation in the delimitation of the spheres of influence in the world.²³

IV

The Soviet position in the Baltic is painted in less bold strokes. Traditionally, Russia never entertained claims to predominance in that area as she did in the Black Sea. In the first place, until recent years she had never achieved the stature of the number one power in the Baltic, and was faced with the naval supremacy of Germany. Secondly, before World War II the Soviet coastline in the Baltic was limited to the Finnish Bay which she controlled together with Finland.

During World War II, in cooperation with Germany (1939-1940), the Soviet Union acquired Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, while the port of Memel went to the German Reich. In the Peace treaty with Finland (March 12, 1940) the USSR acquired further the right to maintain bases on the Finnish territory, which gave it mastery of Eastern Baltic and the Finnish Bay. As the war went on it became increasingly clear that the terms of territorial delimitation established in the annex to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact would not be respected by the German side. Initially, Soviet interests in Finland were assured priority and Germany observed strict neutrality in the Soviet-Finnish war. In the ensuing period, German influence in Finland and its use of Finnish territory increased. German troops travelled through Finland to Norway, and Germany obtained control of Finnish nickel. The matter was discussed during Molotov's visit to Berlin, but his protests fell on deaf ears. Beyond verbal assurances as to the temporary nature of German interests in Finland no concessions to Soviet uneasiness were made and Soviet plans for further territorial acquisitions in Finland were not accepted.²⁴ After World War II, the Soviet Union emerged as the principal naval power in the Baltic. In addition to its former acquisitions the Soviet government annexed the naval base of Koenigsberg in East Prussia and obtained control of the Polish and East German coast line.

The formal demand to close the Baltic Straits has never been repeated since the Rome conference of 1924. In the discussions with Ribbentrop

²²In Molotov's counterproposals to Hitler's plans for the Soviet participation in the general rearrangement of the world, the Soviet government announced its acquiescence to the plan:

" . . . Provided that within the next few months the security of the Soviet Union in the Straits is assured by the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact between the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, which geographically is situated inside the security zone of the Black Sea boundaries of the Soviet Union, and by the establishment of a base for land and naval forces of the USSR within range of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles by means of a long term lease. Provided that the areas south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." *Nazi-Soviet Relations*, p. 258.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 235-238.

²⁴*Ibid.*, pp. 78, 101, 122-8, 131, 232-242.

during his visit in Berlin in November 1940, Molotov sounded German attitudes on the question of the Soviet participation in the control of the Baltic Straits, which Germany obtained by invading Denmark and Norway. He informed Ribbentrop that "the Soviet government believed that discussions must be held regarding this question similar to those now being conducted concerning the Danube Commissions." However, Ribbentrop evaded the issue and refused to commit himself.²⁵

There is no evidence that during the World War II or in the ensuing period have the major allied powers been faced with a Soviet demand for a special and privileged position in the Baltic. However, soon after the war, Denmark and Sweden, the only two independent states on the Baltic, were involved in a controversy over a series of incidents resulting from Soviet actions in violation of the acquired rights. The circumstances of the controversy, touching upon the very foundations of rights of nations in the open seas, Soviet unwillingness to compromise or have its claims adjudicated, hints from the Soviet side at a conference of Baltic states to establish a regime in the Baltic—all these seem to indicate that the Soviet side desires more than to assert its rights.

The core of the controversy is the 1927 Soviet decree which extended Soviet territorial waters to twelve nautical miles. A 1935 decree established for the Soviet citizens a monopoly to fish in this coastal belt, and prohibited all fishing by foreign nations within those limits. Before World War II, however, the whole question was academic, as Russia controlled no Baltic coast, and the Gulf of Finland was subject to a special regime established in a Russo-Finnish Treaty of 1921. A treaty signed by all Baltic states including the Soviet Union in 1925 regulated the exercise of customs control to prevent smuggling and contraband traffic, which seems to indicate that without this treaty Soviet authorities would not feel free to exercise customs control, although authorized to do so under 1927 decree. And on the whole up to the time of the war the Soviet government did not insist on the enforcement of the 1927 and 1935 decrees and on several occasions yielded to the protests of foreign governments.

Since World War II, Soviet authorities have detained a number of Swedish fishing vessels under the charge of fishing within the territorial waters of the Soviet Union. However, the captains and members of the captured vessels invariably refused to admit this charge and claimed that they were captured outside the twelve mile belt. The Swedish note of May 4, 1950, protested against the seizure of two fishing craft and contended that both these vessels were captured outside the 12 mile zone, one at a distance of twenty and the other at sixteen and a half miles. The Soviet note of May 26, 1950, rejected the protest alleging that the vessels were fishing within

²⁵*Ibid.*, 252-3. According to these documents, the matter of the participation of the USSR in some mechanism to control the Baltic Straits seems to have been dropped by the Soviets. There are, however, indications that it was not so. Documents reproduced by Churchill in his account of the Second World War suggest the opposite (*Triumph and Tragedy*, Eden's message to the Prime Minister, p. 516). Cf. Gustav Hilger & Alfred Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies*, New York, 1953, p. 324.

the twelve mile coastal waters. The experience of Denmark was similar. After the war came to an end, several Danish vessels were captured within or outside the twelve mile belt. On July 24, 1950, the Danish and Swedish governments presented identical notes in Moscow in which they challenged the principle of the twelve mile belt under the exclusive Soviet jurisdiction and invoked their ancient and never contested right to fish outside the three mile limit. The exchange of notes continued and finally the two governments suggested to Russia that the case be submitted to the International Court of Justice for adjudication, which suggestion was duly rejected by the Soviet government. In its opinion, the matter lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Soviet legislative authority, and there is no reason to appeal to an international court for the decision in this matter.

On June 13, 1952, a Swedish military aircraft flying over the Baltic failed to return to its base. On June 16, 1952, two unarmed Swedish Catalinas conducted a search in the general area in which the plane was lost, and one of them while at least some fifteen nautical miles from the Soviet coast was destroyed by Soviet fighters. The Swedish government protested, the Soviet government rejected the protest, and in its turn protested against the violation of the Soviet territory by the first Swedish military plane and the destroyed Catalina charging them both with opening fire on Soviet planes. The exchange of notes leaves little doubt as to Soviet responsibility. The Soviet government made the mistake of charging the unarmed Catalina with opening fire on Soviet aircraft. Moreover, while Swedish notes quote evidence to support the contention that none of the aircraft involved was within the twelve mile limit and flew over incontestably international waters, the Soviet government simply rejected Swedish statements, or offered forced interpretations of Swedish accounts of facts. It never produced or referred to evidence of its own. However, if any doubt as to Soviet responsibility would still exist, the refusal of the Soviet government to submit the case to investigation and adjudication either by a commission of inquiry, or by the International Court of Justice damns them.²⁶ The Soviet claim that the delimitation of sea areas in view of the absence of clear principles of international law on the subject is strictly within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction, cannot be entertained. The International Court of Justice has made it clear (*Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case*, Dec. 18, 1951) that:

"The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a unilateral act, because only a coastal state is to undertake it, the validity of delimitation with regard to other states depends upon international law."²⁷

Obviously the issues involved and the scope of the controversy are

²⁶*Nordisk Tidsskrift for International Rel. on Jus Gentium, Acta Scandinavica Juris Gentium*, Vol. 22 (1952), Fasc. 2-3, Scandinavian Documents, pp. 87-100.

²⁷International Court of Justice, *Fisheries Case* (United Kingdom vs. Norway), Dec. 18, 1951, p. 132.

not so conclusive as to determine the purpose of Soviet actions. It is clear, in view of the constantly repeated complaints of the Danish and Swedish governments, that capture of fishing vessels and destruction of Swedish airplanes took place outside the twelve mile limit. Evidently, something more than enforcement of the Soviet legislation on the width of the coastal belt is the goal. Indication as to what it is can be gained from the enunciations of Soviet scholars, who, since the question of the status of the two seas has become a point of interest for the Soviet government, have taken great pains in explaining the Soviet point of view and arguing it in the light of the provisions and doctrine of international law.

V

After the initial brief period of freedom of Marxist opinion in the field of legal scholarship Soviet professors were turned into a propaganda tool of the Soviet state, and dragooned into a position of semiofficial exponents of Soviet policies. As a result the approach of Soviet authors to theoretical problems of international law is dictated exclusively by the current political interests of the Soviet state. The political situation of a given moment is paramount in the mind of a Soviet author. The authoritative exposition of the Soviet views on international law, and its function in the present international community, a work prepared by the Law Institute of the Soviet Academy of Science published in 1951, stated that it:

" . . . explains the contemporary situation of international theory and practice in conditions of the struggle of the two camps . . . the anti-imperialist and democratic camp and of the imperialist camp . . . " ²⁸

"Economics and politics, philosophy and law are at the present time the arena of the struggle of the two camps . . . International law is also the arena of this struggle." ²⁹

More specifically in relation to the problem at hand, the reviewer of a study submitted to the Law Institute of the USSR Academy of Science stated that in the author's opinion:

"The problem of establishing the legal regime for the Baltic Straits cannot be separated from the task of providing permanent and effective safeguards for the democratic peace, from the tasks of the struggle with Anglo-American warmongers, and the tasks of the struggle for the sovereignty and security of nations and states of the Baltic littoral." ³⁰

The current official theory on the regime of various seas is of most recent origin. The textbook *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo* (International Law) published by the Soviet Academy of Science in 1947 still contains none of the militancy which appears in Soviet studies on the subject published but a short time later. According to this work there are two cata-

²⁸*Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo*, Akademia Nauk SSSR, Institut Prava, Moscow, 1951, p. 2.

²⁹*Ibid.*, p. 3-4.

³⁰*Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (1950), No. 5, pp. 61-62. V Institute Prava Akademii Nauk SSSR, Mezhdunarodno-Pravovoi Rezhim Baltiiskikh Prolivov (Dissertatsia S. W. Molodcova).

gories of seas: high seas open to all and closed seas which are geographically closed, such as the Caspian, Dead Sea etc. In this book there is no reference to "mare clausum" in the political and legal sense.³¹

The treatment of historic events in this edition of *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo*, which contributed to the emergence of the present status of the Baltic and Black Sea Straits, reveals no striking dissimilarities from accounts of scholars of other nations. With regard to the Danish Straits, the 1857 Convention which contained no prohibition of passage of foreign warships is still in force. The 1947 edition reported that the closing of the Straits during World War I and their mining by the Danish government caused the Russian government to protest.³² Similarly, Soviet scholars are quite orthodox in their account of the history of the Turkish Straits and interpretation of various international agreements which dealt with the regime of these narrows. In their opinion, Turkey was sovereign in the Straits till 1833. An alliance concluded with Russia in that year made the Straits accessible to Russian men of war. This situation was terminated by the London protocol of 1840, which was the first multipartite treaty, and Turkey regained control of the Straits. Since that time the regime of the Straits was invariably the matter of concern for international agreement in the largest sense.³³

However, a study on the Turkish Straits published in the subsequent year by Dranov (1948) demonstrates a new approach to the problem. One cannot escape the impression that the new attitude must be credited directly to the new interpretation of the current political situation announced *urbi* and *orbi* at the Warsaw meeting of the Communist parties in September 1947, and the resultant creation of the Cominform. The principle of the unity of purpose and method of action of the four major allies was replaced by the theory of the division of the world into two hostile camps headed by the United States and the Soviet Union. Since 1948, Soviet scholars are firmly convinced that claims to free access of their men of war and participation in deciding matters relative to the regime of the Straits advanced by non-Black Sea Powers represent usurpation unwarranted either by historical precedent or by the principles of the law of nations currently in force. In relation to the Black Sea the Kutchuk Kainardzi Agreement (1774) changed the status of the Black Sea from the Turkish inland lake into the Russo-Turkish inland lake.³⁴

"Beginning with the Kutchuk Kainardzi Agreement in 1774, all agreements . . . up to . . . the Montreux Convention of 1936 have admitted a special position in the Black Sea to the littoral states, and to a smaller or greater degree have limited the entry of the warships of other states to the Black Sea . . . In this manner the main sources of interna-

³¹*Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo*, Institut Prava Akademii Nauk SSSR, Moscow 1947, pp. 337-338.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 264-265.

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 265-268.

³⁴Dranov, *loc. cit.*, p. 51 ff.

tional law—international treaties and agreements—have recognized the Black Sea as a closed sea.”⁸⁵

Similar liberties are taken with the facts as to the situation in the Baltic.⁸⁶ In the opinion of Soviet professors, all seas fall into three categories, internal, closed, or open seas. Internal seas are those surrounded by the territory of one state, and subject to its exclusive jurisdiction. Closed seas are enclosed by the territories of two or of a limited number of states, either not having communication with the open sea, or having such communication but leading only to the shores of the littoral states. The regime of these seas is a matter of exclusive concern of the littoral states. The Aral, Asov, and White seas are internal seas, while the Caspian, Baltic, and Black seas are closed seas. Although it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the littoral states to establish the regime of the communicating Straits, in the interest of international cooperation and international trade commercial ships of other nations ought to be admitted and granted freedom of entry, exit, and passage (outside internal waters and prohibited zones).⁸⁷

The character of the seas determines the regime of the straits. Soviet authors have recently been unanimous in the opinion that straits and canals linking open seas are accessible to both war and commercial ships of all nations, and are governed by the law of nations, while straits leading from closed seas are subject to the regime agreed upon by all littoral states of a given closed sea. This applies even in cases when such straits and canals are under the jurisdiction and within the territory of a single state. Specifically, the Baltic and Turkish Straits belong to that category.⁸⁸

Have Soviet scholars produced the argument they have set themselves to produce? In the first place, they have not been able to prove that at any time during the nineteenth century a regime internationally recognized was created in either of the straits which would be based on the special position of the Black or Baltic Sea powers. Similarly, Soviet authors were unable to establish the right of any of the littoral states to cooperate with Turkey or Denmark in the defense of the Straits involved. The authors of the 1951 edition of the *Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo* seem quite convinced that the Russo-Turkish treaty of alliance of 1833, gave Russia the right to send her ships through the Straits. In fact the 1833 treaty of alliance contained no reference to the matter. It merely established each party's right to call upon the other to come to its assistance. There was no doubt that the treaty was a manifestation of Russian political supremacy in the Straits but even Russian pre-revolutionary historians are in doubt whether Russia had obtained the right to sail her warships through the Straits.⁸⁹ But even if such a right could be deduced from the text of the 1833 treaty the Straits

⁸⁵*Ibid.* p. 227.

⁸⁶*Sovetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (1950) No. 5, pp. 60-61.

⁸⁷*Mezhdunarodnoe Pravo* (1951) p. 310.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*, p. 312.

⁸⁹Dranov, *op. cit.*, pp. 90-94. For the history of the Danish and Turkish Straits, see Erik Brül, *International Straits*, 1947, Vol. II.

Convention signed in London (1841), of which Russia was also a signatory, affirmed the rule that foreign warships should be excluded from the Straits. Since then the regime of the Straits has become a matter for international regulation. There is less foundation for such claims to the Danish Straits.

In effect, Soviet argumentation is not based on facts. Beginning with the fundamental document, the Kutchuk Kainardzi agreement of 1774, by which, as Soviet professors want it, the Black Sea was changed from the Turkish lake into a Russo-Turkish closed sea, its import was in fact quite different. By article 11 of this treaty Russian merchant shipping and Russian traders were admitted to sail the Black Sea and the Straits and to enter Turkish harbors, and were granted the same rights and privileges as other most favored nations, specifically the French and English. At no time was Russia alone in the enjoyment of her rights, and the Black Sea prior to 1774 was open to foreign shipping. Developments in the Black Sea reflected that general progress in international relations which favored international trade. If any conclusion is to be drawn from the history of the Straits it seems to be this, that the right to sail the Black Sea conflicted with the interests of Turkish sovereignty and security, and consequently the various regimes in force were a result of a compromise between these interests. Whatever the regime in force, it invariably reflected the following principle: 1. that the creation of the regime of the Straits is the business of the major naval powers, if not of the international community at large; 2. that merchant shipping was always admitted, and 3. never was a regime of the Straits based on their control by a single foreign power.

The Soviet doctrine of *mare clausum* does not stand alone as characteristic of Soviet approach to the problems of international law. It is paralleled by many theories, doctrines and interpretations of international law institutes such as sovereignty, non-intervention, etc., all of them formulated to restrict and eliminate the possibility of foreign influence in the settlement of matters vital to the Soviet Union. This attitude is dictated by the keen hostility to and distrust of the so-called "capitalist surrounding". But this is commonplace. The root cause of the Soviet attitude is the conviction that the Soviet state and the Russian nation have a mission to reform the human race and bring about the new era of higher civilization. This mission and the resulting conflict with the opposing forces provide the ethos for the appraisal of all stages, situations and events resulting from this world wide struggle. International law and its institutes cannot be viewed in the opinion of Soviet scholars and Soviet leaders as an independent and objective set of standards for the behaviour of governments in international relations. It is merely a tool which is beneficial when wielded and resorted to by Soviet diplomats and lawyers, and reactionary when invoked in support of the point of view of the capitalist world.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

EASTERN EUROPEAN FEDERATION
A STUDY IN THE CONFLICTING NATIONAL AIMS AND
PLANS OF THE EXILE GROUPS

by Elizabeth K. Valkenier

INTERMARIUM, the first émigré plan for an Eastern European federation, was proposed shortly after the end of the hostilities in 1945.

Emigrés and refugees who were unwilling to return to their homelands under the conditions prevailing there had formed the Central European Federal Clubs in Paris, Rome, Brussels, and London, and in August, 1946, they set down their principles in the Free Intermarium Charter. This document outlined the structure of a federation of all the Eastern European countries lying between the Baltic and the Black Seas—hence Intermarium. To ensure a durable peace, the federation would guarantee independence to the constituent nations, liberty and social justice to all inhabitants, autonomy to minorities living in ethnically mixed areas, and the rectification of unpopular territorial settlements made after World War I. During 1946 and 1947 these Clubs addressed a series of open letters to the various meetings of the Foreign Ministers, protesting the arbitrary decisions of the Great Powers in turning Eastern Europe over to Russian control. They advocated instead the formation of an Eastern European federation which would become an integral part of a European Union and, eventually, of a world government.

The Central European Federal Clubs have continued to be quite active. In 1950, they inaugurated the Central European Federal Movement to revitalize their efforts to bring about permanent and close cooperation among the exile groups on the matter of federalism. However, during these years the initiative in sponsoring Eastern European federation has passed to various national committees and councils. Since 1948 they have been cropping up under the sponsorship either of well-known, recognized statesmen—in many cases the last freely elected representatives—or of quite obscure, self-appointed spokesmen for various nationalities of Eastern Europe. The first is largely the case with the national councils active in the United States. These groups are composed of former diplomats and members of parliament, as well as of other leading personalities in the cultural and political life of each nation, and have a liberal and a democratic character. The groups active in West Germany and Latin America, on the other hand, are composed of extreme rightists (in many cases men who achieved prominence during German occupation of Eastern Europe) and have a fascist, monarchist, or clerical character. All the liberal groups represent several political parties, while the reactionaries are organized along totalitarian lines.¹

¹Though it is impossible to ascertain reliably the exact strength of the various organizations, it can be stated that the liberal groups unquestionably command far more support than the rightists who, having been political collaborators with the Nazis, can at

The active promotion of federalism passed from a group of private individuals, who were not primarily concerned with enhancing the claims of any one nation, to various national organizations that either are accepted or are seeking recognition in Western circles as the true representatives and potential governments of Eastern European states. Exclusively national approaches to the problems of federation have emerged. It is the purpose of this paper to show to what extent the federation plans of these organizations are formulated not in terms of a genuine concern for a better future based on new allegiances and relationships, but in terms of national interests nourished by traditional ambitions, rivalries, and fears. These groups are often not so much concerned with the impartial discussion and settlement of the many problems besetting Eastern Europe, as with securing the widest possible backing for their particular federal schemes which are largely intended to preserve and to extend some system favorable to the interests of their own country.²

Of all the émigrés³ the Poles are the most persistent and enthusiastic proponents of a regional federation in Eastern Europe as the preliminary step to any supra-national organization of the Continent. Two major factors account for this stand: Poland's unfortunate geographical position in the path of German and Russian expansion and the desire of the Poles to conduct their affairs independently of either one of the powerful neighbors. The Poles see an Eastern European federation as a means of raising an effective bulwark against German and Russian aggression, and in their discussions and proposals they constantly revert to the problem of securing adequate territorial, strategic, and economic safeguards.

Because of the Western attitude toward Soviet aggression, the Poles expect a favorable territorial settlement on their eastern border. With the premise of eventual liberation through the aid of the West, they also assume that it is in the interest of the West to drive Russia behind her frontiers of 1939, at the very least. In this context, they feel, even the more

best muster a small following among the peoples they purport to represent.

The composition and programs of the various exile groups are discussed in three articles by Will Lissner in *The New York Times* on October 4, 5, 6, 1950; by Z. Nagórski in "Liberation Movements in Exile," *Journal of Central European Affairs*, X, 2 (July, 1950), 129-144; and in "Exiles from Eastern Europe," *The Economist*, November 22, 1952. The flourishing connection between former Nazis in the Bonn government and former East European collaborators with Hitler, now residing in West Germany, is reported by Albion Ross in *The New York Times* on Dec. 12, 16, 1954.

²Also operative in the formulation of the federal schemes is the disruptive influence of the small but extremely vocal rightist groups. They receive active German support, and in consequence they further the interests of the traditional German approach to Central Europe. As there is no hope of cooperation or compromise between the extreme rightist and the liberal camps, and as the rightists can count on little or no support at home, this paper will discuss principally the plans of the liberal exiles.

³A word of caution, however, on the use of the terms "the Hungarians," "the Poles," "the Czechs," etc., in the following pages; they do not refer to the entire national emigration but rather to small groups of politically active refugees who associate themselves with the national émigré organizations.

ambitious eastern plans of their federation have a reasonable chance of success.

The question of future relations with Germany, however, presents an entirely different problem. In the past few years Germany has re-emerged as potentially the strongest power on the Continent, and indispensable to the successful integration of Western Europe. The Poles view with great apprehension the intention to associate Germany in the political and military system of the West. They see a dangerous inconsistency in current American policy: United States, the chief proponent of the policy of liberation, also strongly urges the inclusion of German military potential in the defenses of the free world. Since German forces are considered indispensable for preventing Soviet expansion—to say nothing of containing it—the Polish émigrés conclude that Germany will immeasurably strengthen her bargaining position in the East, and that the West will repay for her military contribution by concessions detrimental to the welfare and security of Eastern Europe. Specifically, the Poles expect Germany to reclaim the Oder-Neisse lands and Upper Silesia, which the Potsdam Agreement handed over to the Polish administration.

Even though Polish exiles agree little on political matters,⁴ all concur on Poland's claim to the Oder-Neisse territory. Whereas most Poles base their argument on Poland's historical title to these lands—the core of their early medieval state—and on Poland's need for them as a defense against another German attack, Polish federalists treat the Oder-Neisse line as a boundary affecting relations not only between Poland and Germany but between *all* of Eastern Europe and Germany. They hold that Germany menaces all the states situated between the Baltic and the Black Seas and insist that the only way to neutralize this danger is to make the Oder-Neisse line the western frontier of the regional Eastern European organization.

The Union of Polish Federalists⁵ considers this western frontier as the basic condition for the economic and political success of the Eastern European federation. The theme, that the Oder-Neisse lands are the keystone of the federal arch, figures constantly in the discussions and writings of the ZPF. For example, in December 1951, the Central Council of the ZPF adopted a series of policy resolutions. Number thirteen stated that the Eastern European federation must include within its borders all of Silesia and the entire Oder waterway to the Baltic, if it is to survive and to achieve its purpose. Some members, in fact, feel that without a general agreement

⁴The Polish emigration is divided into three principal organizations: a) the shadow government-in-exile in London which is the successor of the wartime exile government; b) its opponent the Political Council; and c) the Mikołajczyk Committee in Washington.

⁵Known as ZPF from the initials of its Polish name; Związek Polskich Federalistów. ZPF is a sizeable group with headquarters in London and affiliate branches on the Continent and in the United States. It enjoys support among most of the political factions as well as among many professional and cultural organizations.

among all Eastern European émigrés on retaining the Oder-Neisse territories there can be no talk even of creating a common policy.⁶

A detailed elaboration of the ZPF position is given by Z. Jordan in his book *Oder-Neisse Line*,⁷ an attempt to see the problem in its European ramifications. Jordan concluded that no matter how painful this settlement may be to the German sentiments, it did create "a new distribution of economic power . . . which, if preserved when the whole of Europe is free again, will, for the first time in history, provide a basis for the creation of a well balanced European political and economic system capable of securing freedom, peace, and prosperity for all European nations, great and small."⁸ The territorial shift does away with the striking economic inequality that had existed between Germany and her Eastern neighbors and had kept the latter in the condition of underdevelopment and dependence. This imbalance had given Germany the military advantage that was a deadly threat to Eastern and Western Europe alike. Through the Oder-Neisse lands Eastern Europe has now acquired economic potentials which will make her a valuable partner in the European community, while Germany has lost that surplus of natural resources which supported her policy of aggression. With forces thus equalized, peaceful cooperation within the framework of European unity is possible.

Such, in essence, are the aims of the Polish federalists. To carry out their intentions, however, they face not only German opposition but also a large measure of unwillingness on the part of the other Eastern Europeans to support their plans. Unlike the Poles, most of the other émigré politicians simply do not see Germany as a threat. Hence the Poles have taken the line of publicizing the economic advantages that would accrue to federation centered on the Silesia-Ostrava coal basin. For the present they hope to win over the Czechoslovaks and the Hungarians whose industries would benefit directly from this association. With the three nations in agreement on this matter, it is anticipated that the other countries will join either separately or as Balkan and Baltic groupings.

But since most of the Hungarian émigrés reject Polish plans, Polish efforts are directed toward gaining Czechoslovak adherence. One instance is the Czechoslovak-Polish Committee, set up by the Association of Polish Federalists in New York (an affiliate of the ZPF), to "work out in a spirit of complete honesty the many intricate problems confronting the two nations, as well as the entire area of Eastern Europe." The lead article of a quarterly which the Committee publishes clearly states the intent behind this step: "Two nations of East-Central Europe, Czechoslovakia and Poland, will be in a position to give impetus to such integration [the regional

⁶"Problems of a Regional Federation in Central Europe," a speech by Z. Nagórski at the January, 1951, Congress of the ZPF.

⁷*Oder-Neisse Line, a Study of the Political, Economic, and European Significance of Poland's Western Frontier* (London, 1953). This book is based on the researches of a study group set up in 1950 by the Polish Freedom Movement "Independence and Democracy," a political party which is federalist and social progressive in character. Its members, who are of the younger generation, are among the key figures in the ZPF.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 3.

organization of Eastern Europe within the framework of a European community]. Their close, mutual cooperation, taking the form of a federation, may set off a movement for a broader regional federation in the area. The fact that most of the Silesia-Moravia industrial basin is within their boundaries may aid them in acting as initiators of such a movement."⁹

There is a note of urgency in the Polish efforts to find at least bilateral agreement, which is explained in a political resolution adopted by the ZPF in January, 1951. It stressed the need to work out a concrete plan for an Eastern European federation and to secure international endorsement for it as quickly as possible so that the Eastern European nations would not be taken by surprise should events develop rapidly and they be confronted with ready-made solutions imposed from the outside. The ZPF feared that though these solutions from "the outside" might be based on federalist principles, they could easily overlook the special needs and circumstances of the region. Clearly then, the wider the backing the Poles can gain for their plans, the less likely that the West may decide after the defeat of the Russians on some scheme of its own which might make concessions to German demands in the East.

Another maneuver of the Polish federalists to exclude any possibility of an "outside solution" is their championship of regionalism. The principle of regional organization in a united Europe, and eventually in a world-wide organization, is a basic tenet of the ZPF.¹⁰ At all meetings of European federalist groups in which they participate, the Poles staunchly defend this principle. Thus the ZPF claims for itself the success of preventing the November 1950 Congress of Union Européenne des Fédéralistes from pronouncing itself against regionalism. Again at the Central and Eastern European Conference, arranged in January, 1952, in London by the Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement, the Polish delegates championed the need and the wisdom of a regional grouping of Eastern Europe against the arguments of Continental federalists who preferred that the individual states join the European-wide organization directly.

The Poles feel that the reconstruction of European unity through regionalism will afford Eastern Europe additional safeguards against outside interference. For instance, *Trybuna*, organ of the "Independence and Democracy" party, stated: "The smaller nations in order to be partners and not satellites of great nations in a United Europe should form regional ties. Only then will they have at their disposal sufficient population and

⁹"The Commencement and Why," *The Central European Federalist*, I, 1 (April, 1953), 2. Also, when Rowmund Piłsudski, who heads both the "Independence and Democracy" movement and the ZPF and is one of the chief Polish representatives in Western European federalist activities, visited the United States in 1953, he was as eager to gauge the attitude of the Czech émigrés toward cooperation with the Poles as to acquaint himself with the attitude of Washington on liberation. Upon consultation with representatives from other Eastern European countries, Piłsudski became the more confirmed in his opinion that a Polish-Czechoslovak understanding should be the first step toward the creation of a regional federation. *Trybuna*, no. 45 (April, 1953), 4-5.

¹⁰P. Wandycz, "Polish Federalism Today," *The Federalist*, II, 2 (May, 1952), 19.

economic potential to be able to cooperate with the big nations on terms of equality."¹¹

The least hint of a lesser status for Eastern Europe on the international scene—a status which would presumably entitle “outsiders” to interfere in its affairs—is vigorously resisted by the Poles. At the 1952 Conference in London, it was the Polish delegates, E. Raczyński and R. Piłsudski, who led the opposition to the French proposal that once “the peoples of Eastern Europe have recovered their freedom . . . the representatives of these countries undertake to ask that difficulties which may arise between their nations be submitted to an independent European authority for arbitration.”¹² In their objections Raczyński and Piłsudski argued that this system did not provide for universal arbitration, which naturally they, as federalists, could not oppose, but for arbitration “only among certain nations.” Such an arrangement was suspect and the Poles succeeded in having the proposal dropped from the political resolution of the Conference.

The Hungarian plan for a Danubian federation is the chief counter-proposal to the Polish plan for an organization of the present states between the Baltic and Black Seas. Like the Poles the Hungarians see quite specific advantages in the federation they propose. Just as the Poles sponsor a federation which will enable them to retain the Oder-Neisse territories and to resist the pressure of powerful neighbors, so do the Hungarians favor a scheme which will rectify the settlement imposed at Trianon in 1920 and permit them to regain a position of leadership which they enjoyed in the Danubian basin before World War I.

As yet the Hungarians do not agree among themselves as to the extent of their federation; that is, whether in addition to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria, also Rumania and parts of Yugoslavia or even the entire Balkan peninsula ought to belong. They do, however, agree that Hungary's interests would suffer in a federation comprising all of Eastern Europe. Three important factors account for their coolness toward the idea of a larger grouping. First of all, they fear being outnumbered by the Slavs whom many Hungarians consider an alien, if not a somewhat inferior, race. Whenever any proposal for a large Eastern European federation is made, this is one of the objections raised in the émigré press and reported in *The Hungarian Observer*, the organ of the Hungarian National Council in Washington. For example, *Unio*, published in the French zone of Austria, once stated: “If the Hungarian nation were to enter into an Eastern European federation it would deny its past and its historical tradition, all of them connected with the West.”¹³ Again, Charles Bartha wrote in *Uj Magyar Ut*, published in Munich, that one of the main reasons for forming

¹¹*Trybuna*, no. 47 (July-August, 1953) 6.

¹²Central and Eastern European Commission of the European Movement, *Central and Eastern European Conference. Full Report* (London, 1952), p. 64. Hereafter abbreviated as *Central and Eastern European Conference*.

¹³Quoted in *The Hungarian Observer*, I, 3 (May, 1951), 3.

a Danubian federation would be to keep Hungary from being outnumbered by Slavic elements in a system where countries of an "Eastern background" would predominate.¹⁴

Second, there is the bitterness over the treatment received some thirty-five years ago at Versailles. Any plan not sponsored by the Hungarians, or based on principles unacceptable to them, is suspected of being under the domination of the Little Entente states. For instance, *Fáklya*, published in Brussels, stated: "Émigrés from former Little Entente states favor federation so that on that basis they may maintain Hungary's unjust frontiers."¹⁵

This concern with Hungary's frontiers is well illustrated by the uproar in the émigré press after the Hungarian National Council signed a "Declaration of Aims and Principles of Liberation of the Central and East European Peoples" at Philadelphia on February 11, 1951. Since the Declaration recognized the principle of some sort of regional organization as "a step along the road to the indispensable organization of the free world," it was widely assumed that the Council had agreed to an Eastern European federation based on the existing frontiers. *Pressearchiv*, published by Hungarian nationalists in Austria, printed a map of the proposed federation, giving Hungary's 1951 boundaries; this was called "Mutilated Hungary." Alongside was another map with the 1914 borders; here the caption read "That which Lives in Hungarian Hearts." G. B. Bessenyey, chairman of the Foreign Committee of the Hungarian National Council, hastened to reassure his compatriots in the Munich journal, *Hungaria*, that the Philadelphia Declaration was not an announcement of a federation. Furthermore, the Hungarian National Council had no unified or official program as to the details of a federation other than favoring regional groupings within a European union, based on "living" nations and not on "artificially" established states. He also added another assurance, namely, that in the future it will be easier "to find redress for obvious injustices inflicted upon Hungary . . . within the framework of a federation."¹⁶

Finally, the Hungarians are not as fearful as are the Poles of the revival of German power. They see no urgent need for a strong grouping to hold in check German aspirations in Eastern Europe, and so are quite unwilling to assume close ties with the Poles. Recently, Tibor Eckhardt, a member of the Hungarian National Council, maintained in a speech, "The Danubian Order and European Peace," delivered on March 30, 1953, before the Hungarian Society in New York, that "by and large problems of Northern Europe pertain to the great powers. It is best for the little nations not to become involved in matters not vital to their interest." A "healthy and strong" Poland after the liberation, he stated, should be established with the Vistula—significantly not the Oder—as its "natural point of support."¹⁷ Here, as in other instances, are indications that the Hungarians do not

¹⁴Quoted in *Ibid.*, I, 4-5 (June-July, 1951), 6.

¹⁵Quoted in *Ibid.*, I, 3 (May, 1951), 3.

¹⁶Quoted in *Ibid.*, I, 7 (Sept., 1951), 6.

¹⁷Quoted in *Ibid.*, III, 4-5 (March-April, 1953), 7-9.

fear Germany but are rather sympathetic toward her territorial claims. Since both Germany and Hungary have parallel interests in boundary revisions, some Hungarians seem to prefer not to antagonize Germans by lending Poland support through the formation of a large Eastern European federation.

Hungarians expect a great deal from a Danubian federation, in particular, the possibility of revising the Versailles system. The peace settlement of 1920 is constantly under the barrage of Hungarian criticism. At a symposium, "The Future of the Danubian Federation and the Atlantic Union," sponsored in 1952 by the federalist magazine *Freedom and Union*, the Hungarian leaders in exile laid the blame for all the misfortunes that befell Eastern Europe in the interwar period on the "artificial" peace that handed over Hungarian nationals and territory to the succession states.¹⁸ Members of the Hungarian National Council never miss an opportunity to let it be known in influential Western circles that there is nothing to commend the Versailles peace treaties. In a recent letter to the president of the National Committee for a Free Europe, the head of the Hungarian National Council, Msgr. Varga, protested the comment of another official of the Committee on the legality of the borders fixed after World War I and took this occasion to denounce Trianon summarily in the following terms: "The provisions of the treaty . . . have been arrived at without any popular consultations, have been later condemned by leading statesmen of the West, have never been ratified by the Senate of the United States and last but not least, have been always unanimously repudiated by the Hungarian public opinion as unjust and inconsistent with the spirit of President Wilson's Fourteen Points."¹⁹

What then do the Hungarians expect to establish in the Danubian basin after the defeat of Communism? François Honti, the Hungarian member of the Central European Federal Club in Paris, has stated: "This Danubian Union which according to some should comprise the Catholic nations of the old Monarchy—that is to say the Austrians, Croats, Hungarians, Slovaks, and Czechs—and according to others should include also Rumania and Yugoslavia, would amount to the restoration of the Monarchy or to the establishment in its place of a union of the countries of the Danubian basin . . . but on the basis of legal equality of all the participating nations." To many of his compatriots the restoration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in this "more modern form" would provide the best remedy for the "disorders and discords which have been afflicting the . . . area" since the collapse of the Dual Monarchy.²⁰

To forestall another Trianon the Hungarian National Council resolved on June 21, 1949, that the federation "should be built as far as

¹⁸*Freedom and Union, Liberation and Union. The Future of Danubian Federation and the Atlantic Union* (Washington, D. C., 1952), p. 10. Hereafter abbreviated as *Liberation and Union*.

¹⁹*The Hungarian Observer*, IV, 2-3 (Feb.-March, 1954), 11.

²⁰Francis Honti, "Union—the Condition for the Independence of the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe," *The Eastern Quarterly*, V, 3-4 (Aug.-October, 1952), 6.

possible not on states but on nations which are the true living realities." Such is the guiding principle for the policy of the Hungarian émigrés. The correct application of national self-determination—and it must be correct from the Hungarian standpoint—is to them the only basis on which to build the future. Just as the Poles insist upon advance agreement on retaining the Silesia-Ostrava coal basin, so do the Hungarians insist upon advance agreement on a just settlement of all ethnic disputes as the preliminary step to any further planning.

Thus Msgr. Joseph Koezi-Horváth, a member of the Hungarian National Council, urged his readers in the *Katolikus Magyarok Vasarnapja* that, rather than discuss with other émigrés the future of Eastern Europe in terms of Hungary's 1920 borders, an agreement be reached on settling democratically after liberation the rightful demands of oppressed minorities.²¹ In the aforementioned symposium on Danubian federation, Paul Auer maintained that if the free representatives of Russia's European satellites could agree now to arbitrate their disputes, they would be taking the basic and most needed step toward federating. The least the exile politicians can do is to "prepare the ground for future collaboration" and to forestall these nationalist elements which will undoubtedly try to prevent the negotiators "from accepting compromises and [will] hinder them from reaching the final settlement that is necessary before a federal system can be set up."²²

Naturally the ethnic problem that interests the Hungarians most is the fate of their compatriots (estimated at some three million) who live outside of Hungary's borders. Even though some federal minded Eastern European politicians argue that in a federation boundaries would be, so to speak, "spiritualized" and merely administrative in character, the Hungarians remain unconvinced. They insist that plebiscites be held on Hungary's southern and northern frontiers to ascertain the wishes of fellow nationals in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. As for the problem of Transylvania—many concede that its inclusion in either Hungary or Rumania would provide no permanent solution. Members of the Hungarian National Council propose instead that it become an autonomous unit within the Danubian federation.

The Hungarians also sympathize with the national aspirations of the Croats, Slovenes, and Slovaks, whereas, significantly, the Poles and part of the Czech emigration ignore them almost entirely. The extreme nationalists among Hungarians, who are centered in Germany and receive no recognition from the Western powers, openly champion the separatist movements of these nationalities which are generally considered to be reactionary, if not outright fascists, in their politics. The democratic Hungarian politicians, who receive semi-official support in the West—especially in the United States—confine their endorsement to their stated aims of construct-

²¹Quoted in *The Hungarian Observer*, I, 6 (Aug., 1951), 6.

²²*Liberation and Union*, p. 21.

ing a federation on the basis of nationality and enumerate Croatia, Slovenia, and Slovakia as possible members.²³

The Hungarians have also a different conception of the relationship between Eastern and Western Europe. Unlike the Poles, they are not particularly eager to arrive at any comprehensive or binding agreement²⁴ before liberation to prevent Western European interference or arbitration. In fact, they want the West to take part in the disputes of Eastern Europe. Whenever federalists gather, it is chiefly the Hungarians who insist that the disputes of Eastern European states be submitted to arbitration of Western neutrals. At the Central and Eastern European Conference of the European Movement, Paul Auer defended against Polish objections the motion of the French delegate that some machinery be set up for the settlement of the differences in Eastern Europe that will arise after liberation. In his argument Auer frankly stated: "Politicians present here are well aware that a friendly agreement between us, without the intervention of third parties, is impossible."²⁵ At the symposium on the Danubian federation he suggested that "the European Council would be the best qualified body to deal with and settle old differences . . . and so make possible the creation of a federal system."²⁶

Czechoslovakia is of pivotal importance to both the Polish and the Hungarian federation proposals for the reason that her adherence is considered indispensable to the success of either scheme. But the Czechoslovak response to these rival proposals varies according to the factions into which the emigration is split. This division is due not merely to the political differences that plague all groups in exile but especially to the profound disagreement on the future of Czechoslovakia as a state. As it happens, the form of federation that each faction favors is indissolubly bound up with the way it proposes to handle after liberation the problem of the Slovaks and of the minorities expelled in 1945—ethnic questions that involve the very existence of Czechoslovakia.

The Council of Free Czechoslovakia, for a period headed by Peter Zenkl, the leader of Beneš' National Socialist Party, is located in Washington and appears to enjoy semi-official support in the United States. The Council considers the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans as irrevocable,

²³Some other Eastern Europeans are mistrustful of the Hungarian promotion of ethnic justice because they fear the territorial gains which its endorsement will bring to Hungary, and because they frown upon its connection with the separatist movements which receive strong support among the German expellees from Eastern Europe. Hubert Ripka in *A Federation of Central Europe* (New York, 1953, mimeographed) maintains that the Hungarians support Slovak and Croat separatism and contemplate an autonomous Transylvania under the guise of self-determination because their country stands to gain from an atomization of the area. Numerically superior, nine million Hungarians could easily dominate the three million Slovaks, four million Croats, and the weakened Rumanians (p. 37). The Poles have charged outright that the Danubian federation of the Hungarians would be nothing more than an advance post of German penetration in Eastern Europe, if not a German satellite. (*Trybuna*, no. 38 [June, 1952]).

²⁴With the exception, of course, of an amicable agreement to solve the ethnic problems.

²⁵*Central and Eastern European Conference*, p. 67.

²⁶*Liberation and Union*, p. 21.

insists that Czechs and Slovaks are bloodbrothers, and makes the unity of the Czechoslovak republic the core of its program. However, the same fundamental problems that split the Czechoslovak emigration also exist in the Council and have prevented complete agreement on federal matters. It is this group, nevertheless, which includes most of the sympathizers with Polish federal plans.²⁷ The bond that ties together Polish federalists and some politicians from this faction among Czechoslovaks is their opposition to the émigré organizations which urge the territorial break-up of Eastern Europe in the name of national self-determination. Ethnic justice is not their primary concern; their arguments for the preservation of larger state units and the formation of a regional federation are based on similar political, strategic, and economic considerations.

Hubert Ripka is the ardent proponent of a single East European federation in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia. He published in *Hlas Československa*, the organ of the Council, an article with the revealing title, "Czechoslovakia—a European Necessity." Its thesis is that should Slovakia and Bohemia be separately established after the liberation, a general collapse of Eastern Europe and the consequent disintegration of any European-wide union would ensue:

Czechoslovakia split up in a Czech and Slovak state would prepare for German predominance over all of Central Europe . . . The disintegration of Czechoslovakia . . . would initiate a general atomization of the entire area of Central and Southeastern Europe. It would decisively strengthen the separatist endeavors of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians; it would furthermore enliven the attempts for the creation of an autonomous Transylvania, Carpatho-Russia, and probably also of East Galicia, etc. . . . The dismemberment of Central Europe, which would be kindled by the destruction of Czechoslovakia, would lead to new grave international conflicts and would indeed entice Germany to put in "order" again this chaos by constituting a government of her own.²⁸

Ripka also wrote the mimeographed volume, *A Federation of Central Europe*. Closely paralleling the Polish line, he argued here that even in a united Europe a regional federation in the East is necessary to counterbalance German power and to form a strong bloc between Germany and Russia. He rejected the plan for three federations—Baltic, Danubian, and Balkan—in the area on the ground that these smaller units would be too weak to play a constructive and independent role and would eventually become "tools of German penetration."²⁹ For Ripka any positive federal policy must be based on the existing states, since dismemberment would

²⁷Members of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia participate in the Czechoslovak-Polish Research Committee in New York which studies the problems of regional federation.

²⁸Hubert Ripka, "Československo—evropskou potřebou," *Hlas Československa*, III, 5 (May, 1953), 7-8.

²⁹Hubert Ripka, *A Federation of Central Europe* (New York, 1953, mimeographed), p. 28.

lead to nothing but endless dissension. In his opinion the problems besetting Czechs and Slovaks, Serbs and Croats, are entirely questions which can best be resolved through the application of modern federal principles to the political, economic, social, and cultural institutions of multinational countries.

However, Ripka's views—as is the case with most émigré leaders—cannot be considered fully representative of the national committee to which he belongs. The splits in the Council of Free Czechoslovakia, which occurred in the spring of 1951 and again in 1954, were occasioned in part by the lack of agreement on ethnic matters. Significantly, those in the Council, like Osusky, who endorse a more lenient attitude toward the Sudeten Germans and the Slovaks are also the ones who favor a Danubian federation.

With these divergent sympathies in the Council, there is also no wholehearted endorsement of either the Polish or the Hungarian plan. Thus in the symposium on the Danubian federation, Stefan Osusky reminded the Hungarians that among the factors endangering the future federation was the unwillingness of some nationalities to deal with others on a footing of equality, "the expectation of favors from Germany," and the dreams of reverting to the past "when they ruled supreme."³⁰ A similar reminder was addressed to the Poles by Ripka in an article on the Polish-Czechoslovak federation, written for the influential Polish monthly, *Kultura*. Among the traits of Polish political thinking which prevent closer cooperation he cited "the great power complex," the primarily negative approach in seeing the federation as solely a defense against Russia and Germany, and the reluctance to include Austria in the East European bloc, which gives others the impression that the Poles want to organize under their hegemony an anti-German federation.³¹

The criticism expressed by Osusky and Ripka would indicate that instead of lending unqualified support to the Hungarian or Polish proposals, members of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia intend their policy to be an instrument of mediation and understanding between the Eastern European states.

The Czech National Committee in London, headed by General Lev Prchala, is a small group of Czechs of the extreme right with a very limited following. It repudiates outright the idea of a Czechoslovak people with a common statehood and calls Czechoslovakia a manifestation of

³⁰*Liberation and Union*, pp. 11-12. Similarly, the Hungarian émigrés do not endorse the Danubian schemes which the members of the Council of Free Czechoslovakia propose. The reason for this is simple: even though these Czechoslovaks admit the desirability of political and economic unity in the Danubian basin, they do not favor extensive boundary revisions. Therefore members of the Hungarian National Council are apt to speak favorably only of the plans evolved by the Slovaks or by the Czech separatists (such as Bohdan Chudoba and F. O. Miksche), plans which are based on a dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. Cf. speech by Msgr. Joseph Koezi-Horváth delivered on March 26, 1954, at the Abendlaendische Akademie in Munich. Quoted in *The Hungarian Observer*, IV, 4-5 (April-May, 1954), 12-14.

³¹"O federację polski-czeską," *Kultura*, no. 12/62 (December, 1952), 3-15. Interestingly enough, some of Ripka's colleagues in the Council are quite critical of his own inflexible anti-German and anti-Danubian attitude.

Czech imperialism. As for the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans, which it considers a great injustice, the Committee concluded in October, 1950, at Wiesbaden, an agreement with the representatives of the German expellees granting them the right to return. The signing of this agreement caused a split in the Committee and its adherents are now few in number. Nevertheless, the Sudeten Germans and the Croat separatists recognize it as the legal representative of the Czechs. These latter groups share the view that the various subject nationalities of Eastern Europe should be granted a fully independent existence after the fall of communism and should be allowed to join a Danubian federation.

The Czech National Committee views with misgivings the attempts of the West to encourage cooperation among the Eastern European émigrés on the ground that such a policy is based on the existing states which flout the principle of national self-determination and therefore stand for "national oppression and injustice." This is what General Prchala meant when he wrote to Major E. Beddington Behrens, chairman of the Central and East European Commission of the European Movement, "You give the impression of struggling not for the freedom of oppressed nations but for the freedom of various Central and East European imperialists to oppress other nations."³²

The Slovak separatists have formed two groups, the Slovak National Council led by K. Sidor until his death in October, 1953, and the Slovak Liberation Committee headed by Dr. Ferdinand Durčanský.³³ Although there is more strife than cooperation between them, both organizations agree in demanding the dissolution of Czechoslovakia and the recognition of Slovakia as a nation. Like General Prchala they, too, concluded an agreement with the German expellees for their return. Moreover, they formed a "Joint Committee representing the organizations of nationalities and ethnic groups of former Czecho-Slovakia" (that is of Czechs, Slovaks, Sudeten Germans, Hungarians, and Ruthenians) and held a meeting on October 10, 1952, at Bonn, to declare that the Czechoslovak republic was dissolved.³⁴

Incongruous as it may seem, these promoters of separatism are also partisans of federalism. Peter Pridavok, secretary general of the Slovak National Council, stated in *Hungaria*, January 11, 1952: "Federalism honestly applied is in the interest of Czechs and Hungarians, Austrians and Slovaks." But the federalism that they favor differs radically from that of the other Eastern Europeans who are working under the guidance and encouragement of the West. Their sole interest in federalism is to achieve ethnic justice, and they are quite indifferent to the aims of stability, regional defense, and balance of power.

³²Quoted in *ABN Correspondence*, III, 4 (April, 1952), 12.

³³It is generally held that although the separatist Slovak organizations do have the support of the majority of the Slovak emigration, they do not represent the opinions of Slovaks at home. The same is true of other separatist groups, such as the Croatians.

³⁴R. Kopecky, "The Political Exiles from Czechoslovakia and their Problems," *The Eastern Quarterly*, VI, 1-2 (January-April, 1953), 20.

Since their proposals have gained no support in influential Western quarters, the Slovak separatists have had to look elsewhere. And a great measure of cooperation between them, the Croatian separatists, the extreme Hungarian nationalists, the Ukrainian reactionaries, and the German expellees from Eastern Europe has resulted.³⁵ One example of this cooperation is the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations (commonly known as the ABN) which has been variously described as either an organization set up by the resistance movements during World War II,³⁶ or as a gathering of the remnants of the "national committees" that had operated under Alfred Rosenberg, the notorious Reichsminister for the occupied areas in the East.³⁷ Whatever its origin, the present activities of the ABN are directed to the dissolution of the USSR and its satellites into their numerous ethnic components. The ABN is highly critical of the planning for large integrated units that preoccupies the émigrés in the Western countries. "Final stabilization of relations in the Soviet Russian sphere of power cannot and will not be achieved by a retrograde movement of creating a conglomerate of peoples."³⁸ To ABN the first condition for the stability and success of any eventual integration is the liberation of all the nationalities.

These groups and individuals who agitate for the dissolution of Czechoslovakia are generally in favor of a Danubian federation. Colonel F. O. Miksche, a vigorous propagandist of a Danubian federation composed of Bohemia-Moravia, Slovakia, Austria, and Hungary, makes the partition of Czechoslovakia "an essential prerequisite for the . . . restoration of the unity of the Danubian basin."³⁹ The Sudeten Germans, who do not see much chance for the autonomy they desire in a unified Czechoslovakia, are also strong advocates of this federation. In working for its establishment they support all who would split up Czechoslovakia and denounce efforts to preserve it as an attack on the Danubian federation. Colonel Miksche was made an honorary member of the League of Sudeten Germans in New York and he, as well as the Slovak separatists, are frequent contributors to Sudeten German publications. When recently the *New Yorkské Listy* argued for the unity of Czechoslovakia and asserted that the Sudetenland is "old Czech ground" where the Germans have lived only since the seventeenth century, the *Sudeten Bulletin*, published in Bonn, denounced it as an attempt to "oppose . . . the establishment of a Central European federation in the Danubian region."⁴⁰

The émigré politicians from other Eastern European states have aims

³⁵As a consequence of their political activities during World War II—i.e., alleged collaboration with the Nazis—most top figures from the separatist Slovak and Croat organizations, as well as their followers, were refused admittance to the United States and Great Britain. Hence their concentration in West Germany and Latin America, especially Argentina.

³⁶*Slovak. Political Periodical of Slovaks Abroad*, II, 11 (May-July, 1952), 4.

³⁷Fred Forrest, "Intolerance Incorporated," *The New Leader* (Sept. 10, 1951), 12-14.

³⁸"'Balkanization' or Stabilization," *ABN Correspondence*, III, 9-10 (Sept.-Oct., 1952), 11.

³⁹F. O. Miksche, *Danubian Federation* (Camberley, Surrey, England, 1953), p. 37.

⁴⁰*Sudeten Bulletin*, II, 4 (April, 1954), 7.

and methods similar to those of the groups already discussed. They too make proposals to secure maximum advantages for their countries in a federation appropriately related to the rest of Europe.

The Baltic states prefer to hold themselves apart from their large neighbors. In an interview, V. Sidzikauskas, head of the Committee for Free Lithuania, said that the Baltic states should form a close association among themselves before entering any Eastern European union.⁴¹ On the Continent, the Lithuanian émigrés express their apprehensions less guardedly. J. Gytis pronounced himself against the federation of the Baltic states with Poland "because she is a decorative power . . . interested in imperialistic designs at the expense of her neighbors." Instead he advocated the formation of a world federation in which the Baltic states would "participate side by side with all other nations with equal rights and duties."⁴²

As can be expected, the Committees for a Free Lithuania, a Free Latvia, and a Free Estonia (all located in the United States) cooperate more among themselves than with any other Eastern European group. The first issue of the *Baltic Review* (December, 1953), which they jointly publish, expressed a variety of views on federation—some writers preferred to join with Western rather than with Eastern Europe, others favored connections with the liberated nationalities of the Soviet Union—but all agreed that a prior regional grouping of their states was imperative.

A similar guarded attitude to the Hungarian proposals for a Danubian federation is apparent among the Rumanian exiles. In spite of its advantages as pictured by the Hungarians, the Danubian federation fails to satisfy the aspirations of other constituent peoples. In the symposium on the organization of the Danubian basin, Charles Davila's reply to Steven Borsody's appeal to federate indicated important reservations on the part of the Rumanians. Davila shared the fears expressed by Borsody that potential federalism can be frustrated by "the adverse influence of the leading few." But what Davila cited as adverse influence made it clear that he had Hungarian ambitions in mind: "Nationalism in the Danubian area was mainly a reaction to the various master-race concepts, of which even a great revolutionist like Kossuth could not rid himself. It is historically inaccurate to distribute the blame for the ill effects of nationalism equally among all the peoples of the Danubian or Balkan area. In the future, not only the master-race concept must disappear, but also mystical ideas connected with some crown or other." Another Rumanian émigré politician, Grigore Buzesti, challenged the common Hungarian refrain that "instead of having been broken up, the Hapsburg empire could have been transformed into a commonwealth of free Danubian nations," and reiterated his firm belief in the historically justified solutions provided by the Versailles treaties: "If there was ever a popular and long-awaited settlement, it was the peace after World War I which recognized that every

⁴¹*Trybuna*, no. 45 (April, 1953), 2.

⁴²"The Baltic States and Russia," *ABN Correspondence*, IV, 3-4 (March-April, 1953) 5-6.

nation had the right to statehood.”⁴³ Buzesti also declared that deep-seated reservations to federation cannot be allayed by the mere resolution to unite.

Among the Yugoslav exiles the situation is like that prevailing among the Czechoslovaks. As a result of the unfortunate experiences of the inter-war period when federalism, as interpreted by the Serbs, did not assuage ethnic strife, the Serbians alone wish to resuscitate Yugoslavia, more or less intact, within a Balkan federation. The two principal Serbian groups—the Yugoslav National Committee in London headed by S. Jovanović, and the Serbian National Council in the United States headed by C. Fotitch—both favor Yugoslavia’s membership in a Balkan federation. The former stands for a federal organization of Yugoslavia, while the latter would prefer a more centralized and unified organization of the state.

The other nationalities of Yugoslavia are highly mistrustful of Serbian intentions. Either they urge a completely new structure for Yugoslavia or they oppose its re-establishment and seek future connections with the Danubian nations rather than with the Southern Slavs. The democratic exiles from Slovenia and Croatia, grouped in the United States in the Croatian Peasant Party headed by V. Macek and the National Committee for Slovenia headed by Dr. M. Krek, are dissatisfied with what the Serbs offer them. These two groups do not demand the dismemberment of Yugoslavia but do have their own plans for a new and better federation which would give their lands true autonomy. Those who supported the independent state of Croatia, created during the last war by the Axis, reject all political solutions which would associate Croatia with the Southern Slavs in any form whatsoever. In 1950, they formed at Munich a Croatian National Committee which has active supporters in Germany and Argentina among those of Pavelich’s followers who managed to escape Croatia in 1945. The Croatian National Council also favors federalism. But above all—as was the case with the Slovak politicians—these Croats want to secure independence for their country. They feel that Croatia’s sovereignty would be strengthened if it joined either a European or a Danubian federation; but under no circumstances would they join a Balkan organization without protection from their former associates in Yugoslavia.

The fact that the various émigré plans seem so at odds and perhaps irreconcilable, should not be taken to mean that a federal solution to the problems of Eastern Europe is impossible. As was stated at the beginning, the proposals here set forth do not represent the political thinking of all the exiles. Rather they are the schemes of some émigrés who, except for the trimmings of “integration” so fashionable nowadays in Western circles, are essentially conducting the traditional foreign policy of their countries. To repeat, their efforts are devoted more to playing a “successful” political game on the international scene so as to secure the maximum advantages for their homelands than to working out some arrangement more or less suitable to all the nations that are involved. The limiting factor in every case is that shortsighted approach which treats the problems of the whole

⁴³*Liberation and Union*, p. 10.

area exclusively in terms of the needs and aspirations of one country. The narrowness and sterility of such an approach is pointed up in the tendency to measure success by the number of influential allies secured and not by the number of differences resolved or compromises reached.

However, these individuals and organizations are not the only ones preoccupied with federalism. There are groups which bring together nationals from different Eastern European countries and attempt to work out solutions in common through compromise and mutual consultations. As an example the Central European Federal Movement could be cited. At its first conference in January, 1950, at Paris it was proposed to establish a Coordination Committee or a Council of Central Europe to start the permanent and close cooperation of all representative émigré centers. In Washington a Central-Eastern European Committee was organized in April, 1951, to prepare for the unification of Eastern European nations into a regional federation. Ferenc Nagy, its chairman, requested in his opening address the cooperation and support not only of the national councils operating in the United States, but also of the International Peasant Union, the Christian Democratic Union of Central Europe, the Committee of European Labor Center in Exile, the Committee of Liberal Exiles, and of all the democratic parties. In New York, prominent exiles, with help from the National Committee for a Free Europe, set up in October, 1953, a Federation Panel to work out plans for collaboration between Western and Eastern Europe after the liberation and to find out how the region can fit into the economic and political patterns now evolving in the West.⁴⁴

It will readily be granted that in these groups a radically different spirit—a spirit of East European- or even European-mindedness—will not prevail from the outset. But the mere fact that, to achieve any results, the participants will have to make accommodations to the viewpoints, the demands, and the needs of other Eastern Europeans, does provide some hope for a way out of the exclusive and uncompromising approaches that characterize the planning done by the national organizations. The exiles joining such organizations are well aware that the outcome of their proclaimed intentions depends on a spirit of friendship and mutual understanding, as is attested by Nagy's speech at the organizational meeting of the Central-Eastern European Committee:

We have to be loyal to one another and be loyal to the common cause. We are constrained to conduct a policy of mutual assistance rather than one of deceptive exclusiveness. Let us not forget that one's positive love of one's own country and people is incompatible with the hatred of another's country and people. It is only undemocratic chauvinism that breeds love for one's own country and hatred for his neighbor's.⁴⁵

NEW YORK CITY

⁴⁴The findings of the Federation Panel were published as a book, *Europe, Nine Panel Studies by Experts from Central and Eastern Europe*, Free Europe Committee Inc., New York, 1954.

⁴⁵*Monthly Bulletin of the International Peasant Union*, II, 5 (May, 1951), 7.

COMMUNIST LITERATURE IN ROMANIA

by Nicholas Timiras

THERE are two forms of Communist literature: one is mostly distributed for the consumption of the Free World; the other is distributed in U.S.S.R. and in the satellite countries. But there is only one literary rule which is applied to all Communist literature, and it comes from Moscow. While the Communist literature for the Free World is permitted for the moment to have some calculated deviations with respect to the unique rule, no literary deviation is admitted behind the Iron Curtain. As democracy has a different meaning in Communist life from what it has in the free world, so literary criteria have taken on some dissimilar meanings in Communist-ruled Romania.

I. *The basic change: Communist "folklore"*

In Romania, folklore music and folklore literature are submitted to a basic change. They are not, as they once were, the artistic, anonymous and spontaneous creation of the people. We quote an article published by the periodical *Contemporanul*¹ and signed by Vano Muradely, winner of the Stalin prize:

"The singing and dancing troupe of the Soviet Army has recently demonstrated its qualities . . . on the occasion of the concerts dedicated to the folklore songs created . . . in Romania and in other peoples' democracies. . . . The Soviet follows with great interest the profound changes which are taking place in these countries in building up Socialism. The program starts with 'Song for Stalin' written by the Romanian composer A. Vieru . . ." The radical change is officially entrusted to the "State Institute of Folklore". "The Institute of Folklore," says the periodical *Contemporanul*,² "has proven the considerable progress of its orchestra, 'Barbu Lăutarul' . . . This progress is the result of the critical advice received from Soviet artists . . . The orchestra has in its 'répertoire' some revised pieces of our composers . . . It is the duty of our State Institute of Folklore to see to it that a greater number of new songs embodying the new ideas be included in the orchestra's program."

The folklore epic literature which had exalted such Romanian legendary characters as *Dragos the Voivode*, *Toma Alimos*, and *Stephen the Great*, is being replaced on the book market by a revised folklore. In an article published in the newspaper *Universul*,³ the writer Anton Coman declares that "folklore poetry and folklore art are now glorifying Communism." He cites a number of fragments of ballads, tales and songs,

¹Muradely, Vano, "Cântecul întăreste prietenia popoarelor," (The peoples' friendship strengthened through singing), *Contemporanul*, (Bucharest, 1952, No. 27).

²"Corul Statului Ukrainian", *Contemporanul*, (No. 22 (295), May 30).

³*Universul*, (Bucharest, October, 20, 1951), cited by *Information Bulletin*, (Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C., December 1951, p. 26).

allegedly "... collected from various parts of the country," all singing "glory to Stalin."

Here is a piece of revised folklore:

"Flower of the blood-red rose,
Up on high great Stalin comes.
No one knows how to thank him."⁴

Another piece of folklore has been revised in the same manner:

"In the rays of the proud Sun from the East,
Lovely Stalin came. He brought us rich gifts.
He freed the poor and he taught us.
Famous Stalin, Stalin wise, we eulogize thee."⁵

The following was created by the State Institute of Folklore:

"Flower of the linden tree,
Happy day for our country
When the Soviet people came."⁶

These are supposed to be folk poetry. Since Stalin's death the dictator's name has appeared in the Romanian Communist "folklore" less frequently, the new order of the day being the glorification of the Soviet Army which "delivered" Romania.

The Communist novel

Novels published by historically-inspired writers who lived before the Communist régime have been either withdrawn from the book-market or have taken on Communist shape. "Soon after the installation of the Groza (Communist) régime, the law of May 4, 1945, published a series of lists of works that had appeared between 1917 and 1944 and that were banned from circulation for containing harmful ideas."⁷ Living Romanian writers have been compelled by the Communist régime to censor and remodel their own works. "The conditions governing the publishing of any kind of work are set forth in the law of editing and distributing books, which appeared in *Monitorul Oficial* (State Official Bulletin) No. 11, of January 14th., 1949."⁷ Article 10 of the law establishes State control of publications: "Publishing enterprises are required to forward to the Ministry of Arts and Information a duplicate copy of each contract regarding literary works, for approval." In practice, only the works containing either a Communist or a pro-Russian⁸ historical inspiration are approved.⁹ Even

⁴Information Bulletin, (December 1951, p. 28).

⁵Information Bulletin, (December 1951, p. 27).

⁶Suppression of human rights in Rumania, (Rumanian National Committee, Washington, D. C. 1949, p. 109). See also Markham, H. Reuben, *Rumania under the Soviet Yoke*, (Boston, 1949, p. 449).

⁷Suppression of human rights in Rumania, p. 106.

⁸The writer agrees with Mr. Eugene Lyons (*Our Secret Allies*, New York, 1954, p. 316) that "to explain the drive for an all-Communist world—a drive to which Russia's native interests are being ruthlessly subordinated—as "Russian imperialism" is to distort and falsify the present crisis". But we cannot disregard the fact that the Communist rulers are trying to associate the traditional Russia as an ally in their Communist drive.

⁹*Le Figaro Littéraire*, (Paris, July 23, 1949).

the celebrated Communist writer Mihail Sadoveanu had to submit to State censorship before publishing his novel *Mitrea Cocor*.¹⁰

Communist writers launched into library research with the purpose of discovering "eternal friendship and cooperation" between the Romanians and the Russians. Their goal was to compile literary novels out of such historical tissue. The Communist writers were not able to find anything except such information as the doubtful presence of a Moldavian Chief (*Nicoară Potcoavă*) supposed to have been fighting within the ranks of the Cossack Army in Romania,¹¹ or an article mentioning the presence of the Russian Army in Romania in 1877, while the Romanian Army was fighting for its liberation from the Ottoman yoke along with Russian troops.¹² As a matter of fact, in all Romanian native literature it is not possible to find a single word of appreciation of any Russian presence on Romanian soil.

Another source of literary inspiration in the Romanian novel, besides the nation's history, was the attachment to the nation's creeds and traditions. Under the Communist régime Romanian creeds and traditions are sometimes tolerated, sometimes condemned, according to the political circumstances.¹³ As for the language, it is a "mere instrument of communication in view of the economic production,"¹⁴ and nothing more. Briefly, the national feeling is "a false bourgeois patriotism." This sort of patriotism was developed "in the historical moment in which feudalism was eliminated. In the struggle against feudalism, the bourgeoisie has called upon the people and has started to speak with a booming voice about the nation."¹⁵ The "real" patriotism is "attachment to the fight to build Socialism."

The idea of the Latinity of the Romanians has always been cherished by the writers who lived in Romania before the Communist régime. The Romanian people are of Latin descent. The Latin tradition has been unanimously considered as one of the elements of the Romanian national character not only by Romanian scholars, but also by Italian, Spanish, French, German, British and American scholars. Today Communism is against the Latin tradition in Romania. The importance of Slavic words in the Romanian vocabulary is exaggerated to the detriment of Latin words. Orthography is passed through the censorship of the Academy of the Romanian People's Republic, which tends to remove the Latin characteristics of the language as far as possible. The Dean of the Faculty of Philology at the University of Bucharest, Communist George Orzea, wrote: "Russian grammar is of great help in the study of the Romanian language.

¹⁰*Cronica Românească*, (Report on Romania. Research and publication service. National Committee for a Free Europe, New York, January-February 1952. p. 73).

¹¹Sadoveanu Mihail, "Nicoara Potcoava", *Viata Românească*, (Romanian Writers' Union, Bucharest, April, May, 1952).

¹²"Rumanian classics and the war of independence", *Rumanian Review*, (Bucharest, 1952, Nos. 11-12, p. 12). (The Romanian article mentioned by the Communist review was written by Al. I. Odobescu.)

¹³Hunt, Carew, *The theory and practice of Communism*, (An introduction) (New York, 1951, pp. 193-194).

¹⁴*Cronica Românească*, (September, 1951, p. 52).

¹⁵Stalin, J., *Works*, VI, (Bucharest, 1950, ed. PMR), p. 322.

The latter has undergone strong Slavic influence and has been developed in the same circumstances as the surrounding Slavic languages. Therefore grammatical problems in Romanian should very often be related to Slavic rules."¹⁶

In an article published in the Soviet periodical *Bolchevik*, Mr. Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, head of the Communist Government of Romania, expressed the following opinion about Latin civilization: "During more than a thousand years the territory of our country had been the subject of brigandage and invasions of Roman conquerors, of Turkish aggressors, and afterwards, of the 'civilized' French, English and German imperialists."¹⁷ According to Mr. L. Răutu, professor of Marxism-Leninism at the University of Bucharest, "the Occidental Powers had made use of the idea of the Latinity of the Romanian people in order to isolate Romania from the neighboring and allied country, Russia."¹⁸

The social satire was also one of the themes of Romanian novelists prior to the Communist régime. For the sake of the nation, one grieves sometimes to see the negative results of some political abuses or the effects of certain bad education. This sort of criticism which previously had been expressed in some literary works was not aimed at the destruction of the social classes.¹⁹ Still, Communism is trying to assume today that the satire of some Romanian classics is an example of "class struggle."²⁰ Thus the Romanian satiric writers who died long before the Communist régime are considered nowadays as the "forerunners of the class struggle" and are becoming Communist writers under "decree" issued by the Communist critics.²¹

II. The fight against the "bourgeoisie"

A definition of Communist literature, given by the Soviet periodical *Kommunist*,²² begins by asserting that "in the existing intermediate stage from Socialism to Communism, one of the tasks of Communist literature is to fight against the remnants of Capitalism." The remnants of Capitalism are the "bourgeois". This was faithfully reproduced by the periodical *Viața Românească*, edited by the Union of the Communist Romanian Writers.²³

Mr. Mihai Novicov, one of the literary critics of the Romanian People's Republic, dedicated a long article to the study and interpretation of the "fight against the bourgeoisie". Making use of the above definition pub-

¹⁶*Universul*, (July 1, 1951). See also *Cronica Românească*, (1951, August) p. 68.

¹⁷*La Nation Roumaine*, (Paris, October 1, 1951).

¹⁸Răutu, L., *Contra cosmopolitismului și obiectivismului burghez în științele sociale*, (Against cosmopolitanism and "bourgeois" objectivism in Social Sciences), (Bucharest, 1949), p. 3.

¹⁹Gafita, Mihai, "Realismul operei dui Creanga" (The realism of Creanga's work), *Viața Românească*, (April 1952, p. 203).

²⁰Jebeleanu, Eugen, "Nicolae Balcescu", *Viața Românească*, (February, 1953, p. 10).

²¹"I. L. Carageale, great classic of the Rumanian literature", *Rumanian Review*, (1952, Nos. 11-12, pp. 25-30).

²²*Kommunist*, (Moscow, 1952), No. 21.

²³*Viața Românească*, (February, 1953), p. 158.

lished by *Kommunist*, as well as of an article published by the Soviet newspaper *Pravda*,²⁴ Mr. Novicov tried to explain that "we are still in the existing intermediate stage from Socialism to Communism" and that the class struggle has not yet disappeared.²⁵ When class conflict disappears, the reactionary man will entirely disappear too and the Communist man will take his place. Until then, "strike the reactionary man . . . Strike the Romanian bourgeoisie." An example of "fighting-against-the-bourgeoisie" verses is represented by the poem *In satul lui Sahia*, written by the young Romanian Communist poet Eugen Jebeleanu.²⁶ In the first chapter of the poem the reader is introduced to "three rich farmers." The three bourgeois are very happy for they have just found an "American insect" on the ground. According to a Communist propaganda slogan the American planes are destroying the Communist crops by parachuting a special American beetle. In the second chapter of the poem the "three rich farmers" are watching an airplane in the sky. They mistake the plane for an American one, and think the plane is bringing along another lot of "American beetles." Instead, it is a Communist plane bringing insecticide for fighting the "American insects." The "three rich farmers are deeply disappointed." Here is, in our translation, a snatch of the poem *In satul lui Sahia*:

"An airplane is heard. The man²⁷ smiles again.
The rich farmers examine the sky:
—"That's an American, a military plane.
It is destroying the crop!"

The airplane comes down flying close to the ground
And sprinkles a lithe tail of flying flowers
All along the field.

The rich farmers are looking at the scene with parted lips.
All the sky is whirring. Above the thick mass of corn
Large wings whirl. The air-screws are shining like sun-rays.

The rich farmers are now aware of what is going on:
—"That's *their* plane, neighbors, for it's throwing insect powder
Down onto the crop!"

In commenting upon this literary poem, the Communist critic Mihai Novicov expresses the opinion that "the poet Jebeleanu describes very artistically the class struggle, and there is no doubt that the author has

²⁴The article was probably inspired by Stalin with M. Malenkov's help.

²⁵"Sarcinele esentiale ale literaturii sovietice." (The essential tasks of Soviet literature), *Viata Românească* (February 1953), p. 159.

²⁶Jebeleanu, Eugen, *In satul lui Sahia*, (In Sahia's village), (Bucharest, 'Romanian Writers' Union, 1952).

²⁷We do not know which man. Probably the pilot.

succeeded in reaching a high artistic level because of the marvelous, poetic idea of his poem."²⁸

Pitiless hatred toward the "bourgeois" exploiters is expressed in most of the Communist literary works in Romania. We may mention some of them: *Dulăii* (the watch dogs), by Zaharia Stancu (the class struggle between big farmers and farm workers); *Pâine albă* (white bread, by Dumitru Mircea; *Mitrea Cocor* (a peasant's name) by Mihai Sadoveanu; *Ogoare noi* (new farms), by Aurel Mihale; *La cea mai înaltă tensiune* (at the highest pressure), by Nagy Istvan (the fight against "reactionary bourgeois" who try to escape from Romania and to join the West); *Fără frac și joben*, (without evening dress or top hat), by Alexandru Duiliu Zamfirescu (the fight against the "reactionary bourgeois" diplomats like Visoianu, Gafencu and Carol Davila, allegedly expelled from the Romanian Foreign Office); *Undeva pe Dunăre*, (somewhere on the Danube river), by Alexandru Jar (the fight against the Romanian "bourgeois"). All these are examples of novels fighting against free life which Communists use to depict the *bourgeoisie*. The authors of most of them have been awarded the state prize for literature.

III. The search for "new" inspiration and for "advanced" life

Communists are aware that literature cannot be limited to the fight against the *bourgeoisie*. Literature must be in search of some "positive" inspiration. The Soviet press²⁹ has therefore proclaimed that Soviet literature has, among other tasks, that of promoting whatever is "new" and "advanced" in life. In his report to the Nineteenth (1952) USSR Party Congress, Malenkov decided that the "typical" work in literature should be inspired from the "nature of the given social-historical phenomenon," which phenomenon is realized by the "typical" work. Now, what does the "typical" work really mean? Mr. Martin Ebon, in his book about Malenkov,³⁰ has reached the conclusion that according to the Communist dictionary, "typical" means "ideal".

But the Communist critics have tried to explain the formula in a much more complicated way. They put forward an example from Gorki's novel *The mother*: "The character of Nilovna in this novel is a character exalting the qualities of a Communist; it is not, however, a character which is encountered frequently in life." According to the Communist critics, this character is "typical" even if it does not appear frequently in life, because it illustrates the Communist character. It opens our eyes to the way of life that should exist in the future world of Communism.³¹ Thus, Maxim Gorki's literature represents life not necessarily as it is, but as it should be

²⁸Novicov, Mihai, "O sarbatoare a literaturii noastre", (A festival of our literature), *Viața Românească* (February, 1953), p. 193.

²⁹*Kommunist*, loc. cit.; *Izvestia*, (Moscow, July 5, 1947), cited by Reuben H. Markham. *Op. cit.*, p. 449.

³⁰Ebon, Martin, *Malenkov, Stalin's successor* (New York, 1953), p. 135.

³¹"Sarcinile esențiale ale literaturii sovietice" (The essential tasks of Soviet literature), loc. cit.

according to the Communists. "Real art," said Gorki, "has the right to magnify facts."³²

The above mentioned precepts are guiding the Communist "positive" literature not only in Soviet Russia but also in Romania. On this basis, the literary critics in the Romanian People's Republic have built up their new literary rules which might be centered on three main points: "realism," "concretism" and "Marxist humanism."

"Realism", in the full sense of the Communist word, is the description of a life that *is to be* developed. Whenever the artist encounters some difficulties in realizing such a life, he is obliged to search carefully for it "in the people's desire to undergo a complete change." However, "realism" should never be false. "The Soviet men never tolerate what is colorless, dull or false."³³ Let us take the example of the most realistic novel of the year 1952 in Romania, *Otel si pâine* (steel and bread), by Ion Călugăru, which received the Stalin prize. Here is the subject: "The year is 1946, in the fall. The right-wing Social Democrats are trying to bring the country to economic ruin. But the Communist party is mobilizing its men. They are called up at the Party's center. They are told that the iron works of Hunedoara must be delivered from their chaotic state. The Communists' political agitators are going to Hunedoara. Several months later, in spite of the maneuvers of the enemies, the iron of Hunedoara begins to pour abundantly from the furnaces. The novel ends with the new outlook which is created by the revolutionary nationalization of the industrial enterprises."³⁴

First-hand information on this matter, however, reveals that in the Romanian People's Republic the nationalization of industrial enterprises has been achieved under compulsion, against the people's desire, by a non-representative government.³⁵ On April 19, 1953, the General Directorate of Statistics of the Romanian People's Republic, which operates as a Bureau of the Council of Ministers, issued a communiqué concerning the results of the current state plan for the first quarter of 1953, the year officially described as the decisive year of the five-year plan. The communiqué admits that "the ministry of metallurgical industries fell short of the goals for pig iron."³⁶ Even the Communist government has recently acknowledged the disorganization of production, falsely attributing this result to the so-called anti-Communist saboteurs.³⁷ The critic Mihai Novicov wonders why the novel *Otel si pâine* contains some passages which are "shabby looking, inconsistent, flat".³⁸ It is not to be wondered that Ion Călugăru's work contains some passages which are flat; false feelings and descriptions always seem flat in any literature. The same difficulties are

³²*Kommunist*, loc. cit.

³³Novicov, Mihai, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

³⁴Novicov, Mihai, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

³⁵See Brannen, Barry, "The Soviet conquest of Romania", *Foreign Affairs*, (April, 1952). See also Markham, *op. cit.*, pp. 484, 486.

³⁶*Information bulletin*, (June, 1953, p. 9).

³⁷*Information bulletin*, (March, 1953, p. 24).

³⁸Novicov, Mihai, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

encountered in Communist-ruled Romania by the novelist who has assumed the task of expressing the "Socialist changes in the agricultural field." Let us take the example of the novel *Temelia* (the foundation), written by the Communist writer Eusebiu Camilar, who received the state prize for literature in 1952. In this novel the Romanian peasant feels deeply the desire for collectivization, a desire which is felt by peasants only in Communist novels. In reality, the Romanian peasant, like any other peasant, is an individualist. Even Lenin admitted that "the reasonable peasant thinks of the abolition of feudal exploitation in a little *bourgeois* way . . ." ³⁹ The idea of the anti-socialist position of peasantry is also admitted by Stalin. "The peasantry," writes Stalin, "are not socialistic by their position. But the peasant must, and certainly will, take the path of Socialist development . . ." ⁴⁰

Novels like *Otel si pâine* and *Temelia*, examples of Communist literary "realism" in Romania, can hardly be said to depict real life. According to the Communist dictionary, with reversed meanings, *real* means *Communist ideal*.

"Concretism" is the second Communist literary rule. In the Communist sense of the word, "concretism" is a "representation of a fact with strong significance". This rule is applied particularly to poetry. Abstract theories or images are not allowed as sources of inspiration. Only "facts" should inspire the Communist writers. Facts must be chosen from the Communist "life-material". A concrete lyrical work must be divided into three parts: the fact, the generalization and the conclusion. Let us take an example:

"The moon-light enters the poor, small hut.
Three hungry, abandoned kids are asleep inside.
One of them, a girl, sighs a long sigh."

"O! You committed this crime against these children.
You'll incur all my aversion and my hatred.
My pen is calling you to witness.
Should we forgive this horrible crime
To steal childhood from the children's soul?"

"But the hatred of this good people
Will terribly smite into your face
And then the Yugoslav child
Will have its childhood again."⁴¹

This is a "concrete" piece of poetry which contains three parts. In the first stanza "the fact" comes into view. It is taken from the Communist "life-material": three little Yugoslav orphans sleep on the floor of an abandoned

³⁹"The progressive development of the agricultural collectivization", *Cronica Românească*, (August, 1951, p. 54; June, 1952, p. 33).

⁴⁰Stalin, Joseph, *Problems of Leninism*, (New York, 1934), p. 82.

⁴¹Dragoi, Cezar, "Balada despre toamna si despre copiii jugoslavi" (Ballad about autumn and about the Yugoslav children), *Viața Românească*, (February, 1953, p. 113 f.)

small hut, in extreme poverty. In the second part, the "generalization" appears: to steal childhood from the children's soul is an unforgiveable crime. The "conclusion" appears in the third part. The author, after having asked himself what the Communist party requires from the Romanian people, answers that the Party requires the fight against Tito's régime. He has drawn this conclusion strictly in accordance with the Party: the instigation to fight for the "freedom" of the Yugoslav people.

In the verses entitled "The little girl selling matches," published by Victor Tulbure,⁴² a similar example can be found. In the first part we find "the fact" again: a little girl dies of starvation and cold in Copenhagen. This "fact" is carefully picked up from the Communist "life-material". The second part deals with the "generalization": many children die under these conditions in Copenhagen, whereas Romania's children are extremely happy. To reach the conclusion in the third part the author asks himself; what does the Communist Party order in similar circumstances? It orders the Romanians to feel compassionate toward the sufferings of the world proletarians, especially toward the sufferings of the Western proletarians. In feeling compassion for their sufferings the Communist poet expresses the proletarians' hope that one day all the world will be "liberated".

The two examples cited above are typical. Only by abiding by these rules can the Communist writer avoid the following literary sins that are absolutely forbidden: "abstractism", (which is the adoption of abstract theories and abstract images instead of "facts"),⁴³ "mannerism," (which is the too-frequent adoption of a personal point of view or a personal feeling),⁴⁴ and "isolation in an ivory tower" (which is the adoption of a literary inspiration from "outside" the Communist "life-material," as for example, Nature, Love, Spleen, Divinity, Patriotism).⁴⁵ Then the concept of lyricism is changed in practice and vaguely defined in theory. "Communist lyricism is the expression of a dynamic sentiment liberated from any servitude."⁴⁶ Communist "patriotism" is love for the Soviet country. Literary "cosmopolitanism" is denounced as the attachment to the enemies of the Soviet country. It is true that some Communist writers of the Western World were partly exempted from certain Communist literary rules, as Communist propaganda needed them badly abroad. Some of them are "mannerists", and somehow "intimists", as in the case of Paul Eluard. They are sometimes "isolated in their ivory tower", like Howard Fast, Jorge Amado, Louis Aragon, Andre Stil, Pablo Neruda and Martin Andersen Nexø.

The "Marxist-humanism" is the third Communist literary rule. Communists understand by "Marxist-humanism" the art of "making human

⁴²*Viața Românească*, (January, 1953) p. 157.

⁴³"Act de acuzare", (Indictment), *Viața Românească*, (February, 1953, p. 277).

⁴⁴Calin, Vera, "Literatura despre Grivita luptatoare", (The literature about the heroic Grivita), *Viața Românească*, (February, 1953, p. 181).

⁴⁵Novicov, Mihai, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

⁴⁶Calin, Vera, "Chipul omului înaintat în poezia noastră nouă", (The image of the advanced man in our new poetry), *Viața Românească*, (August, 1953, p. 260).

the literary characters of Communist heroes and at the same time rendering them suitable to the ideal of Communism". To exemplify this rule let us suppose that in a certain locality in Romania the secretary of the Party's organization is a short man, plain faced, ill natured, lazy and addicted to drink. The Communist writer's task is to write a novel whose principal character is this secretary. The obligation to be "realist" does not mean that the writer should depict this character as he is. The novelist should provide him with "the qualities corresponding to the Communist ideal". The novelist will have the perspicacity to envision such a being as he will appear on the Communist scene of the future. He will have the foresight of the "corresponding" hero of the future. Thus the hero will acquire a double quality: "he will move naturally" and "he will fit Communist ideals". "The Communist men are a special kind of human being!", Stalin declared. The following explanation had been given by Maxim Gorki: "The Communist hero in literature must be represented as being even more resplendent than he really is; this is not only a command of life, but also a command of the Socialist realism which must think hypothetically and the hypothesis, which means invention, is intimately related to hyperbole, which means exaggeration".⁴⁷

According to the opinion of the literary critics who have been inspired recently by Malenkov, "Hercules, Prometheus, Don Quixote and Faust are not fanciful portraits, but exaggerations of real facts in compliance with the laws and necessities of poetics. By the same token, a portrait of a Communist hero must be a portrait of *real* traits even if *exaggerated* in compliance with the laws and necessities of Communist poetics".⁴⁸

Nevertheless, the literary critic Mihai Gafită notes that very few writers succeed in "humanizing" the "Party's heroes".⁴⁹ For instance, the "Party's Heroes" in the novel of Stefan Andrei, *The new town*, are not natural.⁴⁹ This author's capital sin is "schematism", a sin committed by every writer who does not succeed in "humanizing" the literary characters. This happens primarily because of the author's incapacity to penetrate into the "life of Communism"; secondly because the author is not willing to make the Communist personages ridiculous by exaggerating too much their so-called qualities; thirdly because the author must be careful not to exaggerate the "qualities" of a certain hero who might be purged the following day by the Communist régime. The Communist writers do not know in which social environment to depict the Communist characters more successfully. Should they depict them in the factory surroundings, which means within the "production realm", or at home in their family surroundings "when the heroes, stretched out at full length, read the newspapers?"⁵⁰ The writers generally estimate that they have a greater chance

⁴⁷*Kommunist*, loc. cit.

⁴⁸*Viata Românească*, (February, 1953, p. 158). Our italics.

⁴⁹Gafita, Mihai, "Se construesc orase noi", (New towns are built), *Viata Românească*, (January, 1953, p. 287).

⁵⁰Gafita, Mihai, "Se construesc, orase noi", loc. cit.

of successfully depicting characters drawn from outside factory life, but they fear that in doing so they might neglect the "production realm".

Literature in Communist régimes is considered as a way of persuasion⁵¹ and "reeducation". There is no compromise, no coexistence between the *bourgeois* and the Marxist life in this field. The pursued goal is to build up the "Communist superman", using the formulas described in the preceding pages. The application of these formulas is carried out in Communist dominated Romania by a full range of state organizations: Party, Government, Writers' Union, "Official Editors" (who often modify the "writers' individual creative power"⁵²) and by a series of critics. The circulation of the literary works, after they have passed through the straining press of Communist criticism, reaches an average of 25,000 copies for each novel per year. This number would seem to be considerable for a free Romanian market, but practically means nothing. These copies are paid for by the State institutions and by Party members who are bound to buy the volumes. The circulation is, therefore, not so impressive.

The difficulties in pursuing the Communist goal by means of Communist literary formulas are acknowledged even by the Communist Romanian critics. Artificial formulas which have departed both from human nature and from human life cannot engender the power of persuasion, which is the first prerequisite of Communist literature. Artificial formulas are not only opposed to sincerity and simplicity; they are also opposed to Art itself.

WASHINGTON, D. C.

⁵¹See Guerard, Albert, *Art for Art's sake*, (New York, 1936) p. 205.

⁵²Gafita, Mihai, "Se construesc orase noi", *op. cit.*, p. 290.

NOTES

The first general session of the Assembly of Captive European Nations was held at the Carnegie Endowment International Center in New York City September 20 and 21, 1954. The aims of this Assembly were published in the "Declaration of Aims and Principles of Liberation of the Central and Eastern European Peoples," signed at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, on February 11, 1951. Since that time the organization has been slowly taking form. At this September 1954 meeting there were statements, resolutions and messages read and approved, along lines of the liberal democratic rejection of the present captive status of the native countries of the participants. These statements make no pretense of going deeply into details, as was to be expected of a meeting representing many countries and divergent political backgrounds and parties within each country. Among the better known speakers were George M. Dimitrov, Stefan Osusky, Tibor Eckhardt, Karol Popiel, Stefan Korboński, Constantin Visoianu, and Stanisław Mikołajczyk.

* * * * *

The Polish Section of the Free Europe Press, Free Europe Committee, has initiated the publication of a quarterly, *Zagadnienia Polskie* (Polish Problems), which is intended to present, in Polish, authoritative treatments of pressing problems of Polish life as seen from abroad. The first number (I, 1/2, 1954) carries the following articles: "Problem rolny w Polsce" (The agrarian problem in Poland) by Stanisław Skrzypek, "Partia komunistyczna w Polsce w świetle II Zjazdu PZPR" (The Communist Party in the light of the Second Congress of the United Workers' Party) by J. P., (in which particular attention is paid to the changes in constitution and personnel of the Party), "'Nowy kurs' w świetle II Zjazdu partii" (The New Course in the light of the Second Congress of the Party) by S. S., "Służba zdrowia w Polsce w cyfrach i w rzeczywistości" (Health service in Poland in statistics and in actuality) by Andrzej Regent, "Poziom nauczania w szkołach ogólnokształcących w Polsce" (The level of instruction in the lower and intermediate schools in Poland) by Jadwiga Wojciechowska (the level appears disappointingly low), "'Polska Ludowa' w periodycznej prasie sowieckiej w 1953 roku" ('People's Poland' in Soviet periodical literature in 1953) by J. W. It will be most helpful if this periodical can continue to appear carrying such comprehensive and factual articles.

* * * * *

The Tenth International Congress of Historical Sciences will meet in Rome, September 4-11, 1955. Announcements have appeared in a number of journals of the profession. The program is approximately completed, but has not yet been issued. Participants, their families, and those who wish to attend are urged to indicate their intentions at the earliest possible time to the Segretaria del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche, Giunta Centrale per gli Studi Storici, Via M. Caetani 32, Rome, Italy.

* * * * *

Columbia University announces the institution of a Program on East Central Europe. It is to be a two year program leading to a certificate, based on a collaborative schedule of work in departments of Slavic and Altaic language and literatures, history, government, economics, and the School of International Affairs. Scholarships of up to \$2,000 are available to qualified candidates in this field, beginning with September 1955.

* * * * *

A "Baltic Society," to bring together the "German-Latvian Association," the "German-Lithuanian Association" and the "German-Estonian Association" has been founded in Frankfurt a. M. It is not clear at this distance whether the membership and guidance is German-Balt or Baltic. In any event the German Bundesministerium für Ausgetriebene warmly supports the idea.

BOOK REVIEWS

FLORINSKY, MICHAEL T., *Russia: A History and an Interpretation*, 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1953. Pp. xv, viii, lxxvi, 1511. \$15.00.

The appearance of a new history of Russia designed for English-speaking readers must always be an event of major importance, since to date there has been no adequate treatment in English of the great pageantry spanning over one thousand years of Russian history. Hence the more disappointed one is when such a new treatment of Russia's past still leaves the gap unfilled.

Dr. Florinsky, who is associate professor of economics in the Department of Political Science of Columbia University, set for himself an ambitious task: to re-write and to re-interpret the whole scope of Russian history from the beginnings of the Russian state in Novgorod to the Bolshevik revolution and the consolidation of Soviet power under Lenin. He has divided his work into three parts: From Kiev to Moscow (six chapters); The First Moscow Period (five chapters); and The St. Petersburg Period (thirty-seven chapters). There was to be a fourth part: The Second Moscow Period, dealing with the thirty-five years of Soviet rule, but the author has omitted it indefinitely for lack of proper material. Thus by far the major portion of his work deals with the two hundred odd years of the imperial régime, but although Mr. Florinsky acknowledges in his preface "that the personalities of the tsars and emperors had a greater part in determining the course of Russian history than I was at first inclined to believe" (v. I, p. vi), he has absolutely nothing good to say about any of them with the exception of Emperors Peter III and Paul I, neither of whom left any marked imprint on their times and both of whom, if they had not been removed in time, would have led the Russian state and people to inevitable catastrophe.

Of the first Romanovs, Florinsky writes: "Not only Michael, but also his son (Alexis) . . . were singularly free from any pretensions to actual leadership in the affairs of the nation" (p. 249). If this opinion may be partially true with regard to Michael, it certainly cannot apply to Alexis, who showed both leadership and statesmanship on many occasions and particularly in his struggle against the pretensions of Patriarch Nikon. Further on Florinsky sums up the reign of Peter the Great as follows: "The moment the goddess of history, with whom historians so freely commune, is excluded from participation in human affairs, the flimsy and fanciful temple of Petrine greatness crumbles into dust" (p. 431). And he adds: "It is unquestionably true that there are striking similarities between the methods of Peter and those of Stalin" (*ibid.*), which, to say the least, is not only unhistorical, but also in bad taste.

But when Mr. Florinsky comes to the reign of Catherine the Great he sinks rather to the Waliszewski type of historical writing ("through the alcove"). In a chapter entitled "The Semiramis of the North," he not only enumerates Catherine's lovers, endowing them with such epithets as "seductive" or "robust," but also ends his relation with the following unwarranted comment: "The death of the empress freed Russia from the arbitrary rule of the handsome guardsman (Platon Zubov) whose manly charms had cast their spell over the aged disciple of Voltaire" (p. 509), whereas Zubov never exercised the influence attributed to him by Mr. Florinsky. And he sums up the whole of the eighteenth century in these astonishing words: "It was an unwritten law in eighteenth century Russia that a monarch who

acceded to the throne legally and without the support of a cabal could not maintain himself in power" (p. 500).

Not one of the Russian sovereigns of the nineteenth century fare any better under Mr. Florinsky's pen. Even Alexander II, who freed the Russian serfs, is described as a hypocrite or as an emotionally unstable person: "The nebulous, sentimental humanitarianism of Zhukovsky left little imprint on his pupil's character, except perhaps in fostering public display of his emotions, accompanied at times by copious tears" (p. 880).

But this iconoclastic and cynical attitude is not limited to crowned heads alone. According to Florinsky, Derzhavin, the greatest eighteenth century Russian poet, "owned his literary reputation to the numerous odes in which he sang the glory of Catherine" (p. 598) and Pushkin, Russia's greatest poet, "received a superficial (*sic*) education" and "had difficulty in writing his native tongue and even in his later years admitted that he was more at ease in French" (p. 733), both of which statements are palpably untrue. Stolypin, one of the great statesmen of the world and, perhaps, the greatest statesman Russia produced in modern times, is characterised as "cynical" (p. 1194), "ruthless" (pp. 1193, 1195), and as liking "adulation and applause" (p. 1194). Even the common Russian people do not escape Florinsky's wrath when he denies them the fundamental feature of their national characteristic—religiosity—by saying arbitrarily: "Contrary to the widely held assumption, the indifference of the masses towards religion is one of the characteristics of Russia's history" (p. 129). In this matter of religion, Florinsky seems to tread unfamiliar ground. According to him "the Church-Slavonic language in which the services were conducted was a peculiar venacular (*sic*) which not only the masses but even the educated people found difficult to comprehend and to follow" (p. 128) and the Great Schism (which, incidentally, he calls "cleavage") of the seventeenth century was the result of "minor points of ritual" and "petty and non-essential matters" (p. 287). He also condemns the practice of worship before holy icons as "superstitious" (p. 150) and says that the "adoration of the sacred objects can hardly be considered as a manifestation of Christian faith" (p. 129). Finally he says that "to oppose reason (does he mean "rationalization"?) to faith was in itself an unspeakable insult to the tradition of the Russian Church, with its devotion to dogma and external observance" (p. 168). Anyone familiar with the history and practices of the Russian Orthodox Church will detect the fallacy of these statements.

There are many other historical and geographical mistakes and misstatements. To quote at random: "Lithuania was incorporated in the Kingdom of Poland in 1386" (p. 43). At that time there was only a dynastic union. "No scholar has attempted the thankless task of condoning the crimes" of Ivan the Terrible (p. 189). Professor Wipper of the universities of Moscow-Riga-Moscow did. The ancient nomadic people known before 1917 as Kirghiz are emblazoned as Kazakhs (their present Soviet name) on a map representing Medieval Russia (p. 206). "Paul was never involved in a conspiracy to overthrow" Catherine the Great (p. 505). He was, as I pointed out in my book *Alexander I of Russia*. Some of the accomplishments "were merely impudent stage settings—the famous 'Potemkin villages' which were nothing but sham" (p. 529). Mr. Florinsky ignores the work of recent historians who have exploded the legend of "Potemkin villages." "The Second Hague conference, summoned on the initiative of Russia in 1907" (p. 1261). The initiative was that of President Theodore Roosevelt. On p. 1332, Mr. Florinsky states that the Brusilov offensive in 1916 "achieved no significant gains." Yet a few lines further on he writes: "Austria-Hungary was dealt a shattering blow

(by the offensive) that forced her to abandon her offensive in Italy and contributed to her disintegration. . . . The transfer to the Eastern front . . . of eighteen German divisions from France, of three German and two Turkish divisions from the Balkans was of material aid to the western allies during the crucial battles of Verdun and the Somme, and at Salonika" (p. 1332).

One is also surprised to find in this work by a Russian-speaking author mis-translations and misspellings of such words and names as *Russkaia Pravda*—Russian Truth (p. 33) instead of Russian Law; *Kniazhin* (p. 598, twice) instead of *Kniazhnin*; *Bazhenov* (p. 603) instead of *Bazhenov*; *Bezna* (pp. 1031, 1065) instead of *Bezdná*; *Kamnev* (eight times on pp. 1402, 1446, 1459, 1468) instead of *Kamenev*, and "Special Committee for the Struggle against Counter-Revolution, Sabotage and Speculation" (p. 1460)—the infamous "Cheka"—instead of Extraordinary Commission, etc. Nor is the elaborate bibliography very satisfactory, since it omits many important studies and lists many unimportant ones.

University of Toronto

LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY

Das Hauptstadtproblem in der Geschichte. Festgabe zum 90. Geburtstag Friedrich Meinecke. Jahrbuch für Geschichte des deutschen Ostens. Bd. 1. Foreword by Ernest Reuter, Mayor of Berlin. Tübingen: Niemayer, 1952. Pp. 308. DM 16.

The Friedrich Meinecke Institut of the Free University of Berlin dedicated this series of twelve studies on the problem of the capital city in history to the greatest living German historian. Nothing could have been more fitting. The focus of the several studies is quite naturally on Germany, Brandenburg and especially Berlin, seen through history and across the northern plain.

Wilhelm Berges in "Das Reich ohne Hauptstadt" (pp. 1-30) sets the scene for the problem of a capital in the Empire, by showing how from Charles the Great to modern times, the uncertainty of dynastic succession and the undiminished power of the nobility made it impossible for any centralism to gain strength. The potency of the cities and the remote control of the Church contributed to a condition of separatism. The study of Johannes Schultze, "Caput Marchionatus Brandenburgensis. Brandenburg und Berlin" (pp. 31-84) traces the growth of Brandenburg from the time of Albert the Bear (1157) as a potential nexus of territory and power in northeastern Germany. From then until the mid-fourteenth century the administrative center of the Mark moved with the margraves. Charles IV selected Berlin as the electoral residence, but, failing a continuity in the control of the Mark, the political significance and the commercial importance of the city grew but slowly until the seventeenth century.

The next study, "Die Idee des geistigen Mittelpunktes Europas im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert" by Carl Hinrichs (pp. 85-109) treats, as a manifestation of ideological compensation, the utopias of these two centuries. The chapter by Richard Dietrich "Von der Residenzstadt zur Weltstadt" (pp. 111-140), describes the growing pains of the city during the troublous times of the French occupation, the Befreiungskriege and the rapid rise of German industrialism, and the profound social and economic changes that transpired. The next chapters treat the psychological, political and physical aspects of Berlin's growth from 1871 to 1945. The last four chapters go outside Germany, studying the cases of four non-German capitals: Rome (in antiquity) by Peter Classen, Paris by Gustav Roloff, London by Paul Kluge and Poland's several capitals, Gniezno, Poznań, Cracow and Warsaw,

by Horst Jablonowski. The case of France's early resolution of the problem of a capital city as a focus of administration, culture and national sentiment is contrasted with Germany's almost opposite case with something approaching envy. Kluge's chapter on London is perhaps the clearest in the book; he succeeds in drawing together geography, economy, political forces, administrative problems, and the social connotations of the commercial elements in the city in a most satisfying way.

The reader can hardly avoid wondering why two other capitals, both more commonly considered to be in the German orbit than Poland, Rome or Paris, are not treated at all. Vienna presents a whole set of peculiar problems whose treatment could be most suggestive. Prague, a Slavic city subjected to Teutonic pressure for centuries, and indeed the capital of the Holy Roman Empire *der deutscher Nation*, for over a century, would have lent itself admirably to historical analysis.

University of Colorado

S. HARRISON THOMSON

MURAWSKI, KLAUS EBERHARD, *Zwischen Tannenberg und Thorn. Die Geschichte des deutschen Ordens unter dem Hochmeister Konrad von Erlichshausen, 1441-1449*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1953. Pp. 482. \$6.00.

For the Teutonic Knights, the early years of the fifteenth century marked the beginning of a period of constant decline. When Lithuania accepted Christianity at the end of the fourteenth century this Order of military monks lost its reason for existence. Until then, the Order had enjoyed a wide reputation throughout all of Europe for its supposed great mission of christianizing Lithuania, and for this purpose it received steady assistance, not only from the Germanies but from other countries as well. With the conversion of Lithuania, military aid stopped. The Order never recovered from its defeat at Tannenberg, for now there were no pagans to conquer, no crusade to lead, and therefore no more assistance from the rest of Europe. Humiliated, the Order became an ordinary state like its neighbors. The lofty mission which it had so pompously and insistently proclaimed was gone, but its internal structure remained the same. This provoked great confusion within the state, and, finally, open revolt of various nobles and towns who broke away and submitted to the suzerainty of the King of Poland, who was also Grand Duke of Lithuania. The Order had become an anachronism, unable to hold the respect of its own citizens who now demanded freedoms and rights of their own. Under such circumstances, the Order's unchanged *regulae* were hypocritical, or in any case meaningless, and this automatically led to internal disintegration.

The typical German doctoral thesis deals with one specific problem. But Mr. Murawski is different: his work is the survey of a whole period in history. The portion of the story of the Teutonic Order's decline upon which he focusses his attention is the comparatively short rule of Konrad von Erlichshausen, Grand Master from 1441 to 1449. Mr. Murawski touches upon many problems, discussing them in separate sections. One by one, he explains the circumstances determining the Order's existence at the time of Erlichshausen's ascent to power, reviews the Grand Master's actions and decisions concerning these problems, and describes the various conflicts within the Order. The author also considers the Erlichshausen

family tree, the Order's internal structure, its relations with the Empire and the Church, its trade policies and relations with its neighbors.

The author considers Erlichshausen a great statesman with vast plans to revive the Order's declining power. Erlichshausen tried to fulfill this design both by internal reform and by a solid international policy. He managed to restore the Knight's discipline and thus, at least to some degree, regain lost prestige for the Order. However, he failed to lay a foundation for future improvements; the reforms which he made were not on a large enough scale to prevent the steadily increasing disagreements between elements within the state, which later, after his death, were to be the cause of serious conflicts. The author's treatment of ideas is methodical and facile. Everywhere his method is analytical and his conclusions based on numerous quotations from a large bibliography. However, his conclusions are not far-reaching; his discussion often deteriorates into a mere cataloguing of facts.

Mr. Murawski dedicates his thesis to the cause of proving the eternal German character of "East Germany." Nowhere does he note that the territory under discussion was in fact nothing more than a colony, separated from the German mother country by Slavic lands, a state founded by the Order in the territory of the Prussian tribe. The colonial nature of this state is clearly seen from the dissertation's context—Mr. Murawski does show that this state possessed an entirely different way of life from that of contemporary Germany itself. Its rulers were military monks, immigrants from various German lands, who were not of local descent. This characteristic is common to all colonial territories. The author is concerned only with these ruling knights; he almost ignores the other social classes, except for a few words when explaining the Order's political ventures. Burghers and country nobles are mentioned only in connection with their activities against the Order, and the peasants are never mentioned at all. Cultural and national relationships are not discussed. The author disagrees with the conclusion that the enslaved former inhabitants of the Order's territory were for the most part systematically exterminated; however, he offers no justification for his opinion. Otherwise there is little originality in the presentation. The work is hardly more than a review of the official policies of the Teutonic Order during the period 1441-1449.

Toronto, Canada

A. SAPOKA

THIELEN, PETER GERRIT, *Die Kultur am Hofe Herzog Albrechts von Preussen (1525-1568)*. Göttingen: Musterschmidt Wissenschaftlicher Verlag, 1953. Pp. 256. DM 18.

This monographic study is the first comprehensive effort to rescue from complete oblivion certain aspects of the cultural history of the Duchy of Prussia, now absorbed in the Soviet Union and Poland, from 1525, the date of the secularization of the state of the Teutonic Knights, to the death of Duke Albert of Brandenburg-Ansbach in 1568. It is the result of research done in the history seminar of Professor Hubatsch at Göttingen, and has all the merits and some of the defects of a doctoral dissertation. Its documentation is meticulous and precise, its exploitation of the East Prussian archives, transferred toward the end of World War II from Königsberg to Goslar, is exhaustive, and the entire study is equipped with an elaborate critical apparatus and a complete bibliography. Its formidable scholar-

ship, however, is achieved at the expense of a larger interpretive grasp and perspicuous readability. Its central theme is the cultural life of the Duchy as seen through the perspective of the princely court, and its substance is largely based on the voluminous correspondence of the amiable and gifted Duke Albert with princes, musicians, painters, architects, and with German and Polish humanists. Structurally, this often meritorious study is patterned on the mistaken analogy between the Duchy of Prussia and those numerous Italian princes whose courts became the radiating centers of the Renaissance. The overwhelming historical phenomenon of the Duchy of Prussia after the secularization of the Teutonic Order in 1525, however, is not the Renaissance but the Protestant Reformation of which the author has little to say. For all his generous patronage of the arts and learning, Duke Albert's fame rests chiefly upon his abundant contributions to Protestant hymnology. It is not the humanists, reduced to a precarious and uneasy existence, who set the pace at the University and at the court with their neo-Latin poetry, but the formidable theological heavy-weight, Andreas Osiander, who became the most powerful spiritual mentor of Duke Albert. The University of Königsberg, the *Albertina*, founded by Albert in 1544, was pre-eminently the watch-dog of Protestant orthodoxy and the intellectual problems that agitated its professors were above all theological problems. The peculiar species of humanism most widely represented at the court and in the University was dedicated to the cultivation of the *sapiens et eloquens pietas* most forcefully advocated by Melanchthon, and was characteristic of Protestant Germany generally. In the end, this humanism produced that special variety of Protestant neo-scholasticism which sought to harmonize the basic concepts of the Reformation with Ciceronian rhetoric and Aristotelian ethics. Thus the author, whose literary design for a study in cultural history calls for an elimination of the Reformation proper from his discussion, is compelled in the end to pronounce both the *Albertina* and the court as a colony of Wittenberg.

Ohio State University

WALTER L. DORN

PASCAL, ROY, *The German Sturm und Drang*. New York: Philosophical Library, 1953. Pp. 347. \$4.75.

Late in his life Goethe once remarked that when he was eighteen years old Germany had just turned eighteen, too. He thus acknowledged that the outburst of his own youthful creativity happily coincided with a general awakening of the German poetic spirit, which, until the middle of the eighteenth century, seemed to have been enveloped in a hundred years' sleep. It is this breaking-through-the-husk which we call the *Sturm und Drang* (Storm and Stress), representing not so much just another literary school, but rather a revitalization and reaffirmation of the German spirit, evolving a new and revolutionary human attitude which was to leave its imprint not only on the Golden Age of German Literature, but contribute decisively to the formulation of new European concepts of social consciousness of history, religion, and poetics.

Of this movement Professor Roy Pascal is a superbly informed, lucid and sensitive chronicler. His book illuminates the total *Weltanschauung* of the Storm and Stress, by no means a "philosophy" in the usual sense, but rather a fruitful, albeit at times bewildering, groping for new insights into the condition of man. It is remarkable how successfully Pascal has brought order into the exalted, more often than not undisciplined, flow of spiritual and emotional energies, without

ever superimposing a "system" which would have distorted the dynamic vitalism and the unruly spontaneity of this young generation. He works in his presentation from the circumference to the center, starting out with thumbnail sketches of the leading personalities, Hamann and Herder, Goethe and Schiller, Klinger and Lenz, and gradually leading to the full unfolding of the Storm and Stress cult of the creative personality; of their passionately monistic concept of mind and matter (corresponding to their religious pantheism); of their (mainly Herder's) interpretation of history as an organic growth, indissolubly linked to the geographical, climatic and biological conditions, as opposed to the rigidly teleological view of the Enlightenment; of their revolutionary affirmation of poetry as a "dynamic and necessary function of the totality of man," and not as a handmaid to theology, moral philosophy or, even worse, a socially conditioned and socially oriented pastime. The discussion of these topics represents the very core of Pascal's book, although he does not under-rate the importance of the evolvment of the new political and social consciousness of the Storm and Stress generation. Yet he sees clearly that the unfavorable sociological conditions in eighteenth century Germany relegated the activities and thoughts of the Storm and Stress writers in these fields to a place definitely inferior to the achievements of their contemporaries in France and England. It is rather in the metaphysical fields, in their re-evaluations of religious, existential, historical and aesthetic problems, that the Storm and Stress has reoriented and revitalized the thinking of Germany and the Western World.

It is one of the chief merits of Pascal's book that it places the evolution and the achievements of the Storm and Stress mentality within the framework of the totality of Western European intellectual history in the second part of the eighteenth century. He clearly shows how the philosophies of LaMettrie and d'Holbach contributed to the Storm and Stress's strongly realistic conception of nature; how Rousseau's principles on society and art were assimilated; how Spinoza served as a catalyst in the religious thinking of this generation; how Herder digested and re-shaped in his philosophy of history the theories of Montesquieu and, perhaps even more decisive, of the Scottish Historical School. In every case Pascal admirably succeeds in illuminating the sources from which the Storm and Stress writers drew, and in pointing out the spot where the roads parted, where these young Germans went one (and at times much more than one) step beyond. I would like to single out as a particularly successful example of Mr. Pascal's method his discussion of Herder's *On the Origin of Language*, a chapter which in spite of its brevity makes it fully understandable why Herder's essay could be called "the first rude foundation of the science of comparative philology and of the deeper science of the ultimate nature of language" (J. Sully).

It may be ungrateful and a sign of pedantic carping to find any faults at all with a book as excellent as Pascal's. But since it is so good and substantial, one would like it to be quite perfect. Pascal fails to relate the Storm and Stress to the animistic and spiritualistic philosophies of the Renaissance (Pico della Mirandola, Paracelsus, Cusanus, Kepler), e.g., to the vital concept of the microcosm which may throw Herder's and surely young Goethe's views into sharper relief than the (thoroughly legitimate) reference to Spinoza. A linking-up with this specific intellectual under-current would have helped Mr. Pascal to highlight even more the importance of the notion of organicism which to me seems the all-informing center of the Storm and Stress thinking, and which in Pascal's interpretation does not quite occupy the key position which it deserves. But these are no more than trifles (still more trifling my objection to calling the bishopric of Osnabrück a "state"), and we are looking forward to the author's promised second volume, an

analysis of the poetic qualities of the Storm and Stress's imaginative works proper, which, together with this more theoretical first book, will then provide us with an authentic and definitive picture of the whole complex of the Storm and Stress.

Ohio State University

OSKAR SEIDLIN

HAUPTMANN, FERDINAND, *Osterreich-Ungarns Werben um Serbien 1878-1881*. Vienna: Verlag Ferdinand Berger, 1952. Pp. 122-249.

No period in the history of the Eastern question has aroused such interest and been endowed with so many monographs as the "eighteen seventies." The latest contribution to the growing literature on the subject deals with the pro-Austrian tendency of Serbian foreign policy, culminating in the so-called Secret Convention (1881), a landmark in the dependence of Serbia on the Dual Monarchy.

The close alignment of Prince Milian with Austria-Hungary had various causes, the most important of which was the unfavorable (from the Serbian point of view) turn of events during the Eastern crisis of 1875-1878. This was felt all the more grievously as the romantic movement had a delayed flowering in Serbia, long after its decline in Western Europe, and had kindled rather exaggerated hopes of Serbian martial capabilities and Turkish weaknesses. The successes of the Serbian insurgents in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1875) seemed to confirm these hopes, only to be disproved in the war which Serbia and Montenegro fought single-handed against Turkey in 1876. The following year's campaign and the Treaty of San Stefano shattered another illusion: the belief that Serbian and Russian interests were identical and that Czarist diplomacy would therefore support Serbian claims to Bosnia and Macedonia.

The Russian neglect of what were felt to be vital and legitimate Serbian interests induced Prince Milan to change his foreign policy by reaching a close understanding with Austria-Hungary. That great power had already backed some of Serbia's territorial claims at the Congress of Berlin and provided throughout the nineteenth century the main market for Serbian exports. Furthermore, her diplomats were prepared, in return for concessions elsewhere, to support the Obrenović dynasty against its rivals, and also the expansion of Serbia towards Macedonia. Such support was not to be despised at the moment when the Western Balkans were within her sphere of influence, and Prince Milan was firmly convinced that war between Austria-Hungary and Russia would shortly break out. Hence his eagerness to bring the isolation of Serbia to an end, a desire that the Ballplatz reciprocated for its own reasons.

Dr. Hauptman's detailed study of Austro-Serbian relations and negotiations is based on his doctoral dissertation presented at the University of Graz in 1944, and published in Vol. V. of the *Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs*. The author makes available a great deal of material from the Austrian State Archives and uses fully the works of Professor S. Jovanović and Dr. G. Jakšić, the leading Serbian authorities on the subject. His careful documentation and objective approach provide a useful addition to our understanding of Austria-Hungary's foreign policy in the Balkans.

London Oratory School
Chelsea, England

IVAN AVAKUMOVIĆ

VON RAUCH, GEORG, *Russland: Staatliche Einheit und nationale Vielfalt*. Munich: Isar Verlag, 1953. Pp. 235. \$3.90.

The dominant strain in Russian historiography since the age of Karamzin has placed the emphasis on the process of political unification and centralization—the gathering of all the “Russian lands” under the aegis of Moscow. The historians of this “statist” school, looking upon the gradual extension of Moscow’s authority as the principal theme of Russian historical development, tended to regard all the forces which hampered this process as retrogressive, un-national, and perhaps even somewhat Don Quixotic. This attitude helps to explain the reason why neither the anti-autocratic opposition of the Russian upper classes, such as the boyars’ nor the anti-centralist opposition of the historical and national regions has received sufficient attention from Russian historians. Prof. von Rauch has chosen as the subject of his interesting study one feature of his neglected counter-current: the conflict between the idea of unification of the Russian state, and the voices urging decentralization. His work is a historical survey of the centripetal tradition in Russian history from the inception of the Moscow state until the establishment of the Soviet Union, with stress on the problems of federalism.

In a book which is barely over two hundred pages in length this enormous, complex, and little studied problem can only be sketched in its broadest outlines. The author unnecessarily restricts even further the space available to him for the analysis of his main topic by failing to isolate the centripetal forces from some other phenomena of Russian life with which they had been historically connected only in an indirect way; thus he deals with such problems as Panslavism, which is not essential for the exposition of his topic. On the other hand, his analysis of such vital questions as the attitude of the Great Russian and minority parties towards the issue of Russia’s political structure is quite superficial and for the most part based on secondary sources. In dealing with the national movements among the minorities of the Russian Empire, Prof. von Rauch supplies much interesting information on the Baltic peoples and the Finns, especially the German inhabitants of Esthonia and Latvia; he is considerably less reliable when dealing with the Moslems, Jews, and Caucasians.

The present book is unfortunately marred by numerous inaccuracies in the references and the bibliography, and occasional ones in the text itself. The proof-reading is extraordinarily poor, and it is quite common to find discrepancies between the notes and the bibliography—e.g. in note No. 1 on p. 89, where four books are cited, there are no less than four such discrepancies. The Menshevik leader Irakli Tseretelli is consistently confused with the right-wing, pro-German historian Michael Tseretelli, both being treated as one and the same person. The reader acquainted with the history of Russian Marxism reads with some surprise that Lenin was the founder of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party [p. 146], and that Stalin in his 1913 essay on Marxism and the National Question interpreted national self-determination to mean the right of separation [p. 201]. It is an even more serious offense to attempt to “explain” the participation of the Jews in the Russian revolutionary movement by a single reference to a statement made by a Russian émigré mystic to the effect that to the Jews socialism is a substitute for the “Christianity which they betrayed” [p. 190]. Errors and oversimplifications of this nature seriously decrease the value of this interesting and objective study.

Russian Research Center,
Harvard University

RICHARD PIPES

RATHJE, JOHANNES, *Die Welt des freien Protestantismus. Ein Beitrag zur deutsch-evangelischen Geistesgeschichte dargestellt an Leben und Werk von Martin Rade*. Stuttgart: Ehrenfried Klotz Verlag, 1952. Pp. 527. DM 36,60.

This sizable volume is at once a biography of a leading churchman, an account of a highly influential periodical, and an intellectual history of German Protestantism as mirrored in the letters of the man and the pages of his journal.

This man, Martin Rade, born in 1857, was the son of a Lutheran minister and was himself destined for a career in the church. His first position was a country parish in Schönbach (Oberlausitz). In 1892 he was called to the pulpit of St. Paul's in Frankfurt a. M. In 1900 he became a *dozent* in systematic theology at Marburg University and professor *ordinarius* in 1921. In November, 1886, he founded, together with his friends from Leipzig University days, W. Bornemann, P. Drews, and F. Loofs, the *Christliche Welt*, designed for the educated layman.

As editor of the *Christliche Welt*, Rade was involved in almost all the crucial questions of both a religious and political nature confronting Protestantism for over a half a century. Having studied under Adolf Harnack at Leipzig, he belonged to the Ritschlian school of theology. His religious views are best expressed in his dogmatics, "Glaubenslehre", three volumes, 1924-27. He thought of himself as an unconfessional Lutheran and, indeed, combined a basically pious Christian faith with the greatest enthusiasm for freedom of thought and belief. In spite of his protest that his journal had always remained true to its original principles, there was an unmistakable shift toward the theological left. Rade attended international assemblies of religious liberals in Boston (1907), Berlin (1910), and Paris (1913). He exchanged visits with English clergyman to promote an atmosphere of friendship and opposed a moratorium on love even in wartime. This volume provides a close-up view of many great personalities on the religious scene, men like Ernst Troeltsch, Rudolf Otto, Friedrich Heiler, and Paul Tillich. What a commentary on the changing theological scene is presented in Harnack's lines to Rade on the Barthian dialectic: "I would never have thought that still another speculation might arise among us for which I possess no antenna."

Rade consistently championed the non-conformist, religious and political. He organized the "Society of the Friends of the *Christliche Welt*" in 1903 to bolster closer personal relations and not for party purposes. But it was inevitable that he and his journal should become involved in all the major controversial questions. Like his brother-in-law, Friedrich Naumann, he promoted the Christian-Socialist movement and participated in the Evangelical-Socialist Congresses. After the war he himself became a Democratic representative to the Prussian constitutional assembly—*Politik ist Christenpflicht*. He had the distinction in the end of being dismissed from office in 1933, having his house searched, and his Society dissolved by the omniscient state. The year after his death in 1940, the *Christliche Welt*, too, succumbed to a repressive edict.

Here, then, is a picture of a man of substance, active and influential in religion and church affairs, politics and social questions. Here, too, is an excellent and comprehensive study of the development of German Protestantism and theology, especially valuable for the decades around the turn of the century. Rathje, a layman and a journalist, has made an important contribution to church history which will take its place alongside the biographies of *Friedrich Naumann* by Theodor Heuss, of *Adolf Harnack* by his daughter, Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, and of *Ernst Troeltsch* by Walther Köhler.

University of Missouri

LEWIS W. SPITZ

I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani. Terza Serie, 1896-1907, Volume I (10 marzo 1896-30 aprile 1897); Settima Serie, 1922-1935, Volume I (31 ottobre 1922-26 aprile 1923); Ottava Serie, 1935-1939, Volume XIII (12 agosto-3 settembre 1939). Rome: La Libreria dello Stato, 1953. Pp. xxxviii, 356; lviii, 582; lii, 501.

The ambitious undertaking of the publication of the Italian diplomatic documents is proceeding apace; here are three more volumes brought out during the year 1953.¹ They are edited respectively by Professors Morandi (succeeded by Professor Perticone upon his death), Moscato and Toscano. These three volumes deal with widely separated intervals of time; thereby they serve to bring out certain permanent, or at least durable, aspects of Italian foreign policy while reflecting the changing conditions and tempo of its operation. In keeping with the purpose announced with the initiation of the whole project, use has been made of other sources besides state archives. Thus, the papers of Caetani and of Visconte Venosta, who in succession occupied the foreign office, have been drawn upon in the first of these volumes, while some of the documents in the third are reproduced from Ciano's *L'Europa verso la catastrofe*.

The first volume deals with the period following the fall of Crispi brought about by his ill-managed and ill-fated imperial attempt in East Africa. The task of Rudini, who took over from Crispi, was to liquidate the unfortunate episode; this did not involve any elaborate negotiations and led to the treaty of October, 1896, with Menelik which closed for a long time the chapter of Italian ambitions in that quarter. There is some evidence of Russian interest suspected of aiming at obtaining a territorial foothold in the Red Sea; out of it grew the talk of Russian mediation, which however did not go beyond abstract consideration. There was also a scheme (see Doc. 399) for leasing the Italian possessions in Africa to King Leopold of the Belgians on the strength of his experience in the Congo.

But the more important task of Rudini lay in Europe where he initiated a major reorientation of Italian policy. In concrete terms, this meant the problem of relations with France, which in turn meant dealing with two specific issues: the tariff war dating back to 1888 and the Tunisian question. Only the second of these was definitely settled at the close of this volume with what amounted to the Italian acceptance of the French position in Tunis.

If it would be too much to describe this agreement as a rapprochement, there were nevertheless broad implications in the move. They were part of the shifting picture of European alignments initiated with the Franco-Russian alliance. Both Tornielli in Paris and Nigra in Vienna were sensitive to the changing climate and it is revealing to find the first speaking already at this time of France aiming at the isolation of Germany (Doc. 6), while Nigra cautions that the danger for Italy lies in the possibility of an Anglo-French understanding or of Anglo-German differences (Doc. 70). If perhaps premature, this was also accurate foresight. The widespread continental suspicion of British policy is also reflected here.

More immediately, there was concern in Rome over French designs in Tripoli. What gave point to these fears was the possible reopening of the Eastern Question as a consequence of the Cretan disturbance. The volume closes in the midst of mounting tension mingled with hopes that the ripples originating in Crete, even if they could not be prevented from reaching Balkan Macedonia, would

¹Volume I of the first series and Volume XII of the eighth series were reviewed in the April, 1954 issue of the *Journal*.

stop short of involving the Powers. Throughout we see diplomacy operating in classical fashion, with both caution and leisure, striving to defend limited national interests, but equally the European equilibrium and peace as a whole.

The opening period of the Fascist era with which the second of the volumes under review is concerned brought little change in these methods and their operation. Even Sforza's resignation from the Paris embassy does not appear as a gesture of serious opposition or disapproval, and there were no other significant changes in diplomatic personnel. What impresses one rather is the orderliness and mildness of the change and the continuity of policy: if Fascism meant to put an end to the immediately preceding trend toward retrenchment and abandonment, there was no attempt to undo the accomplished results whether in Yugoslavia, in Albania or in Turkey, save where the still open matter of the Dodecanese was concerned. What could Italy do for that matter? As Frassati, in a long and interesting analysis from Berlin (Doc. 103) indicates, her main asset was lost with the complete defeat of Germany and the consequent destruction of the balance of power which put French influence in a controlling position throughout the continent.

Two problems fill this volume to an almost exclusive degree: Germany—more narrowly Reparations and the Ruhr episode—and the negotiation of a new settlement with Turkey to take the place of the still-born Treaty of Sèvres of August 1920. Where Germany was concerned, Italy, like England, was generally favorable to some restoration at least of German power with a view to reestablishing the general European balance. But Italy was also realistic; in the last analysis, she would align herself with France as the best way to defend her own interests, though always remaining on the alert for opportunities to modify the effects of French "hegemony."

There was besides the lingering suspicion of Britain. Had not a *quid pro quo* been arranged on the basis of a British free hand in the Near East in exchange for a French free hand in Germany? Britain seemed strangely passive where the latter country was concerned, and the Ruhr episode, in Italian eyes, was primarily a political operation. In Turkey also there was much Italian effort to reach a prior understanding with France on the score of economic interests. Little scope is given to the violent nationalistic component associated with Fascism. If an eye is kept on Corsican developments, anti-French demonstrations in Italy must be curbed as well as utopian designs in East Africa.

If the initial stages of Fascism were marked by reasonableness and moderation, its later performance might be cited as illustration of the corrupting effects of uncontrolled power. The earlier picture has quite changed in the eighth series which the thirteenth volume brings to a close. In a sense it is the least interesting of the three volumes under discussion for the reason that so much of its content has already been revealed from American and other publications of Axis sources. Attolico in Berlin and the Italians in general saw the situation much more clearly than the directors of German policy. Hitler and Ribbentrop really seemed to believe that the western democracies would remain inactive, thus allowing Germany a localized war with Poland; Hitler himself appeared to be quite convinced by his own atrocity propaganda, and this naturally made it difficult to deal with such a state of mind.

To a degree one is reminded of the situation of July 1914 when Germany's rash commitments to Austria robbed the former country of the possibility of exercising a moderating influence. Likewise in 1939 Italy was too far committed, her freedom of action lost in her own estimation, if one is to judge by the mildness of her remonstrances at Germany's breach of the terms of the agreement embodied in

the Pact of Steel. Yet this was in a sense quite logical, for with the fundamental premise of war Mussolini agreed, his only difference being that he wanted it later. But all this, as indicated before, is for the most part well known, and this last volume of documents merely rounds out the record without substantially adding to it.

The standard of editorship remains the same high one as in the initial volumes, typographical errors are few, and one looks forward to further additions to this valuable collection.

Barnard College
Columbia University

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

GERSON, LOUIS L., *Woodrow Wilson and the Rebirth of Poland, 1914-1920*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. Pp. 166. \$4.00.

It is a curious fact that thirty-five years after the First World War there does not yet exist a critical and exhaustive study of the United States diplomacy during that conflict. Here is a study that attacks not the whole subject but a significant segment of it, President Wilson's policy towards the restoration of Poland.

The author uses, in addition to published materials in the Polish and western languages, documentary materials drawn from the Wilson Papers in the Library of Congress and the House Papers as well as the William Wiseman and Frank Polk Papers which form a part of the House collection at Yale University. Unfortunately, the author did not use the files of the State Department in the National Archives, which are much better organized than the chaotic Wilson Papers. The originals of President Wilson's letters to Secretary of State Lansing are there, appended to the State Department correspondence, to which they pertain. The State Department files contain much valuable material on the Polish question unavailable in the Wilson Papers. There is, for instance, a voluminous correspondence addressed to the President through William B. Wilder, a Princeton classmate of Wilson's, by the Polish Socialists in New York, B. D. Kulakowski, A. H. Debski (who proudly appended to his signature "personal friend of General J. Piludski"), and their ally J. Sosnowski, who hotly disputed the leadership of R. Dmowski and I. Paderewski. This correspondence would have interested Gerson, since he is highly critical of the activities of Paderewski and of the President's Polish policy.

Gerson's thesis is that the President's Polish policy was an ill-compounded mixture of ignorance, misguided liberalism, uncritical acceptance of Paderewski's false propaganda, and a concern over the Polish-American vote. Although he never explicitly says so, he strongly implies that the Poles were unworthy of Allied sympathy and that the restoration of Poland was a mistake. If that is indeed his view, this reviewer would have welcomed the suggestion of an alternate solution of the Polish question. It seems to this reviewer that whatever the motives of President Wilson's Polish policy, he had little choice but to approve the restoration of Poland. During the war he could hardly suggest that the Poles be handed over to Imperial Germany or Bolshevik Russia or that they be divided between the two. There was of course the Austrian solution, which was acceptable perhaps to the majority of Poles and which President Wilson did not definitely reject at the time of the Fourteen Points (January 8, 1918), but when the armistice came Austria vanished, and in her place there rose immediately Poland and the Successor States, created, it is well to remember, not at the point of Allied

bayonets but by the efforts of the Poles themselves. It would have taken Allied military intervention to suppress them, which was hardly feasible at the time, considering the state of Allied public opinion. And above all, Allied military intervention might have driven them into the hands of the Bolsheviks, which was the last thing desired by Allied statesmen.

This is a revisionist account which contents itself with analyzing and pointing out the many contradictions in Wilson's policy, but seldom endeavors to explain them. It has many faults of organization. Thus a good deal of space is devoted to Lenin's views on the Polish question, which are historically interesting but of no direct bearing on the President's Polish policy. On the other hand, the French Polish policy during the war, which affected Wilson's policy considerably, is barely mentioned. British policy during the war is also only glossed over. At one point the author explains an action of the British Government by its concern "over the Polish vote in Great Britain" (p. 79). This reviewer was unaware that there ever was an appreciable Polish vote in Britain.

This book is a pioneer study and will by no means be the last word on the subject. Nevertheless, the author should be congratulated on his courage in tackling a new and difficult subject and realistically analyzing President Wilson's policy, while most historians still content themselves with mouthing old clichés about Wilsonian idealism.

Florida State University

VICTOR S. MAMATEY

ORVIK, NILS, *The Decline of Neutrality, 1914-41*. Oslo: Johan Grundt Tanum Forlag, 1953. Pp. 294.

The author treats neutrality both before and after, as well as during, the period indicated in the title. The story is one which, despite its technicalities, is not without a certain drama, at least for the political scientist sensitized to the interplay of law and politics. The author, however, although well aware of the significance of his materials, does not make the most of them. His work is uncommonly good for a doctoral dissertation, for such it is, but falls short of treating the subject with the art which it deserves. Stretches of the study are written in a relaxed style, making it longer than need be and reducing by that much its effect. The conclusion, however, is notable for both its insight and incisiveness.

The story told here is not new, but a highly useful purpose is served in bringing it all together and down to date. The author has a good appreciation for the political conditions which underlay the rise and fall of neutrality, avoiding thereby the sterility of a wholly legal treatment of the subject. While recognizing the inapplicability of the norms of abstention and impartiality to the twentieth century conditions of international politics, he does not attack neutrality as such after the fashion of the dogmatic partisans of the League of Nations, who depicted it as an unmitigated evil and collective security as an absolute good. Rather he would seem to argue that neutrality was both feasible and desirable in an age when there were many powers of roughly equal strength, which were in some degree economically self-sufficient, and which were not disturbed by ideological conflict.

Strangely enough, these conditions, except for that of economic self-sufficiency, are also those most favorable for the successful functioning of a system of collective security. The decline of neutrality, then, has not been owing to the competing ideology of collective security but rather to objective conditions, unfavorable to

both neutrality and collective security. The author did not himself point up this irony and may indeed entertain a different view. This reviewer, however, was struck by what seems to be a certain inner connection between the fortunes of both neutrality and collective security. Although these systems differ radically in their assumptions and in their implications for policy, it is lamentably true that neither can operate to the best advantage in the presence of superpowers facing each other across an ideological gulf.

The law of neutrality reached its zenith in the Hague Conventions of 1907 and the Declaration of London of 1909. In neither of the two world wars, however, has the status of third states resembled this model, which the diplomats so carefully constructed. In the First World War those states which managed to stand apart did so only by virtue of desperate bargaining, the law of neutrality, insofar as it was brought into play at all, serving merely as an initial point of departure. In the Second World War, even the name fell into disuse, giving way to "non-belligerency."

It is, of course, somewhat misleading to speak of the "decline" of neutrality, inasmuch as it never played a dominant role in relations between states. Nor has collective security, another attempt on the part of international law to establish a working model of international politics, been much more successful. The upshot, so far as American policy is concerned, would seem to be that, much as we might wish it, there is not to be found in international law a ready-made foreign policy.

Indiana University

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG

STERNBERG, FRITZ, *The End of a Revolution: Soviet Russia—From Revolution to Reaction*. Translated from the German by Edward Fitzgerald. New York: John Day, 1953. Pp. 191. \$3.00.

It is Sternberg's thesis that the Russian revolution was progressive in an economic sense in contrast to Tsarist "feudalism", but that under Stalin it became reactionary in an economic as well as in a political and social sense. He thus feels that the Russian revolution bears comparison with the French only at its earliest stage and then only in the economic realm, but that in every other respect it brought only a greater subjection of the Russian people. The view of Russian history implicit in this thesis is rather strangely at odds with the facts, in so far as it ignores the rapid modernization of Russia in the generation or two before the revolution. Many would maintain that the essential economic changes associated with the French revolution were achieved in Russia in the years after 1861, and that to call Russia "feudal" in 1917 is a very inaccurate use of that term.

Within the framework of this somewhat questionable interpretation, Sternberg presents a brief but vigorous argument against the Soviet form of dictatorship and the power that it represents in international relations. Writing as a socialist, Sternberg takes particular pains to point out that the rapid growth in Russia's industrial production since 1928 has been accomplished without increase in real wages for either worker or peasant. This exploitation of the great mass of the Russian people by the Soviet government is the main characteristic of the Soviet régime in the author's view, and he asserts that it resembles Marx's program in neither theory nor practice.

Sternberg's analysis of Soviet foreign relations stresses the difference between Soviet policy in Europe and in Asia. He points out that Russia's expansion into Eastern Europe was essentially military, and that the main purpose of Soviet

policies in that region is to strengthen the Russian economy. Sternberg also sees Soviet policy as aiming at the ultimate absorption of Western Europe, and pending the achievement of this goal the aim is to isolate it from the United States. He further notes that Russia is a technically advanced country by comparison with Asia, and that in the absence of a vigorous Western policy the Soviet Union has an opportunity to catch the imagination of Asiatic leaders bent on modernization.

The main lines of Sternberg's argument are familiar enough, although his presentation is weakened by the fact that he relies on rather haphazard statistics and does not appear to be acquainted with the extensive pertinent materials available in United Nations publications and in much other recent research on the Soviet area. The forcefulness and brevity of his argument nevertheless gives it strength, and it should provide interesting reading not only for wavering socialists—to whom it appears to be primarily directed—but to many liberals as well.

Princeton University

C. E. BLACK

BONOMI, IVANOE, *La politica italiana dopo Vittorio Veneto*. Turin: Einaudi, 1953. Pp. 173. Lire 1000.

Written partly as reminiscences and partly as "objective history," Bonomi's essays provide a sane and informative discussion of some aspects of the crisis in Italian democracy that followed the First World War.

The late author, a democrat of slightly socialist outlook, was closely associated with parliamentary events of the era, as he held the premiership from July 1921 to February 1922 and lesser offices in other periods. He retired from political life during the Fascist dictatorship, but returned to prominence in 1943, when he played a part in the overthrow of the *Duce*. From June 1944 until the summer of 1945 he was once more premier. In 1944 he published in *La politica italiana da Porta Pia a Vittorio Veneto* his interpretation of Italian political history between 1870 and 1919. He had intended to discuss the years 1919 to 1925 in an equally large second volume, but death intervened. In consequence, this volume contains only the ten chapters he had completed, and covers the period through Giolitti's last ministry (June 1920 to July 1921). It is unfortunate that the chapters dealing with Bonomi's own ministry were not completed.

The author, who sympathized with much of Woodrow Wilson's peace program, offers a shrewd analysis of the reasons why Italy's representatives at the peace conference failed to win foreign support. He notes, for example, that war-time Italian governments had failed to cultivate public opinion in the Allied countries. More important, Premier Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino were inconsistent when they demanded in one breath scrupulous adherence to the territorial clauses of the Treaty of London—nevertheless that some of these violated the principle of self-determination—and yet in the next breath demanded the annexation of Fiume on the basis of self-determination, even though that city had not been included in the secret treaty. The frustration and disillusionment which many Italians felt toward both the war and the peace settlement facilitated the rapid growth of leftist and rightist extremism.

The impact on Italian politics of Lenin's seizure of power in Russia was also profound. Italian Socialists came to believe that their country could, like Russia, move quickly into the stage of the dictatorship of the proletariat, despite the immaturity of the Italian industrial capitalist system. The Socialist movement thus became predominantly "maximalist" in its attitude, and although it sought to

elect members to parliament, it thought mainly in terms of direct action outside parliament. The climax of this policy was the workers' occupation of the factories in September 1920, but any possibility that the Socialists might overthrow the government disappeared quickly thereafter, Bonomi insists.

In his chapter on the 1919 parliamentary elections, the author declares that these had greater political repercussions than any event in Italy since the overthrow of the Right in 1876. The results of proportional representation, which was introduced in 1919, were by no means entirely beneficent, Bonomi argues, because neither of the two mass parties (Socialists and Catholic Populists) which emerged was willing or able to assume governmental responsibility, while the old ruling élite of liberals were almost completely defeated at the polls because of their lack of strong party organization. The result was ministerial instability.

Other chapters discuss the vacillations of the early Fascist movement and the importance of its links with the aggressive, new post-war class of agricultural landowners in the Po valley and with certain northern industrialists; the impact on Italian public opinion of D'Annunzio's seizure of power in Fiume; the unsure role played by the leaders of the new Popular Party; the downfall of Nitti's ministry in 1920; the final Giolittian cabinet, and the defeat of "red extremism." In an appendix, the publishers have included reprints of two newspaper articles by Bonomi: one in defense of Giolitti's final government, in which Bonomi served as Minister of War; the other in regard to the Facta cabinet crisis of July 1922, when Bonomi would have been able to assume the premiership had it not been for the unwillingness of the chief "maximalist" Socialists to join Filippo Turati in renouncing the doctrinaire Marxist policy of abstention from any bourgeois government. The refusal of the "maximalists" to share in the responsibilities of Italian government was one of the important factors which made possible Mussolini's advent to power in October.

While Bonomi tries to be objective, his personal sympathies for Bissolati, Giolitti, and Nitti in preference to Salandra, Sonnino, and Orlando are clear. The revelations in the book are seldom surprising, but they clarify some of the events in which Bonomi was a participant. The general tone of the essays reveals clearly the middle-of-the-road political philosophy of one of Italy's most distinguished anti-Fascists.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

BENTWICH, NORMAN, *The Rescue and Achievement of Refugee Scholars, the Story of Displaced Scholars and Scientists, 1933-1952*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1953. Pp. 107. 6.25 guilders.

In response to a protest by Max Planck against his policies, Hitler is said to have stated: "If the dismissal of Jewish scientists means the annihilation of contemporary German science, we shall do without science for a few years." Within two years after the Nazis assumed power in Germany some twelve hundred scholars were dismissed from their posts in state universities and research institutes, among them six Nobel Prize winners. By 1937 their numbers had increased to seventeen hundred and they had been joined by some 3,500 refugee students.

Anschluss in 1938 caused more than four hundred Austrian scholars to lose their posts and over a hundred scholars left Italy when Mussolini pushed his own anti-Semitic campaign in that year. Meanwhile, a number of intellectual casualties of the Spanish Civil War had sought succor abroad. Czechoslovak scholars

joined the migration after Munich and Poles after Hitler unleashed his attack on their country in 1939. The Nazi blitzkrieg in 1940 caused Danes, Norwegians, Dutch, and French scholars to swell the ranks of the uprooted intellectuals as the rescuers of the early thirties fled with those they had saved. The "most remarkable physical movement in the intellectual world since the migration of the Greek scholars from Constantinople in the fifteenth century" had been brought about. After 1945, as after 1917, intellectual refugees from Communism joined the migration of minds.

Among those who voluntarily or involuntarily sought freedom from bigotry were Sigmund Freud, who could take wry satisfaction from this most recent and personal proof of the irrationality of his fellow men; Arnold Schönberg, who fled the political dissonances of Europe to bring atonality to musical America; Ernst B. Chain, co-discoverer of penicillin; and Albert Einstein, Lise Meitner, Enrico Fermi, and Niels Bohr. It was fitting that many of the refugee atomic scientists should be aided by an organization in England in which J. J. Thomson and Lord Rutherford played a prominent part. This organization, the Academic Assistance Council, was formed in May, 1933, upon the initiative of Sir William Beveridge. It was renamed in 1937 the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning. By 1945 it had registered 2,541 academic refugees from totalitarianism, and had helped place a large percentage of these scholars in positions in many parts of the world. Mr. Bentwich is primarily concerned with—and understandably proud of—the accomplishments of this organization and of the scholars it has helped. But he briefly indicates the work of similar organizations which grew up in the countries of Western Europe and in the United States during the thirties. And he shows that although prior to 1939 Britain placed a larger number of the academic emigrés than any other country, by 1941 the United States was home—or haven—for an even larger number. One of the many fruitful results was an increase in the quantity and quality of American university work in Central European affairs. (See, e.g., "Forschungen zur deutsche Zeitgeschichte an amerikanischen Universitäten, 1933-1953," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, July, 1953.)

Norman Bentwich began his service to intellectual refugees in the mid-thirties by aiding in the resettlement efforts of the League of Nations. In reviewing their migration and their accomplishments abroad he helps to explain the twentieth century decline of cultural creativity in continental Europe and the simultaneous advancement of European civilization outside Europe, not only in England and the United States, but also in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, because the intellectual refugees of Europe have fled to all these areas. This book, in reminding us of the penalty Hitler paid for his folly, has meaning for an America still unsure of the way in which to treat its own non-conforming scientists.

Tulane University

JOHN L. SNELL

SALVEMINI, GAETANO, *Prelude to World War II*. London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1953. Pp. 519. 30 S.

This detailed, pithy, and provocative study of the diplomacy of the inter-war period, particularly as it impinged upon Fascist Italy between the Corfu crisis of 1923 and the conclusion of the Ethiopian War in 1936, should arouse the interest of a great many students of recent international relations. The author, a well-known historian and émigré during the period of Mussolini's dictatorship, is now eighty and has returned to his former chair at the University of Florence. He

completed the manuscript of this book in the summer of 1949 before leaving Harvard. It is unfortunate that publication of this book was delayed and that during this interlude Salvemini apparently was unable to incorporate recently published evidence bearing on his topic.

In the preface Salvemini states his intention of avoiding the use of collective terms like "Britain" and "Italy"; instead, he prefers to place responsibility for decisions in international affairs squarely on politicians and diplomats, or at most on such less abstract entities as "Governments" and "Foreign Offices." Frankly conceding that he has a bias, the author avers that he has done his "utmost to avoid being blinded or side-tracked by it." He does not hesitate to render moral judgments, but he does not claim that they represent objective truth. Although some of Salvemini's contentions may not be entirely substantiated by revelations in the official documents now in course of publication, it appears unlikely that his main thesis will be vitiated.

The book's 59 chapters are divided into four sections, the first of which deals with the years from the First World War until 1928. A highlight of this period was the Corfu crisis, the handling of which by Curzon and Poincaré demonstrated to Mussolini that they did not intend to make the League of Nations a really effective instrument. From that time forward the story of the League was one of "devices, ruses, deceptions, frauds, tricks and trappings whereby the diplomats who had to operate [it] circumvented and stultified the Covenant . . . Procrastination was Geneva's favourite device. It touched nothing that it did not adjourn" (p. 56). After his evacuation of Corfu, Mussolini turned his attention to Albania, and thereby drove the Little Entente into France's arms. For his part, Mussolini obtained the support of Hungary, Bulgaria, and Austria.

Skippping over the years from 1928 until 1931, Salvemini next discusses the background of the Italo-Ethiopian war, and in the third section of his book the diplomacy of that conflict. He places squarely upon Mussolini's shoulders the guilt for the war, but insists that the *Duce* was "aided and abetted by two accessories before the fact. The first of these was the British Foreign Office under the successors of Sir Austen Chamberlain" (p. 510). According to Salvemini's thesis, Sir Austen's responsibility dates back to December 1925, when he made an agreement with Mussolini, behind the back of the League, to support Italian construction of a railroad across Ethiopia to link the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland. In return, Mussolini consented to British control of Lake Tana at the headwaters of the Blue Nile. From then until the autumn of 1935 "all British Foreign Ministers worked more or less hand in glove with Mussolini. In 1935 and 1936 that understanding seemed to have collapsed, but it never altogether broke down; and starting with the summer of 1936 it was re-established, lasted until June 1940, and was finally shattered not by the British Government, but by Mussolini" (p. 8). France's Briand refused to go along with the Chamberlain-Mussolini deal of 1925, with the result that for the ensuing nine years the Italian leader's enmity was directed primarily at France.

The second "accessory before the fact" was Pierre Laval, "whose collusion was direct, his motive for throwing Ethiopia to Mussolini in 1935 being to balance re-emergent Germany by creating a Franco-Italian group which might turn into a Franco-Italian-German block independent of, or even hostile to, Britain" (p. 510).

As Salvemini proceeded with his research his appraisal of Laval and certain British leaders underwent serious changes. "Though still remaining a disreputable figure, [Laval] unexpectedly benefitted by a growing number of extenuating circumstances" (p. 9). Anthony Eden emerged from the crisis of 1935-36, in Sal-

vemini's judgment, not as a kind of "Sir Galahad" vigorously upholding sanctions, but rather as little better than a hypocrite. Likewise, the author feels no "respect, admiration, or enthusiasm" for Sir Austen Chamberlain, Sir John Simon, Sir Samuel Hoare, Stanley Baldwin, or Neville Chamberlain.

In his epilogue, "Towards World War Two," Salvemini assigns responsibilities somewhat differently:

"Here the arch-criminal is Hitler, who consciously, wilfully, and maliciously planned and unleashed it. The British and French Governments were not his wilful abettors. But on the Conservative Government of Britain falls the responsibility of giving Hitler rope with the idea that he would hang himself. By throwing Central Europe piecemeal to the wolf they thought they were heading Hitler off eastwards to meet his doom in Russia, two birds killed with one stone. What they actually did was to strip France of her eastern ramparts, thus causing her to plunge into the disaster of 1940. Mussolini did his wicked utmost to follow Hitler's footsteps, his evil-doing being limited solely by his inability to do worse. Stalin, in making his pact with Hitler, sought to turn the tables and deflect the war westward. In this he was successful in 1939, but only to find, not long after, that he, as well as the British Government, had been outsmarted by Hitler (p. 510)."

Salvemini has woven together in a skilful and often witty manner evidence from memoirs of the protagonists and dispatches from the daily press to support his contentions. He confesses that at times he may have relied too heavily upon the latter, but justifies this on the grounds that the press is a valuable "indirect" source of history, supplying pointers to what the governments were plotting. Unquestionably the author overloads the reader with long quotations which more profitably might either have been summarized or relegated to an appendix. Many readers will wish that he had shortened some paragraphs and smoothed transitions between chapters. Inclusion of a few maps would facilitate understanding of intricate diplomatic moves. The only error of fact noted by this reviewer was a passing reference to Memel as a part of Estonia (p. 480). Footnote references are plentiful, but not all of them are completely authoritative. It is likely that most students will regard Salvemini's book as an extremely helpful guide through a labyrinth of intricate diplomacy, even though they may wish to suspend final judgments on certain conclusions until the rest of the evidence is in.

Vanderbilt University

CHARLES F. DELZELL

REICHHOLD, LUDWIG, *Europäische Arbeiterbewegung*. Frankfurt a. M.: Verlag Josef Knecht, Carolusdruckerei, 1953. Pp. xi, 391, iii, 340. DM 12.

These volumes represent an ambitious attempt at clarifying the historical and present-day role of the European labor movement and at defining the contribution which labor ought to make to the cause of European unification. Our times undoubtedly call for a clearer elaboration of the intellectual and spiritual bases of what is too often and too loosely called "European civilization." There also is, after the experience of totalitarian government in Europe, an obvious need for a new assessment of the relationship between state, society and group (including labor), and for a critical examination of the principal European ideologies. Yet,

although the author tries his hand at attacking all of these problems, his treatise falls short of providing the necessary clarification.

Of greatest interest is perhaps the introductory part which contrasts European society and its labor movement with American society on the one hand and Russian on the other. Here the author shows himself a gifted eclectic with a considerable breadth of historical knowledge and a capacity for interpretation, drawing insight from many sources and ideologies. One might argue that Mr. Reichhold, as other foreign interpreters, is overawed by the apparently individualistic features of American civilization and therefore fails to understand the full significance of its social controls. One might feel that the author neglects certain aspects of bolshevist doctrine and practice when he sees in the Soviet Union nothing but a revival of historical patterns. But on the whole his comparisons and contrasts between the three civilizations are not overdrawn. For him the Europe of the last and of the beginning of our century is a class civilization, or as the book prefers to call it, one based on the *Staende* (estates).

The author, a fervent Roman Catholic, tries to map out a synthesis between the stages of European history rooted in Christianity, and the struggle of the workers for freedom and human dignity. In his often repetitious discussion of the "mission" of the labor movement his thoughts veer constantly between mysticism, Hegelian dialectics, and neo-thomist natural law concepts. He finds the identity between the morally good and the economically practical in the formula of an "organic democracy." When the term is pressed more closely it turns out that what is called here the "key to a reorientation of society" is essentially a reedition of the corporate state even though many features of democratic control and group "self government" are introduced.

The author's sincerity is in no way to be impugned. He shows much of it in his concluding chapter which at least indirectly challenges many of the current superficial assumptions about the foundations of European unity and tries to determine how the European labor movement could form the "bridge" between the two hostile ideologies of capitalism and communism. The author never succeeds in explaining why in post-war Europe the restoration of traditional forces has pushed the labor movement into the background, and how this trend could be reversed.

Altogether this book is less important for the cogency of proposed solutions or the originality of historical analysis, than as a mirror of the intellectual confusion of a tormented continent seeking a new basis for an independence which is disputed from both East and West.

University of Colorado

HENRY W. EHLMANN

GRAYSON, CARY TRAVERS, JR., *Austria's International Position, 1938-1953. The Re-establishment of an Independent Austria. (Études d'Histoire Économique, Politique et Sociale, vol. V)*. Genève: Librairie E. Droz, 1953. Pp. xvi, 320. Fr. 15.

The work under review is a very carefully elaborated inventory of the events bearing on Austria's most recent history. The sources, so far as they are available today, have been collected with a rare completeness and are considered in a calm and scholarly manner, though not devoid of some sympathy for the topic of research. This reviewer knows of no other work on this subject which could compete with Dr. Grayson's study of Austria's struggle for full independence after World War II and her fight for the State Treaty. Dr. Grayson correctly enumerates

the basic mistakes which were made in Potsdam and the origin of the unfortunate formula of "German assets in eastern Austria." He describes the friendly attitude of the Soviets toward the first Austrian Government and the effects of their later change in policy. It is an impressive and tragic story.

The author is not of course in a position to discuss all the influences underlying and shaping the Austrian problem—for example he does not discuss the territorial claims of Yugoslavia—but he repeatedly insists that the widening rift between the Soviets and the western Allies since mid-1946 has had a considerable bearing on Austria. While Austria herself to some extent has chosen the West (p. 162), "both East and West seem ready to realize that the complete collapse of Allied cooperation in Vienna would signify world collapse. They are seeking to keep the contact, and they are employing Austria as a barometer of the Cold War" (p. 172).

That a reviewer who is himself interested in Austria's recent history would voice some conflicting opinion upon minor points will hardly come as a surprise to the reader. For instance, I think that Grayson's statement of the origins of the most unfortunate events of February 1934 has been oversimplified (p. 10), and that it is at least premature to refer to Guido Schmidt as "pro-Nazi." I would not agree that the vote in the Schuschnigg plebiscite was given to "all persons" (p. 12), as the age requirement was exceptionally high. In the discussion of the Austrian Resistance Movement no reference is made to the part performed by the prisoners of war; the disabling of the "Alpine Redoute" is hardly given its full importance; and in one passage (on p. 67) the author seems to over-emphasize the part played by the Communists in the Austrian Resistance.

As a peculiarity in the history of the treaties between Austria and Germany it may be mentioned that the original text of the first post-war agreement between these two countries was in English and that the German version was considered only as a translation.

In no way should the few critical remarks detract from the impression that Dr. Grayson has made a truly important contribution to the highly involved history of the most recent period of Austria.

Catholic University of America

FRIEDRICH ENGEL-JANOSI

CAMPIONE, FERNANDO, *Guerra in Epiro—Diario di un combattente della Divisione "Siena."* (51d). Naples: Alfredo Guida, [1952]. Pp. ix, 215. L. 650.

Written in a flowing style, this diary relates the day-to-day experiences of an Italian non-commissioned officer who served in Albania from September to December, 1940. The Siena Division, to which the author belonged, penetrated into Greek Epirus, across the River Kalamas, and threatened Yannina in the early days of November. The Greek counter-attack on the Italian left wing forced the Siena Division and the other units participating in the campaign to retreat in confusion with heavy losses. The author blames the Italian high command for this military disaster.

The book is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the period from the author's landing in Albania to the invasion of Greece; Part II, the invasion; Part III, the retreat. The story, told in a personal, subjective way, provides little material for the historian. In fact, it adds nothing important to our information about the Greco-Italian conflict.

In the preface, where Campione attempts to build an acceptable frame of reference, and where consistency would have been possible and even necessary, we

notice, on one hand, an apologetic attitude for the attack on Greece ("una dolorosa campagna" by the Italian people who are "hardworking, peaceful, humane, and just"), and, on the other hand, an attempt to idealize the equally unjustifiable invasion of Ethiopia ("la gloriosa conquista dell' Etiopia"). The author, in every instance proud of his country's army, denounces Mussolini's leadership in so far as it heaped "tragedy and ridicule upon a people possessing the highest and oldest civilization." One gathers the impression that, had the outcome of the attack on Greece been successful, the author would have found it easy to write about "la gloriosa conquista della Grecia". If such had been the case, there would have been no ground for criticizing Mussolini. This lack of moral consistency runs throughout the book. As a patriotic Italian of 1940 the author is more concerned with the effects of Italy's defeat than with acts of aggression. All sentiment is directed toward the poor, hungry, and harassed Italian soldiers, who are praised for their "tenacity, bravery, and self-sacrifice." There are only brief and sporadic expressions of sympathy for the victims of the fascist aggression.

Limited as it is in outlook by the author's prejudices, the book is nonetheless an interesting account of the campaign, as seen through Italian eyes. Its value lies in its empiricism and sincerity. If the author's purpose was to put on record his experiences and the ideas and attitudes current among Italians in 1940, it is fair to say that he has not been unsuccessful.

University of Kansas

G. G. ARNAKIS

FOLLIOT, DENISE, ed., *Documents on International Affairs, 1951*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1954. Pp. xxvi, 698. \$9.60.

This third post-war companion volume to the *Survey of International Affairs*, published by the Royal Institute, contains the public addresses, diplomatic notes, communiques, declarations and international agreements reflecting a year in which the Western coalition was shaken by the successful intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea. The resulting changes in the balance of power led to the Japanese peace treaty, renewed emphasis upon German rearmament and European integration, the accession of Turkey and Greece to NATO, and the increase in American aid to Tito's Yugoslavia. Complicating factors included the Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, the war in Indo-China, and the deterioration of Anglo-Egyptian relations.

The documents in this volume deal with all of these events as well as with many others. The student of Central and Eastern European affairs will find more than 150 pages of documents concerning those areas. The issue of Trieste is dealt with in terms of the Anglo-Italian talks of March 1951, the Soviet protest of November and the American rejoinder to it. The question of the reunification of Germany is treated in the context of the various resolutions and counter-proposals of the German governments and the pronouncements of the Allied High Commission and the United Nations General Assembly.

The section on relations between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers includes two Stalin "interviews" from *Pravda*, the resolutions of the so-called World Peace Movement of the Communists, and the acrimonious exchanges between Washington and Moscow regarding the Kersten Amendment to the U. S. Mutual Security Act of 1951. Also to be found here are the recriminatory notes exchanged between London, Paris and Moscow over alleged treaty violations resulting from the decision to rearm Western Europe. One can find here a graphic

testimony to the difficulty of negotiating with the Soviet Union in the series of notes and statements dealing with the protracted and futile Palais Rose Conference which was to prepare an agenda for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

The materials on the Soviet East European satellite régimes are very meager and cover less than twenty pages. They deal with the Clementis, Oatis and Slansky cases in Czechoslovakia, the trial of Vogeler in Hungary and the indictment of the Polish generals in July 1951. Materials concerning deportations in Hungary and in Rumania are also included along with others concerning church-state relations in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. Yugoslavia and its relations with the West and the Vatican receive close to fifty pages of text, and the documents range from agreements for American assistance to the laws on the management of the national economy.

The "explanatory" footnotes are utterly inadequate but could have been improved immeasurably by the addition of only a few lines in each case.

The publication of documents is not a rewarding enterprise from a financial point of view, but it is a necessary and valuable one. The Royal Institute is to be congratulated on having set as its goal the publication of one volume for each year.

Princeton University

JOHN S. RESHETAR, JR.

DEUTSCHER, ISAAC, *Russia, What Next?* New York: Oxford University Press, 1953, Pp. ix, 230. \$3.00.

The reputation of Isaac Deutscher as an authority might have rested on more solid ground had he not undertaken to publish *Russia, What Next?* The book—intended for the general public, not the scholar—deals with Stalinism, with the "break of continuity" in Russia's policies after Stalin's death, and with future possibilities.

Deutscher contends that Stalinism put an end to "proletarian democracy" (p. 26) as it existed with Lenin and Trotsky, that it represented the "amalgamation of Western-European Marxism with Russian barbarism" (p. 35), and that "under Stalin Bolshevism came to be rewritten in terms of sorcery and magic." (p. 59). He insists that Stalin betrayed the communist parties in the world and sacrificed them to Russia's national needs; successes of Communism, as in China, surprised Stalin, who then managed to turn the situation to Russian advantage.

Deutscher believes that Stalin's successors, like Lenin's earlier, must now make radical changes. Lest they prepare the way for a Bonaparte-like military dictatorship, the possibility of which the author discusses lengthily, they must retrieve the democracy of early Bolshevik times. This, he says, is feasible now that the Russian people, owing to Bolshevism, are "coming of age politically and culturally" (p. 123). Collectivization and planned economy must remain; the author extols them as responsible for Russia's progress; their abolition, if attempted, would be, he insists, contrary to the desires of the Russian people.

As to foreign relations, parallel changes in line with a democratized communism would be indicated.

The entire thesis of the author, far from being based on "relentless logic," as vaunted by the publisher, fails to convince. We may ignore the author's failure to foresee—in April 1953—the role of Khrushchev or his misjudging the attitude of Malenkov's government with regard to Germany. We may also disregard his doubtful historical parallels and shallow philosophizing about the individual's role in history. But it is difficult to understand his illusions, for instance, about the

possibility of an agreement with the West regarding control of Russian military installations. And it is impossible not to resent the use he makes of statistics (cf. pp. 68 ff.), his neglect of developments in non-communistic countries since 1917, and his glossing over the inherent connection between planned economy, technology, and communistic dictatorship. Moreover, the thesis about the necessity of a complete break in continuity is untenable. Changes occur, but they need not go beyond those which either a Lenin or a Stalin undertook at the crossroads of 1921, 1928, 1939, and 1946.

Is it necessary to go on pointing out mistakes: that Soviet self-containment was "written into the paragraphs and clauses of the Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam agreements" (p. 97); or that police and army were the only two material instruments of Soviet power (p. 167), as if complete government control of the economy of a country and its means of communication and publication did not constitute material instruments of power? Why such an absurd formula as on p. 213 that "in domestic policy as in war the relation of morale to physical factors is as three to one"?

We trust that the scholarship of the author demonstrated by his other publications will make us soon forget a book which deserves early oblivion.

University of Delaware

WALTHER KIRCHNER

SHORTER NOTICES

KÜRBISOWNA, BRYGIDA, *Studia nad Kroniką Wielkopolską*. Poznań: Poznańskie Towarzystwo Przyjaciół Nauk, 1952. Pp. 187.

The authorship and structure of the *Kronika Wielkopolska* has been something of a puzzle to students of early Polish history since the first edition of the work by Sommersberg in 1730. The chronicle is clearly not by a single author, being a compound of thirteenth and fourteenth century elements. This study by Mlle Kürbisowna forms fascicle 1 of Vol. XVII of the works of the Historical Commission of the Poznań Society of the Friends of Learning. The author sets out to find a clearer solution of the basic problems posed by the complex nature of the text of the chronicle. She reviews the previous studies and examines their assumptions and conclusions. The most suggestive and profitable work on the text she finds to have been the fundamental study of the late Wojciech Kętrzyński, *O kronice wielkopolskiej* (1896), and rather minimizes the contribution of Pierre David, *La date et l'auteur de la chronique de Grande Pologne* (Paris, 1929). David identified the principal author as Godysław Baszko (d. ca. 1284), custos of Poznań, and posits later and various interpolations for the period reaching into the fourteenth century.

The specific contribution of the present study, aside from a fairly thorough description of the nine extant MSS, seems to lie in the approach to the problems of authorship through the social and class attitudes of the distinct elements of the text. With this—in addition to the orthodox criteria of text analysis—as a key, Mlle Kürbisowna concludes that the chronicle was composed over two centuries, the thirteenth and the fourteenth, (not a new conclusion) and came out of two social and intellectual milieux, one dynastic and pro-Franciscan (Baszko), the other more broadly nationalistic and popular. This latter conclusion, which will undoubtedly have to undergo further examination and testing, is novel and suggestive. The new and critical edition of the chronicle which Mlle Kürbisowna promises, is much to be desired. It might be suggested that closer attention be paid to the paleography of the manuscripts. Something will certainly be learned as to their origin and date of writing beyond what appears in her present description.

S. H. THOMSON

VON PÖLNITZ, GÖTZ FREIHERR, *Fugger und Hanse*. Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1953. Pp. 236. DM 14,80.

The author is director of the Fugger Archives in Augsburg and has long had access to a large body of important materials which have not often been consulted by Hanseatic and Scandinavian historians. His previous work includes an impressive two volume study entitled *Jakob Fugger* (Tübingen, 1949, 1951), and he is at present working on a monograph on Anton Fugger.

Fugger und Hanse is an attempt to survey the role of the Fuggers in Scandinavia, the Low Countries, England and even Russia; all regions where the Hansa was especially active. The author has succeeded in restricting his account to 236 pages of which about 40 per cent are taken up by notes and transcriptions of hitherto unpublished documents including a statement of indebtedness from Elizabeth of England to the Fuggers and requests from Philip II for money for the troops of the Duke of Alba. If only because of the seventeen documents published, the book would be of interest and value, but the text itself brings much

which is new. The chapter titles give an indication of the breadth of the work: The entrance of the Fuggers in the Hanseatic region (1476-1512), The struggle for the Baltic market (1513-1525), The currying of Danish favor (1526-1539), The retreat from Hungary (1540-1546) and English and Russian reverberations (1546-1600).

A large proportion of the book is concerned with Fugger interests in the Hungarian copper mines at Neusohl (Baňská Bystrica in Slovakia) and their efforts to keep this copper flowing to the west by way of the Baltic and the Sound. *Fugger und Hanse* discusses, thus, some of the widespread Fugger commercial and financial interests seen against the background of the vital political and economic changes which took place in Northern Europe during the sixteenth century. The major weakness of the book lies in the author's incomplete understanding of Scandinavian history (an example of this is the highly inaccurate discussion of the Count's War on page 64) and occasional oversimplifications of Hanseatic history.

The merits of the book far outweigh any errors or misprints (Brösebro for Brömsebro on page 85) and the new contributions are many indeed. For example, Albrecht of Prussia is given the prominence he deserves in the Baltic history of the period of the Reformation. In general, Pölnitz' book is both important and good and should not be lacking on the shelves of any library or scholar interested in the economic and political history of Northern Europe in the sixteenth century.

University of California
Riverside

ERNST EKMAN

SERAPHIM, PETER-HEINZ, *Das Genossenschaftswesen in Osteuropa*. Neuwied am Rhein: Raifeissendruckerei GmbH., 1951. Pp. 176. DM 7.90.

In this book, Professor Seraphim endeavors to give a general review of the origins, development, and present conditions of the cooperative movement in Eastern Europe.

Because of the profound changes in the economic structure of the Eastern European countries brought about by the Russian revolution and the later sovietization of the so-called "satellite states" and of Yugoslavia, the study is divided into two main parts. Chapters II, III and IV deal with the history of the Eastern European cooperative movement under capitalist conditions, while chapters V and VI describe its transformation under the soviet system. Both parts of the study contain much valuable information, even though for some of the satellite countries, only limited and frequently somewhat biased sources have been used.

Of special interest is the author's interpretation of the role which the cooperative movement played in the nationality struggles in the Austro-Hungarian and the Tsarist empires and in their successor states.

The scholarly level of the study is somewhat impaired by the author's endeavor to trace the origin of the modern cooperative forms in Eastern Europe back to the Yugoslav "zadruga" and the Russian "mir" and "artjel"; all the more so, since Professor Seraphim shares the rather antiquated view that these institutions had their origin in the "primitive-collectivist character traits of the Slavs." The author should certainly be aware that analogous forms of primitive collectivism existed at one time or other all over the world and were not the outcome of any peculiar "Volksgeist."

However, the short introductory chapter which expresses these views is not an essential part of the book, but rather a quasi-historical ornamentation. In its main chapters, the book is very instructive and well worth reading.

Detroit, Michigan

ROMAN ROSDOLSKY

DE GRUNWALD, CONSTANTIN, *Metternich*. Translated by Dorothy Todd. London: Falcon Press, 1953. Pp. 334. 21 s.

This biography of the Austrian chancellor is a curious mixture of the popular and the scholarly. Its impressionistic and anecdotal style smacks of the former type, but it displays the paraphernalia of scholarship, bibliography, footnotes, etc., all handled, however, in a most negligent fashion. The most interesting chapter, though marred by an inadequate translation, is the one headed "Vienna, Capua of the Mind", which describes with considerable charm the social life of the Austrian capital in the 1830's and '40's, when Metternich's third wife, a Hungarian lady of ancient lineage, was queen of Viennese society. The account of the meeting between Balzac and Metternich, though not new, is certainly worth repeating.

On the other hand, the political side of Metternich's career, which takes up the great bulk of the work, is not treated in a very satisfactory manner. In spite of research conducted in the archives of Vienna, Paris and Berlin, during which the author brought to light a good many new letters and diplomatic reports, he adds little or nothing to what was already known from the standard biographies of Mazade and Srbik. The organization of the material is sketchy and confused, and the attitude of the author is scarcely as judicial as it should be. Though his sympathy with his subject is understandable, Grunwald being a Russian émigré of the old, imperial era, he hardly gives enough weight to the new nationalistic forces at work in Europe at that time. The general judgment of Metternich as a reactionary statesman with limited vision will scarcely be altered by this book.

Technically, the work leaves much to be desired. The titles in the bibliography are listed without any arrangement, alphabetical or otherwise, and in many cases place and date of publication are lacking. A number of volumes cited in the body of the work do not appear in the bibliography at all. Misprints are frequent—for example, the Austro-American publicist Sealsfeld appears throughout the book as "Sealsfeld"—and there are many other errors.

The original of this book, written in French, was published in Paris in 1938.
West Virginia University J. C. EASTON

HEUSS, THEODOR, *Vorspiele des Lebens: Jugenderinnerungen*. Tübingen: Rainer Wunderlich Verlag, 1953. Pp. 348. DM 14.80.

These reminiscences were written in part in 1945 and completed in 1950 when Heuss had become the first *Bundespräsident* of the new West German Federal Republic. They include only the first twenty-one years of his life (1884-1905) and contain descriptions of his family and friends, of the Heilbronn *Gymnasium* which he attended, his early political and literary ventures, and conclude with his student years at the Universities of Berlin and Munich.

The book is not an autobiography of literary distinction or of deep human significance. The writing is dry, direct and honest. Although a number of important figures in Heuss' early years are brought to life, the pages are crowded with the names of many persons who can mean but little to the general reader. This reader at least would have preferred less reporting and more reflection. The portrait which emerges is that of an exceptionally well-rounded young man, interested in scholarship, art and politics, eager for the fray of life, companionable and with a gift for life-long friendships but curiously uninterested, at least during that period of his life, in women.

Perhaps the reason was that the three strong personalities who helped mold his thought and character decisively were all men: his father, Friedrich Naumann and Lujo Brentano. His father, a civil engineer engaged in road construction, was a man of independent mind and a political fighter in the tradition of the

Swabian liberalism of 1848 in which young Heuss thus grew up. Fredrich Naumann, the leader of the *Nationalsozialen* and famous orator, attracted some of the very best and most serious academic German youth; and when he called Heuss to Berlin to become editor of his weekly *Die Hilfe* in 1905, he gave him the job which started him on his long political and literary career. Lujo Brentano, finally, was perhaps the most brilliant professor of the University of Munich at the time. Heuss attended his lectures and seminars on economic history, was impressed by his advocacy of free trade and his sense of social responsibility which led him to seek the improvement of the conditions of labor. Under his guidance Heuss wrote his doctoral dissertation on Viticulture in Heilbronn.

This autobiography is of value to historians interested in the political and educational conditions prevailing in Germany at the end of the nineteenth century.
University of California FREDERIC LILGE

VALJAVEC, FRITZ, ed., *Südostforschungen*, Bd. XII. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1953. Pp. 442.

The Südostinstitut in Munich publishes not only this annual volume of Studies, but separate monographs, the last of which, by Fritz Valjavec, *Geschichte der deutschen Kulturbeziehungen zu Südosteuropa, I, Mittelalter* (1953) is number 41. The general cast of the articles and notices in the present volume is toward early and literary history. Among the main articles are: Rome and the Southeast in Antiquity (Baldwin Savia); The Byzantine-Russian War of 1043 (George Vernadsky); On the Style of the Galician-Volhynian Chronicle (Dmitri Čiževský); South Slav Philology (R. Aitzetmüller). There are numerous necrologies and notes, and 100 pages of meaty reviews, broken up by countries. There are, finally, over 20 pages of bibliography of Bulgarian publications since 1945. The level both of articles and reviews is high.

T.

Statistical Pocket-Book on Expellees. Wiesbaden: Federal Statistical Office, 1953. Pp. 115.

This small but tightly packed handbook is published by the Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, through the Federal Statistical Office in Wiesbaden. The statistics are intended to account for the 17 million Germans "expelled from their hereditary homes in East Germany and abroad." The research and statistical labor involved must have been tremendous. Hardly an area of social life has been neglected. Statistics on origin of expellees, their mortality, their present habitation by type and number, their educational background, their integration into their new homes, either on the land, in government service or in industry, and the nature and extent of assistance to them by Federal and private agencies, and a final section on the results—as of 1952—for the areas into which they have come, give a detailed picture—so far as figures can show—of this tragic displacement.

T.

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

- Armstrong, H. F., "Postscript to E. D. C.," *For. Affs.*, Oct. 1954, 17-27.
- B. W., "Floty wojenne wzór 1954," *Bellona*, July-Sept. 1954, 45-47.
- Barcia Trelles, Camilo, "La Conferencia de Ginebra," *Política Intern.*, Apr.-June 1954, 9-19.
- Barcia Trelles, Camilo, "El ayer, el hoy y el mañana internacionales: Monroísmo y comunismo," *Rev. de Estudios Políticos*, May-June 1954, 91-101.
- Birke, Ernst, "Die französische Osteuropa-Politik 1914-1918," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, III/3, 1954, 321-359.
- von Boltho, Alexander, "Tunesien: Vom Berliner Kongress zu Mendès-France," *Aussenpolitik*, Nov. 1954, 733-739.
- Dujčev, Ivan, "Le témoignage du Pseudo-Césaire sur les Slaves," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 193-209.
- Epting, Karl, "Zehn Jahre Politik der Grösse," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Oct. 1954, 592-599.
- von Farkas, Julius, "Die gesellschaftliche Organisation der finnisch-ugrischen Völker im Lichte der Wortkunde," *Saeculum*, V/3, 1954, 329-335.
- Friedensburg, Ferdinand, "Die Saar und Frankreich," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Sept. 1954, 546-547.
- Gerhart, Dietrich, "Die slawischen Sprachen im Schulunterricht," *Osteuropa*, Aug. 1954, 247-254.
- Grenfell, Russell, "Die Atombombe als Abschreckungsmittel," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 554-564.
- Haraszti, E. H., "Compte Rendu du Congrès des Historiens," *Acta Historica*, II/3, 1954, 265-300.
- Harsch, J. C., "Präventivkrieg und militärisches Gleichgewicht," *Aussenpolitik*, Nov. 1954, 697-712.
- Hochheim, Arnold, "'Westliche Satrapie' Osteuropa," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Oct. 1954, 440-451.
- Hostowiec, Paweł, "Notatnik nieśpiesznego przechodnia," *Kultura*, Sept. 1954, 7-24.
- Kafka, Gustav, "Der unterminierte Rechtsstaat," *Wort und Wahrheit*, Nov. 1954, 821-832.
- Kennan, G. F., "Das amerikanisch-russische Verhältnis," *Aussenpolitik*, Oct. 1954, 631-642.
- Keyser, Theobald, "Die wirtschaftliche Bilanz der Entflechtung im Kohlenbergbau," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Nov. 1954, 641-648.
- Kormoss, I. B. F., "Les objectifs d'une nouvelle cartographie européenne," *Cahiers de Bruges*, July 1954, 110-114.
- Makins, Sir Roger, "The World Since the War: The Third Phase," *For. Affs.*, Oct. 1954, 1-16.
- von Merkat, Hans-Joachim, "Wie kann es weitergehen?" *Aussenpolitik*, Oct. 1954, 617-627.
- Mieczkowski, Bogdan, "Towards Post-Liberation Financial Systems," *Central Eur. Federalist*, July 1954, 2-7.
- Müller, K. V., "Étapes et Envergure de l'Integration des Réfugiés," *Integration*, 1, 1954, 51-55.
- Muyneck, Gust de., "Churchills Europapolitik," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 573-583.
- Nalepa, Jerzy, "Wyprawa Franków na Wieleń w 789 r.," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 210-231.
- Namier, Sir Lewis, "Diplomacy in the Interwar Period," *World Politics*, Oct. 1954, 102-118.
- Oyarzun, Román, "Comercio entre el Este y el Oeste," *Política Intern.*, Apr.-June 1954, 21-36.
- Peselj, B. M., "The Transformation of Socialist Agriculture," *Bull. of Intern. Peasant Union*, July-Aug. 1954, 7-12.
- "Réalisations de Benelux, 1944-1954," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère*, Nov. 1954, 659-688.
- Redding, A. D., "Volume and Distribution of Nonagricultural Employment, 1928-1955," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 356-374.

- "Saarland und Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl," *Saarländische Bevölkerungs- und Wirtschaftszahlen*, 1/4, 1953, 10-24.
- Saposs, D. J., "Current Trade-Union Movements of Western Europe," *Social Research*, Autumn 1954, 297-313.
- Sánchez Agesta, Luis, "Sentido sociológico y político del siglo XIX," *Rev. de Estudios Políticos*, May-June 1954, 23-43.
- von Echmieden, Werner, "Le Conseil de l'Europe et le Problème des Réfugés et des Excédents de Population," *Integration*, 1, 1954, 40-45.
- Seidel, Arno, "Wider die Politik der 'Dritten Kraft'," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Oct. 1954, 581-584.
- Slessor, Air Marshal Sir John, "Air Power and World Strategy," *For. Affs.*, Oct. 1954, 43-53.
- Sokolnicki, Michał, "Pomonachijskie porachunki," *Bellona*, July-Sept. 1954, 24-32.
- Spulber, Nicolas, "Eastern Europe: the Changes in Agriculture from Land Reforms to Collectivization," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 389-401.
- Stolper, Wolfgang, "Präferenzabkommen und Ost-West-Handel als Lösung des europäischen Dollarproblems," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Sept. 1954, 364-370.
- Valentine, Alan, "Benelux: Pilot Plant of Economic Union," *Yale Rev.*, Autumn 1954, 22-32.
- Vosnjak, Bogumil, "The Greatest Fallacy," *Bull. of Intern. Peasant Union*, Sept. 1954, 4-9.
- Weber, Alfred, "Nicht Neutralität, aber militärische Ausklammerung," *Aussenpolitik*, Oct. 1954, 627-631.
- Winding, P., "Osteuropas økonomiske udvikling," *Økonomi og politik*, 1, 1954, 41-52.

AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

- Arató, I., "Neue Kollisionsnormen in Ungarn," *Zft. f. ausländisches u. intern. Privatrecht*, 1, 1954, 100-104.
- Baeck, P. L., "Status and autonomy of Austrian attorneys at law," *Tulane Law Rev.*, June 1954, 468-479.
- Halperin, E., "Inside Hungary," *Swiss Rev. of World Affs.*, Aug. 1954, 8-11.
- Heimann, Rudolf, "Kommunistische Propaganda in der Schweiz," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Sept. 1954, 384-387.
- Koren, Hanns, "Strauch- und Balkeneggen in Steiermark," *Blätter f. Heimatkunde*, 28/1, 2, 1954, 18-24.
- Kosa, John, "The Early Period of Anglo-Hungarian Contact," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 414-431.
- Kunz, J. L., "Infelix Austria," *Amer. Jl. of Intern. Law*, July 1954, 453-458.
- Márkus, Stefano, "Il barone Ricasoli e la questione ungherese," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 436-448.
- Markus, Vasyi, "Carpatho-Ukraine under Hungarian Occupation (1939-1944)," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 252-256.
- Mód, Aladár, "Mark und die ungarische Geschichte," *Acta Historica*, II/3, 1954, 217-249.
- Moser, Oskar, "Der karntisch-steirische Ringhof," *Blätter f. Heimatkunde*, 28/1, 2, 1954, 30-39.
- Niederhauser, Emil, "Gercen i Vengria," *Acta Historica*, II/3, 1954, 251-264.
- Popelka, Fritz, "Bergnamen im Hochschwabgebiet um 1600," *Blätter f. Heimatkunde*, 28/1, 2, 1954, 12-18.
- "Quelques mots sur la question de l'admission de la Hongrie à l'ONU," *Hongrie Nouvelle*, July 1954, 20-23.
- Reychman, Jan, "Prace węgierskie w zakresie starożytności słowiańskich z lat 1945-1952," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 453-457.
- Volgin, V., and A. Alekseenko, "K. voprosu o gosudarstvennom dogovore s Austriей," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 4, 1954, 81-89.
- Willen, Paul, "Communist Hungary: the Locusts and the Briefcases," *The Reporter*, Oct. 21, 1954, 31-33.
- Wolfram, Richard, "Das Aufhängeverbot in den Zwölfen," *Blätter f. Heimatkunde*, 28/1, 2, 1954, 49-58.

BALKANS AND DANUBIA

- Belsky, K., "Austria-Hungary: The Causes of its Disintegration," *Central Eur. Federalist*, July 1954, 13-21.
- Blackstock, P. W., "The Occupation Fund Documents: a Reassessment of 'a Crude and Ignorant Forgery'," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 535-548.
- Braham, R. L., "The new constitution of Rumania," *Amer. Jl. of Comparative Law*, Summer 1954, 418-427.
- Brugne, H. de, "Politieke en economische vraagstukken in het na-oorlogse Griekenland," *Economisch en Sociaal Tijdschrift*, Feb.-Apr. 1954, 45-75.
- Stantchev, Stantcho, "L'Archéologie slave en Bulgarie 1949-1951," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 366-376.
- Stantchev, Stantcho, "Un monument de l'agriculture slave à Plisca," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 338-358.
- "23 August 1954—Zehnter Jahrestag der Befreiung Rumäniens," *Länder der Volksdemokratie*, Aug. 1954, 725-744.

BALTIC

- Aizsilnieks, A. P., "The Earnings of a Collective Farmer," *East & West*, 2, 1954, 35-43.
- Blumfeldt, Evald, "Origin and Growth of the Idea of Estonia's Independence," *East & West*, 2, 1954, 44-54.
- Duhamel, Morvan, "La naissance du parti communiste suédois dans le cadre de la III^e Internationale (I)," *Rev. Polit. et Parlementaire*, Oct. 1954, 149-158.
- Hellmann, Manfred, "Der Deutsche Orden und die Königskrönung des Mindaugas," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, III/3, 1954, 387-396.
- Hocij, Mychajlo, "Die Krone des Mindaugas," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, III/3, 1954, 397-415.
- Horatius, "The Strategic Position of the Baltic," *East & West*, 2, 1954, 28-34.
- Ivinskis, Zenonas, "Mindaugas und seine Krone," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, III/3, 1954, 360-386.
- Krusius-Ahrenberg, L., "Politisk udvikling og parlamentariske problemer i Finland," *Økonomi og politik*, 28/1, 1954, 3-17.
- Labuda, Gerard, "Saga o Styrbjörine, jarlu Jónsborga," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 283-337.
- Møller, Erik, "Karl XV's og Napoleon III's personlige Allianceforhandlinger 1863," *Historisk Tidsskrift*, 3, 1954, 281-295.
- Soloveytschik, George, "Zwei Aspekte des schwedischen Sozialismus," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Nov. 1954, 497-507.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

- "Aperçu des normes les plus importantes publiées en 1953 au Recueil des lois de la République tchécoslovaque," *Bull. de Droit Tchécoslovaque*, 4, 1953, 320-323.
- Feierabend, Ladislav, "Customs Union of Poland and Czechoslovakia," *Central Eur. Federalist*, July 1954, 8-13.
- Matejka, Ladislav, "R. M. Rilke and the Czech Language," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 588-596.
- Novotny, A., "Aus dem Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei der Tschechoslowakei an den X. Parteitag," *Neue Welt*, July 1954, 1698-1707.
- Schieche, Emil, "Das Recht in der Sudetenfrage," *Aussenpolitik*, Oct. 1954, 647-652.
- Shandor, Vincent, "Carpatho-Ukraine in the International Bargaining of 1918-1938," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 235-246.
- Súsedka, P., "Industrializácia Slovenska," *Statistický obzor*, 6, 1954, 200-209.
- Wąsowicz, Teresa, "Czechosłowackie badania archeologiczne nad wczesnym średniowieczem (1950-1952)," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 377-386.

GERMANY

- Abendroth, Wolfgang, "Die deutsche Einheit in den Vereinbarungen von 1945," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 586-588.
- Anchieri, Ettore, "Das grosse Missverständnis des deutsch-italienischen Bündnisses," *Aussenpolitik*, Aug. 1954, 509-519.
- Anchieri, Ettore, "Der deutsche 'Bündnisverrat' am Italien," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 588-595.
- Barraclough, Geoffrey, "Geschichtsschreibung und Politik im neuen Deutschland," *Aussenpolitik*, Nov. 1954, 720-729.
- Boyens, John, "Die Wahrheit über Südschleswig," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Oct. 1954, 600-608.
- "Code civil allemand en vigueur dans la Zone soviétique d'Allemagne," *Doc. Juridique Étrangère*, 5, 1954, 1-86.
- Conze, Werner, "Die Krise des Parteienstaates in Deutschland 1929/30," *Hist. Zft.*, Aug. 1954, 47-83.
- Domenech, J.-M., "Le nouveau réarmement allemand," *Esprit*, Nov. 1954, 665-672.
- E. B. W., "Some Characteristics of the Younger Generation in Western Germany," *World Today*, Sept. 1954, 407-412.
- E. P., "The German Approach to Convertibility," *World Today*, Oct. 1954, 430-439.
- Ehmke, H., "Verfassungsänderung und Verfassungsdurchbrechung," *Archiv d. öffentlichen Rechts*, 4, 1953/54, 385-418.
- Evgen'ev, I., "Vozrozhdenie militarizma v Zapadnoi Germanii-ugroza evropeiskoi bezopasnosti," *Kommunist*, July 1954, 96-107.
- "Die faschistischen Wehrwirtschaftsführer in der westdeutschen Wirtschaft," *Berichte d. deutschen Wirtschaftsinstituts*, 9/10, 1954, 1-63.
- Giniewski, Paul, "Allemagne et Israël. Le traité de réparations israël-allemand du 10 septembre 1952," *Polit. Étrangère*, Apr.-May 1954, 211-226.
- Hamerow, T. S., "History and the German Revolution of 1848," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 27-44.
- Herz, J. H., "German Officialdom Revisited: Political Views and Attitudes of the West German Civil Service," *World Politics*, Oct. 1954, 63-83.
- Jaspers, Karl, "The Fight Against Totalitarianism," *Confluence*, Sept. 1954, 251-266.
- Kerr, Clark, "The Trade Union Movement and the Redistribution of Power in Post-war Germany," *Qy. Jl. of Economics*, Nov. 1954, 535-564.
- Londyńczyk, "Niemiecki sztab generalny," *Kultura*, Nov. 1954, 75-80.
- Londyńczyk, "Przegląd niemiecki," *Kultura*, Sept. 1954, 94-98.
- Luther, Hans, "Erinnerungen an Gustav Stresemann," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Oct. 1954, 426-432.
- Miles, "Der Militarismus der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," *Schweizer Monatshefte*, Sept., 1954 387-389.
- Pezet, Ernest, "Une force allemand autonome serait-elle une nouvelle Wehrmacht," *Polit. Étrangère*, Oct. 1954, 467-487.
- von Salomon, Ernst, "The Silent Revolt," *Confluence*, Sept. 1954, 295-306.
- Schütz, W. W., "Die Voraussetzung unabhängiger deutscher Politik," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 584-586.
- Snell, John, "Wilson on Germany and the Fourteen Points," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.*, Dec. 1954, 364-369.
- "Spotlight on West Germany," *Monthly Rev.*, Nov. 1954, 225-237.
- Stone, William, "German Rearmament," *Editorial Research Reports*, Oct. 19, 1954, 755-772.
- von Studnitz, H. G., "Deutschland zwischen den Mächten," *Aussenpolitik*, Aug. 1954, 481-488.
- Szymański, A., "Fragmenty niemieckich przygotowań wojennych w ostatnim przedwojennym półroczu 1939," *Bellona*, July-Sept. 1954, 4-11.
- "The Third Federal Conference of the German Trade Union Federation," *Trade Union Bull.*, Oct. 1954, 4-7.
- Trauth, Sister Mary Philip, "The Bancroft Despatches on the Vatican Council and the Kulturkampf," *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, July 1954, 178-190.
- Wagner, Wolfgang, "Besatzungszonen und Spaltung Deutschlands," *Aussenpolitik*, Aug. 1954, 496-508.

ITALY

- Agazzi, Alberto, "Il 1848 a Bergamo," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Oct.-Dec. 1953, 475-512.
- Anchieri, Ettore, "Italiens Ausweichen vor dem Krieg," *Aussenpolitik*, Oct. 1954, 653-662.
- Balestreri, Leonida, "Sui giornali dell'emigrazione italiana in Grecia durante il periodo del Risorgimento," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 258-263.
- Baudi di Vesme, Carlo, "Il fattore del ghibellinismo toscano nel processo di unificazione italiano," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 264-268.
- Ciureanu, P., "Rapporti culturali e giornalistici tra l'Italia e la Romania dal 1850 al 1880: Cesare Correnti e Tullo Massarani Filoromeni," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 312-324.
- Clark, M. G., "Governmental Restrictions on Labor Mobility in Italy," *Industrial and Labor Rels. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 3-18.
- Clemente, Aldo, "Die Giulianischen und Dalmatinischen Flüchtlinge," *Integration*, 1, 1954, 28-37.
- De Rubertis, Achille, "Uno smacco della polizia granducale nel 1850," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Oct.-Dec. 1953, 538-541.
- Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, "Aspects politiques du conclave de Léon XIII," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 360-365.
- Engel-Janosi, Friedrich, "The Roman Question in the First Years of Benedict XV," *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 269-285.
- Gaeta, Giuliano, "Atteggiamenti dottrinari e giornalistici del Risorgimento slavo di fronte all'italiano," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 378-384.
- Galante Garone, Alessandro, "L'emigrazione politica italiana del Risorgimento," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 223-242.
- "Italian Efforts towards European Unity," *Ital. Affs.*, Sept. 1954, 481-492.
- "Land Reform in Maremma and Fucino," *Ital. Affs.*, Sept. 1954, 541-548.
- Lodolini, Elio, "L'organizzazione del partito mazziniano italiano in Italia ed all'estero agli inizi del secolo XX," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 398-403.
- Mack Smith, Denis, "Vittorio Emanuel e i suoi primi ministri," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 412-418.
- Meissner, Frank, "Politics of the Italian Land Reform," *Amer. Jl. of Economics & Sociology*, Oct. 1954, 39-53.
- "Parliamentary Inquiry into Unemployment in Italy," *Ital. Affs.*, Sept. 1954, 505-519.
- Perini Bembo, F. A., "Opinione pubblica e pubblici poteri nel Risorgimento italiano," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Apr.-Sept. 1954, 550-564.
- Porter, W. E., "The Influence of Italy's Communist-Bloc Dailies," *Journalism Qy.*, Fall 1954, 473-480.
- Vidal, César, "Studi francesi sul Risorgimento (1864-1870) (continuazione e fine)," *Rassegna Stor. del Risorgimento*, Oct.-Dec. 1953, 513-537.
- Zingarelli, Italo, "Hat Italien eine Aussenpolitik?" *Aussenpolitik*, Aug. 1954, 489-496.

NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST

- "Les Accords du 5 Août 1954 sur les Pétroles Iraniens," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère*, Nov. 1954, 720-724.
- Bechtoldt, Heinrich, "Alleingänger im Osten," *Aussenpolitik*, Aug. 1954, 519-524.
- Cook, R. C., "Israel: East Meets West," *Population Bull.*, Oct. 1954, 81-93.
- Davison, R. H., "Turkish Attitudes Concerning Christian-Muslim Equality in the Nineteenth Century," *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, July 1954, 844-864.
- Eisenstadt, S. N., "Le passage d'une société de pionniers à un État organisé: aspects de la sociologie politique d'Israël," *Rev. Française de Science Polit.*, July-Sept. 1954, 545-563.
- Fischel, W. J., "The Leaders of the Jews of Bokhara," *Jewish Leaders (1750-1940)*, 1953, 535-547.
- G. C. W., "Cyprus: The Closed Issue?" *World Today*, Sept. 1954, 372-380.
- Gil Benumeya, Rodolfo, "Siria en la actualidad árabe y en el próximo Oriente," *Política Intern.*, Apr.-June 1954, 67-73.
- Gokay, F. K., "Situation des Réfugiés en Turquie," *Integration*, 1, 1954, 13-20.

- Kaster, H. L., "Aussichten der ägyptischen Revolution," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 564-573.
- Pefkos, George, "Enosis—Cyprus' Road to Freedom," *Labour Monthly*, Nov. 1954, 510-515.
- Peretz, Don, "The Arab Refugee Dilemma," *For. Affs.*, Oct. 1954, 134-148.
- "La Question de Chypre," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère*, Nov. 1954, 725-732.
- Radovanovic, Ljuba, "La politique du traité d'Ankara," *Polit. Étrangère*, July 1954, 257-274.
- Schmidt, Ernst, "Die Innenpolitik der Türkei," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Nov. 1954, 652-658.
- Stock, Ernest, "The Press of Israel: Its Growth in Freedom," *Journalism Qy.*, Fall 1954, 481-490.
- "Le Triangle Belgrade—Athènes—Ankara: Du Traité d'Amitié et de Collaboration au Traité d'Alliance, de Coopération Politique et l'Assistance Mutuelle," *Chron. de Polit. Étrangère*, Nov. 1954, 707-719.

POLAND

- Birziska, Mykolas, "375th Anniversary of Vilnius University," *East & West*, 2, 1954, 55-63.
- Brock, Peter, "Zeno Świętosławski, a Polish Forerunner of the *Narodniki*," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 566-587.
- Daniel, Wolfram, "Danzig heute," *Osteuropa*, Aug. 1954, 267-275.
- Geilke, Georg, "Der Aufbau der polnischen Staatsverwaltung," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, III/3, 1954, 443-459.
- Hensel, Witold, "Les investigations sur l'origine de l'état polonais," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 394-439.
- J. P., "Partia komunistyczna w Polsce w świetle II Zjazdu PZPR," *Zagadnienia Polskie*, 1/1-2, 1954, 60-88.
- J. W., "'Polska Ludowa' w periodycznej prasie sowieckiej w 1953 roku," *Zagadnienia Polskie*, 1/1-2, 1954, 176-185.
- Jordan, Zbigniew, "Plan sześcioletni a rolnictwo," *Kultura*, Oct. 1954, 99-111.
- Kostrzewski, Józef, "Ze studiów nad wczesnym okresem żelaznym w Polsce," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 22-70.
- Kürbisówna, Brygida, "Kształtowanie się pojęć geograficznych o Słowiańszczyźnie w polskich kronikach przeddługoszkowych," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 252-282.
- Mackiewicz, Józef, "O pewnej, ostatniej próbie i zastrzelonym Bujnickim," *Kultura*, Nov. 1954, 81-95.
- "Przegląd wydarzeń za grudzień 1953 i I kwartał 1954," *Zagadnienia Polskie*, 1/1-2, 1954, 186-188.
- "Przyczynki i materiały do historii kampanii wrześniowej: I. Wyciąg z relacji mir S. Małeckiego o szarzy 18 p. uł. pod Korjantami, II. Przyczynek źródłowy do dywersji niemieckiej w kampanii wrześniowej 1939 roku," *Bellona*, July-Sept. 1954, 32-45.
- Rakowski, M., "O pogłębianiu pracy ekonomicznej nad planem pięcioletnim," *Gospodarka planowa*, Aug. 1954, 29-34.
- Regent, Andrzej, "Służba zdrowia w Polsce w cyfrach i w rzeczywistości," *Zagadnienia Polskie*, 1/1-2, 1954, 111-149.
- Rosdolsky, Rojan, "Die ostgalizische Dorfgemeinschaft und ihre Auflösung," *Vierteljahrsschrift f. Sozial- u. Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 41.2, 1954, 97-145.
- Sawczyński, A., "Epizod pod Wizną," *Bellona*, July-Sept. 1954, 11-24.
- Skrzypek, Stanisław, "Problem rolny w Polsce," *Zagadnienia Polskie*, 1/1-2, 1954, 10-59.
- Sułowski, Zygmunt, "Geografia dokumentu 'Dagome Iudex'," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 232-251.
- Vetulani, Adam, "Krakowska biblioteka katedralna w świetle swego inwentarza z roku 1110," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 163-192.
- Weintraub, Wiktor, "Kazimierz Nitsch," *Kultura*, Oct. 1954, 15-30.
- Wojciechowska, "Poziom nauczania w szkołach ogólnokształcących w Polsce," *Zagadnienia Polskie*, 1/1-2, 1954, 150-175.
- Zajązkowski, Stanisław, "W sprawie plemion Łęczycan i Sieradzan," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 71-94.
- Zaleski, Wojciech, "'Kombinat' śląski," *Kultura*, Oct. 1954, 68-76.
- Zbyszewski, W. A., "Rządy Pana Premiera," *Kultura*, Nov. 1954, 47-55.
- Ziółkowska, Hanna, "Ze studiów nad najstarszym targiem polskim," *Slavia Antiqua*, IV, 1953, 151-162.
- Zubrzycki, Jerzy, "Socjologia polskiej emigracji (dokończenie)," *Kultura*, Sept. 1954, 77-93.

RUSSIA AND THE UKRAINE

- "Academic Freedom in the U.S.S.R.," *Annals of Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in U.S.*, Spring 1954, 853-862.
- Backus, O. P., III, "Was Muscovite Russia Imperialistic?" *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 522-534.
- Bauer, R. A., "The Psycho-cultural Approach to Soviet Studies," *World Politics*, Oct. 1954, 119-132.
- Biehl, Max, "Binnenwanderungen in der Sowjetunion," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Nov. 1954, 677-684.
- Bilibin, I., "Religion in the U.S.S.R. Today," *Listener*, Sept. 2, 1954, 57-68.
- Birko, Petro, "Saline Soils of Southern Ukraine," *Annals of Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in U. S.*, Spring 1954, 838-852.
- Block, A., "Soviet Housing: Some Town Planning Problems," *Sov. Studies*, July 1954, 1-15.
- Cymbalistyj, Bohdan, "Existe un humanismo soviético?" *Oriente*, July-Sept. 1954, 161-168.
- Deutscher, Isaac, "The New Soviet Policy Toward the Satellites," *The Reporter*, Dec. 2, 1954, 17-20.
- Eudin, X. F., "Moscow's Views of American Imperialism," *Russian Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 276-284.
- F. F., "A Revival of Religious Feeling in the U.S.S.R.," *World Today*, Oct. 1954, 439-447.
- Farber, I. E., "O primenii norm sovetskogo sotsialisticheskogo prava," *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo*, 4, 1954, 15-26.
- Friedberg, Maurice, "Foreign Authors and Soviet Readers," *Russian Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 266-275.
- Gecys, C. C., "Freedom of Cultural Activities in the Soviet Union," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 275-285.
- Geyer, Dietrich, "Der Ausbau der sowjetischen Machtsphäre," *Zft. f. Geopolitik*, Nov. 1954, 667-676.
- Haroska, R. P. L., "Capítulos de la Pasión de la Iglesia Católica en Bielorrusia (continuación)," *Oriente*, Apr.-June 1954, 118-120.
- Holzman, F. D., "Soviet Economic Growth," *World Politics*, Oct. 1954, 133-156.
- Jelavich, Charles, "The Diary of D. A. Miliutin, 1878-1882," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.*, Sept. 1954, 255-259.
- Krypton, Constantine, "The Siege of Leningrad," *Russian Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 255-265.
- Krypton, Constantine, "Soviet Policy in the Northern National Regions after World War II," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 338-355.
- Lukas, J. A., "Russian Armies in Western Europe: 1799, 1814, 1917," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 319-337.
- Mayer, Wilhelm, "Der sowjetische Industrieroman," *Osteuropa*, Aug. 1954, 255-261.
- Montgomery, Arthur, "A Communist Death Sentence," *East & West*, 2, 1954, 17-21.
- Nove, A., "The USSR after the Death of Stalin," *Sov. Studies*, July 1954, 41-52.
- Nove, A., and R. D. Laird, "Kolkhoz Agriculture in the Moscow Oblast," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 549-565.
- Odarchenko, Petro, "The Struggle for Shevchenko," *Annals of Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in U. S.*, Spring 1954, 824-837.
- Ollero, C., "La organización constitucional del poder en la U.R.S.S. y Europa Central (cont.)," *Inofrmación jurídica*, July-Aug. 1954, 609-635.
- Osteneck, E. S., "Sport in der Sowjetunion," *Osteuropa*, Aug. 1954, 262-266.
- Pavlyuk, Mykhaylo, "Real Size of the Population of the USSR To-Day," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 286-293.
- Pelicon, Ivo, "Situation in Soviet Agriculture," *Rev. of Intern. Affs.*, Oct. 1, 1954, 21-23.
- Protsiuk, S. Y., "The Oil Industry of Ukraine," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 264-274.
- von Rauch, Georg, "Moskau und die europäischen Mächte des 17. Jahrhunderts," *Hist. Zft.*, Aug. 1954, 25-46.
- "La 'reconversion' de l'agriculture Soviétique," *Rev. de l'Institut de Sociologie*, 1, 1954, 5-40.
- Renning, Anatol, "What Makes the Soviets Thrive," *East & West*, 2, 1954, 22-27.
- Revay, Julian, "The March to Liberation of Carpatho-Ukraine," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 227-234.
- Sarkisyanz, E., "Russian Attitudes Toward Asia," *Russian Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 245-254.
- Schlesinger, R., "Soviet Law and Soviet Society," *Sov. Studies*, July 1954, 33-40.
- Smith, R. E. F., "The Amalgamation of Collective Farms: Some Technical Aspects," *Sov. Studies*, 16-32.

- "The Soviet Crossing of the Carpathians," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 213-218.
- "Soviet industrial planning for mobilization," *Automotive Industries*, Aug. 15, 1954, 53-63, 112-118.
- Stefan, Augustin, "Myths about Carpatho-Ukraine," *Ukrainian Qy.*, Summer 1954, 219-226.
- Streit, Peg, "On the Soviet-Turkish Border," *Freedom & Union*, Nov. 1954, 15-17.
- Taskin, G. A., "The Falling Level of the Caspian Sea in Relation to Soviet Economy," *Geogr. Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 508-527.
- Thaden, E. C., "The Beginnings of Romantic Nationalism in Russia," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 500-521.
- Timoshenko, Volodymyr, "M. I. Tuhon-Baranovsky and Western European Economic Thought," *Annals of Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in U. S.*, Spring 1954, 803-823.
- Towster, Julian, "The Soviet Union after Stalin: Leaders and Policies," *Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, Dec. 1954, 471-499.
- Tucker, R. C., "The Metamorphosis of the Stalin Myth," *World Politics*, Oct. 1954, 38-62.
- Tuhon-Baranovsky, Mykhaylo, "Periodic Industrial Crises," *Annals of Ukrainian Acad. of Arts & Sciences in the U. S.*, Spring 1954, 745-802.
- Warneck, P. A., "The Volga-Don Navigation Canal," *Russian Rev.*, Oct. 1954, 285-291.

YUGOSLAVIA

- A. J., "How Communism Influences Family Life in Yugoslavia," *Bull. of Intern. Peasant Union*, Sept. 1954, 9-13.
- Antoljak, Stjepan, "1848 godina i Split," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 119-144.
- Avakumovic, Ivan, "An Episode in the Continental System in the Illyrian Provinces," *Jl. of Econ. Hist.*, Summer 1954, 254-261.
- Bartoš, Milan, "Yugoslavia at the International Law Congress in Edinburgh," *Rev. of Intern. Affs.*, Oct. 1, 1954, 9-11.
- Bebler, Alex, "Jugoslawien, Europa und Deutschland," *Aussenpolitik*, Sept. 1954, 549-554.
- "El Clero Croata en la Defensa de su Patria," *Hrvatska Revija*, Sept. 1954, 217-226.
- Djordjević, Jovan, "Producers' Councils," *Rev. of Intern. Affs.*, Oct. 1, 1954, 17-19.
- Egić, O. P., "Oslobođelje Kolašnia 1943 godnie," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 68-75.
- Gligorov, K., "L'économie yougoslave en 1955," *Rev. de la Polit. Mondiale*, Sept. 1, 1954, 17-19.
- Hindels, J., "Djilas und die Lawine-Probleme der jugoslawischen Entwicklung," *Zukunft*, Aug. 1954, 210-215.
- Kovijanid, Risto, and Ivo Stjepčević, "Hajduci u Boki do Morejskog rata (1654-1684)," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 162-187.
- Krstajić, Pero, "Zakonodavstvo u NR Crnoj Gori (1942-46)," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 43-67.
- Mijnšković, Slavko, "Pleme Nikšići u Morejskom ratu (1684-1699)," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 1-42.
- Milošević, Miloš, "Pomen o Baju Pivljaninu u Državnom arhivu o Koturu (1684-1685)," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 188-210.
- Milović, Jevto, "Njegošev boravak u Beču 1836 i 1837 i njegov pokušaj da pođe u Pariz," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 76-118.
- Milutinović, Nikola, "Mihailo, Polit-Descaičić i Crna Gora," *Istoriski Zapisi*, X/1, 1954, 145-161.
- Weller, George, "The Almighty Independence of Tito's Yugoslavia," *The Reporter*, Oct. 7, 1954, 29-33.

DATE DUE
UIC Rec'd OCT 30 2015

No Renewal	
------------	--

PRINTED IN U.S.A.